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The idea of this study was bom in the late 1980s during the discussions on the 
developments in international economic law with Professors M.M.Boguslavsky, 
V.G.Butkevich, V.A.Vasilenko, G.M.Veljaminov, and most of all, with my University 
teacher, Professor I.I.Lukashuk, who inspired me to study international economic law
and supervised my Candidate of Law dissertation at Kiev University. After reading
1 2 the excellent monographs by P.VerLoren van Themaat and Palithba I.B.Kohona , I
became more convinced, th a t one of the dominant trends in the current international
economic law is the move from bilateralism to multilateralism in legal regulation,
th a t is primarily connected with the role played by the numerous international
economic organizations.
It was really my great fortune to get an opportunity for the research work at 
the European University Institute (Florence), where this paper was basically written 
under the patient and friendly supervision of Professor Antonio Cassese, to whom I 
would wish to address my warm thanks. The perfect technical and librarian facilities 
of the Institute, high professionalism and helpfulness of its teaching and 
administrative staff (in particular, Sandra Briere, Elvira Zaccardelli, Alison Tuck, 
Ursula Brose, Ken Hulley, Francoise Thauvin), as well as the intellectual atmosphere 
created by the researchers make it the best place for comparative studies in 
international economic law. Thanks to the Institute, I have got chances to visit the 
headquarters of UNCTAD, GATT, FAO, OECD, EBRD, and EEC, and this was extremely
1. P. VerLoren van Themaat. The Changing Structure of International Economic Law. 
Hague/Boston/London, 1981.
2. P.I.B. Kohona. The Regulation of International Economic Relations Through Law. - 
Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1985.
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important for the understanding of how international economic organizations 
practically work.
I owe a special debt to my colleagues and friends in Kiev University, who 
carried my teaching burden during the research period in Florence, and above all, to 
my wife and daughter for their patience, love and encouragement.
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PREFACE
This paper is intended to expose in what manner and forms international economic 
organizations (IEOs) participate in the two main stages of international legal 
process: law-making and law-implementation. Intensive development of international 
economic institutions in the post-Second World War period gave birth to a vast legal 
practice in this field, which has been examined in numerous juridical studies but 
still needs a generalized analysis. As E.-U. Petersmann rightly noted, " an 
explanatory ’theory of the law of international economic organizations’ based on 
comparative and systematic inquiries into the ’infrastructure’, objectives, basic 
legal norms, steering instruments, procedures, organs and activities of 
international organizations, could greatly contribute to the understanding and
3reform of the institutional framework of the world economy" . The same idea was 
stressed by P.van Dijk: "...a comparative analysis of these organization may lead 
to the formulation of certain general features of the law of international economic 
organizations as part of a general theory of international economic law, from which 
conclusions may be drawn as to the legal structure and contents of the existing 
international economic order and concerning the question of which changes are needed
Ato make it a more ju s t and equitable order which benefits all States" .
This study is not supposed to go into substantive problems of IEOs’ activities,
3. E.-U. Petersmann. International Economic Theory and International Economic Law: On the Tasks 
of a Legal Theory of International Economic Order. - In: The Structure and Process of International 
Law / Ed. by St.J.Mcdonald and D.M.Johnston. Hague, 1983, p. 258-259.
4. Supervisory Mechanisms in International Economic Organizations. P.van Dijk: General Editor. 
Deventer, Kluwer, 1984, p. XIX.
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neither to tackle all numerous institutional and legal issues . These matters will 
be touched only in so far as being related to law-making and law-implementation 
within the frameworks of IEOs. The subject-matter of the present inquiry necessarily 
deals with a lot of procedural and technical issues, as well as a number of 
quotations from various documents. It makes the author apologize for those parts of 
his presentation which will inevitably be somewhat diy. I hope that this shortcoming 
will be partially compensated by my efforts to focus the analysis on the legal
gfacets of IEOs which have not yet been comprehejisively examined .
* * *
The emergence of the early elements of institutional mechanism in economic
sphere dates back to the last century when the first administrative unions came into
being (1865 - the International Telegraphic Bureau, 1874 - the Universal Postal
7Union, 1875 - the Metric Union, 1886 - the International Copyright Union) . The 
general premises for this process were the formation of the world m arket andgincreasing internationalization of the economic life , which, however, did not
5. For instance, such essential facets of the IEOs’ legal existence as privileges and immunities, 
legal responsibility, withdrawal from membership, etc. are basically beyond the scope of the 
present paper.
6. Some parts of the present study were published in: S.A.Voitovich. Normative Acts of the 
International Economic Organizations in International Law-Making. - In: 24 JWT 4 (1990) 21-38;
S.A.Voitovich. The Law-Implementing Functions of International Economic Organizations. - In: GYIL 
34 (1991), p. 230-253; S.A.Voitovich. The Concept and Classification of the International Economic 
Organizations as the Subjects of International Law. - In: Gosudarstvo i pravo, 1992, N5 (in 
Russian); S.A.Voitovich. Legitimacy of the Use of Economic Force in International Relations: 
Conditions and Limits. - In: World Competition, June 1992, vol. 15, N 4, p. 27-36.
7. See more details in: G.I.Mangone. A Short History of International Organization. Westpoint, 
1975, p. 67-97.
8. F.Moravetsky. The Functions of International Organization. Moscow, 1976, p. 41 (in Russian).
All the titles and quotations have been translated from Russian by the author of the present
paper.
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appear to suffice the establishment of a comprehensive institutional mechanism for 
economic cooperation in th a t period. Practically, up to the time when the UN system 
was formed, only separate fragments of such mechanism had existed ( e.g. the League 
of Nations, the Genoa Conference of 1922, the Geneva Conference of 1927, the London 
Conference of 1933, the first commodity organs, and some others). The scope and 
intensity of international economic relations of that time determined their mainly 
bilateral treaty regulation to be sufficient for ensuring individual economic 
interests of interacting States. The attem pts for m ultilateral cooperation in the 
economic field did not give any considerable effect. However, under the influence of 
the world economic crisis of 1929-1933 which showed the danger of free-market 
anarchy and trade wars, the idea of global IEOs started to conquer the minds of9scholars and politicians .
In the post-war time the international community faced the new realities, which 
led to increasing economic interdependence of States. A coherent institutional 
mechanism started to be formed, first, at the global level, primarily within the 
framework of the UN system. The initial steps towards the establishment of 
m ultilateral regulation of trade and finance were inspired by the USA, the most 
powerful State of th a t time, which planned to use a shift from protectionism to 
liberalization in international economic relations for its economic expansion on a 
world s c a le d  The European States, whose economies heavily suffered during the 
war, had nothing to do but support the US efforts in order to use foreign capitals 
for their economic restoration. Under those conditions, the first global IEOs ( the 
IMF, the IBRD, the GATT, the FAO) emerged.
9. See G.Anulova. The IMF and IBRD in the World Economy: a view from new positions. - In: World 
Economy and International Relations, 1990, N l, p. I l l  (in Russian);
10. See A.Cassese. International Law in a Divided World. Oxford, 1986, p.325.
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In 1950s-1990s the new factors, such as scientific and technical revolution, 
decolonization, regional economic integration, global economic problems (New 
International Economic Order, international economic security, energetic and food 
problems, etc.), as well as the radical reforms in Eastern and Central Europe, gave 
more weight to the necessity of institutional instrum ents and caused a considerable 
rise of global and regional IEOs. At present, together with States they are the main 
actors affecting the state and developments of the international economic order ̂  \
It should be noted, tha t unlike political and some specialized institutions of 
the UN system, the first global economic, organizations initially caused a 
restrained, not to say reluctant, attitude of the USSR. The Soviet holding aloof was 
determined by two main considerations: ( l ) a  simplified view, tha t market-oriented 
IEOs are useless for a planned-economy State; (2) a fear of being debarred from 
active decision-making by an overwhelming majority of the W estern Member States. 
Things had changed by the mid-80s. The Soviet economy of the "perestroika" period 
(1985-1991) was trying to tu rn  its face towards m arket on both national and 
international scales, and this inevitably raised the question of membership of the 
global IEOs. This trend obtained stronger incentives in the new independent States 
tha t have emerged within the borders of the former Soviet Union after its dramatic 
dissolution in the late 1991. Their economies, confronting the exigency of economic 
survival and gradual adjustm ent to the m arket economy conditions, make pressing 
demands for deeper integration into the world economy th a t is unthinkable now 
without broad participation in the world-wide and regional IEOs.
* * *
11. This statement does not mean an underestimation of multinational corporations as another 
protagonist of international economic scenarios, which basically operate at the non-in terstate 
level, and therefore are intentionally left out of consideration.
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In this paper the term  "IEOs" is used in a broad sense, for denoting all
intergovernmental organizations dealing prevailingly (or considerably in the case of
international organizations of general competence) with international economic
problems. Since practically every international organization one way or another
touches financial and other economic issues in its activity, the stress is made here
on the prevailing or considerable involvement of an IEO in the coordination of the
Member States’ economic policies. Such approach narrows to certain extent the
applied notion of IEOs, although, its margins may be arguable. In general, the
12distinction between the IEOs as a functional category and other international 
organizations is made for concentrating on the institutional foundation of the 
international economic order and the impact of intensifying institutionalization on 
international economic law.
The author does not pretend to compete with extensive literature on individual 
IEOs, on which he strongly relied doing his study. The latter’s purpose is basically 
considered as comparative analysis and generalization in order to see some common 
"wood" behind the individual "trees".
Apparently, it is hardly possible to embrace all numerous IEOs in one 
comparatively short inquiry. For this reason, the present writer intentionally 
leaves out of consideration such well-examined specialized organizations partly 
involved into economic problems, as the ILO, the ICAO, the WHO and some others. 
Several IEOs have not been covered by the analysis due to the lack of available 
information on them. Nonetheless, this study is based on the normative instruments 
and accessible elements of practice of about fifty organizations.
The author is aware of certain limits of his academic study which is not a result 
of personal experience, but of the outside observation of the IEOs. A great deal of
12. See Stephen Zamora. Voting in International Economic Organizations. - In: AJIL, 1980, vol. 74, 
No 3, p. 568.
17
internal mechanisms of the IEOs’ law-making and law-implementation has been 
inevitably hidden from the author’s view.
In sum, the present inquiry modestly continues the efforts of P.van Dijk, 
P.I.B.Kohona,E.U.Petersmann,I.Seidl-Hohenveldem,P.VerlorenvanThemaatandmany 
other scholars to contribute to the legal theory of IEOs, leaving, in turn, enough 
space for the following researchers, and, hopefully, making their work somewhat 
easier.
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FIRST PART: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS
CHAPTER I. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGULATION IN 
THE ECONOMIC FIELD: GENERAL FEATURES
This Chapter gives a general outline of international legal regulation of 
economic relations, th a t is the field where IEOs act as international legal persons.
1. International Economic Relations as the Object of Regulation
The object of regulation is likely to be a starting point for juridical analysis
in any field, since the efficiency of legal instrum ents perceptibly depends on how
the law-makers realize the character of the social relationships they intend to
rule. As I.I.Lukashuk writes, "the object of international legal regulation plays a
decisive role in everything relating to the character of regulation, its objectives
13and principles, methods and means"
In general view, the object of legal regulation may be defined as the social
relationships which are directly ruled by the subjects of law by virtue of legal
instruments. Three basic components of any system of legal regulation can be
observed in this definition: (1) the subjects of law; (2) certain social
relationships as the object of law; (3) the complex of legal means applied by the
14subjects (i.e. the mechanism of legal regulation) These components are 
functionally interconnected through two main phases of legal process: law-making and
13. I.I.Lukashuk. International Legal Regulation of International Relations. Moscow, 1975, p. 9 
(in Russian).
14. See I.I.Lukashuk. The Mechanism of International Legal Regulation. Kiev, 1980 (in Russian).
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law-implementation (each of them contains a number of sub-phases). Such general 
scheme works in both municipal and international laws, having, along with common 
features, some notable peculiarities in each of them.
W hat sort of relationships does belong to the object of international economic 
law (IEL)? A traditional answer is as simple as: international economic relations. 
However, more complicated is to describe this phenomenon through the prism of law. 
Here the term  "economic" reveals the substantive character of the IEL object, while 
the term "international" indicates the sphere covered by it and the circle of the 
involved subjects.
From a substantive viewpoint, international economic relations have its 
objective foundation in the international division of labour, which means that 
national economies are specialized in the domestic production of certain goods with 
their further international exchange. International economic relations cover a large 
scope of m atters, inter alia trade, monetary and financial issues, investments, 
scientific and technological cooperation, transports and communications, industrial 
and agricultural co-operation, taxation, services, etc. By intensity, they vary from 
episodic economic contacts to elaborate integration systems.
From a viewpoint of the subjects involved, two levels of international economic 
relations should be borne in mind:
(a) an interstate or organization-state level covering the relationships among the 
traditional subjects of international law: and .
(b) a level of nationals (individuals and legal persons) belonging to different 
S tates.
The interstate level deals with co-ordination of economic policies, elaboration 
of guidelines and mechanisms for international economic co-operation. In other 
words, interstate relations in the economic field are more political than properly 
economic. Meanwhile, direct economic interactions on production and exchange of 
goods are executed at the level of nationals. As R.Ostrihansky stresses, "it is not
20
governments, but enterprises and individuals, who make most economic decisions" 
Hence, it is quite evident tha t international economic relations as a whole can not 
be regulated isolatedly either by IEL or municipal economic laws. In this sphere 
close interrelationship between international and national laws is inevitable.
In connection with this, one might rightly ask, whether non-interstate 
international relations (with participation of nationals) belong to the object of 
IEL. In most cases these relations are not directly ruled by IEL. Despite the fact 
th a t many IEL norms are addressed to the nationals, strictly speaking, most of them 
regulate directly the relevant interstate relations concerning the application of 
the uniform rules to the nationals by virtue of the appropriate municipal law 
procedures (e.g. the unification conventions). However, the rule-making practice of 
the EEC gives the examples of direct application of international legal acts to the 
nationals of the Member States.
Hence, there should be a certain flexibility in the approach to the subjects and 
object of IEL as regards nationals and relationships with their participation. The 
present-day practice - the only proper guide - witnesses that interstate economic 
relations make up the prevailing part of the object of IEL, although, in some cases 
non-interstate relations are also directly regulated by its rules. W hat is the 
circle of international legal persons and what types of relationships are within the 
object of international legal regulation depends on the descretion of States th a t 
are the principal destinators of international law. States have created 
international organizations as the new subjects of international law, and nobody can 
hinder them to endow other actors, including nationals, with a special international 
legal personality, if it deems to be necessary. Another point is tha t it is doubtful
15. R.Ostrihansky. Settlement of Interstate Trade Disputes - The Role of Law and Legal Procedures.
- In: NYIL 1991, vol. XXII, The Hague, 1992, p.174-175.
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to expect th a t States would ever make nationals, which are juridically subordinated 
to them, the full-fledged international legal persons.
The deepest roots of each legal phenomenon are hidden inside the object of 
regulation. How international economic relations influence the character of legal 
process in the economic field mav be traced in a number of wavs:
(1) Why does IEL appear to be one of the largest branches of public 
international law as regards the amount of norms? Why are the types of international 
economic agreements so diverse? The answers to these questions can be found in the 
peculiarities of the existing international economic relations. The variety of 
spheres and forms of the States’ foreign economic activities, as well as their high 
intensity and, most of all, the vital importance for the interacting subjects 
determine the complicated system of regulatory means, the immense amount of IEL 
norms, the multiplicity of the types of international economic agreements.
(2) Why do international economic relations seem to be the most 
institutionalized sphere of international life? The answer lies in the character of 
international economic cooperation. Its growing intensity and complication have 
caused the emergence of numerous international economic institutions, whose number 
is constantly growing up. The individual or bilateral S tate’s efforts are no longer 
sufficient to cope with the intricate international economic issues. On the other 
hand, the cycles of the institutionalization process are very sensible to the 
changing economic environment, which may entail the dissolution of even seemingly 
homogeneous IEOs. The notable examples are the 1977 collapse of the EAC because of 
the hard clashes among the Member States, and the 1991 dissolution of the CMEA, 
whose methods and forms of operation could no longer match the new socio-economic 
exigencies.
(3) International economic relations are known for their high dynamics. Economic 
situations, models and scenarios change ra ther quickly. This demands adequate 
renovations of IEL rules according to the changing practical needs, stim ulates the
22
intensity of operative decision-making by virtue of IEOs. That is why most special 
IEL rules have a short- and medium-term character, while the long-term norms are of 
prevailingly general contents.
(4) Why for centuries has IEL been developing as a conglomerate of predominantly 
bilateral rules, while the recent decades have seen a considerable shift to 
multilateralism on regional, interregional and world-wide levels? The answer can be 
found in the character of the States’ economic interests that are protected by IEL 
rules. Unlike, for instance, international space law, where the global interests 
dominate over or coincide with the individual interests of States, the rules of IEL 
are aimed at ensuring, firstly, individual economic interests, secondly, the group 
(subregional, regional, interregional) economic interests, and only thirdly, the 
global economic interests.
(5) Sophisticated economic issues, that are often connected with quantitative 
parameters, make specific requirements to the formal requisites of IEL norms. The 
need for clear and precise rules for economic conduct make a treaty and, last time, 
the IEOs’ binding decisions primary sources of IEL, while a custom plays more 
limited, secondary role in this legal branch.
On the other hand, conflicting economic self-interests of the interacting 
States, due to the differences in their starting economic positions and 
opportunities, often lead to the lack of a real consent resulting in numerous 
drawbacks in both law-making and law-implementation in IEL.
(6) How the IEL rules are executed strongly depends on existing international 
economic and political climate. The Cold W ar period was known for the abuse of 
economic force as a regular economic and political behaviour of many States. 
Institutional and legal mechanisms, whatever sophisticated they were, failed to 
realize their potential because of the controversies between West and East, North 
and South. By now, the decisive changes in international life at the late 1980s and
23
early 1990s have encouraged more optimism for effective law-oriented world economic 
order.
Of course, this does not mean that IEL passively reflects the developments in
international economic relations. It makes considerable back impact on its object
16discharging, according to G.I.Tunkin, "stabilizing and creative functions” . IEL 
does not only fix a certain level of requirements to international economic 
relations, but actively influences the changes and developments in its object.
2. International Economic Law:
Concept. Structure. Principles
2.1. Concept of International Economic Law
The analysis of extensive literature on IEL highlights two basic approaches to
17its concept as regards the normative composition of this legal branch
(1). Some authors consider the law regulating international economic relations a 
mixed branch comprising the norms of international public law, international private 
law and the rules of national legal systems. E.-U.Petersmann writes in connection 
with this: "IEL still presents itself as a conglomerate of private law (including 
’law m erchant’ and ’transnational commercial law’), state law (including ’conflict 
of laws’) and public international law (including supranational integration law as 
in the EEC) with a bewildering variety of m ultilateral and bilateral treaties, 
executive agreements, ’secondary law’ enacted by international organizations,
16. See Course of International Law. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1989, p. 152 (in Russian).
17. See numerous definitions of IEL in: H.Fox. The Definition and Sources of International 
Economic Law. - In: International Economic Law and Developing States. An Introduction. Ed. by Hazel 
Fox, L., British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1992, p. 12-15.
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’gentlemen’s agreements’, central bank arrangements, declarations of principles, 
resolutions, recommendations, customary law, general principles of law, de-facto 
orders, parliam entary acts, governments degrees, juridical decisions, private 
contracts or commercial usages"
The other constructions of mixed legal branches were termed by their authors as
19 20"the law of international trade" , "international trade law" , "the law of
21 22 international economic relations" , "international monetary law" , etc.
In fact, as it has been above noted, international and municipal laws are
closely interrelated in the economic field due to the inseparability of the economic
m atters they deal with. That is why a complex approach to legal regulation of
international economic relations can not be seriously challenged. To quote
P.Verloren van Themaat, "international economic law should meet the requirements of
the infrastructure of national economic policies and national economic 
23law" However, stricto sensu. a branch of law is "the totality of the single-system 
24norms" . The norms of international and municipal legal systems differ by their
18. E.-U-Petersmann. International Economic Theory and International Economic Law: on the Tasks of 
a Legal Theory of International Economic Order, p.251. See also R.Durovic. Medunarodno Privredno 
Pravo, Beograd, 1977, p. 3-5,11-12; J.Gilas. Problems of Methodology in International Economic Law.
- In: Polish Yearbook of International Law 1984, Wroclaw, 1985, p. 79.
19. See J.-D.Bredin. Droit du commerce international. P., 1969.
20. See V.I.Menzhinsky, I.V.Shapovalov. Working out the Legal Principles of International Trade 
Cooperation in the United Nations. - In: Pravovedenie, 1969, N 3 <in Russian).
21. See F.Madl. The Law of International Economic Relations. - In: Annales Universitatis 
Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eotvos Nominatae, Sectio jurídica, Budapest, vol. XX, 1978.
22. See A.B.Altshuler. International Monetary Law. Moscow, 1984 (in Russian).
23. P.Verloren van Themaat. Op. cit., p. 16.
24. G.V.Ignatenko. International and Soviet Laws: the Problems of Interrelation of Legal Systems.
- In: Sovetskoye gosudarstvo i pravo, 1985, N 1, p. 78 (in Russian).
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nature, modes of creation, subjects, objects and methods of regulation. Therefore,
it would be methodologically incorrect to unite them into a "mixed" branch of 
25law . It seems to be more reasonable to speak about the complex of legal
26regulation of international economic relations__ comprising IEL (as the branch of
international public law) and relevant municipal legal branches. Within this
complex, the rules of different legal nature interrelate by virtue of various
procedural means (implementation, incorporation, reference, unification, etc.).
Being less important from the practical viewpoint, such distinction between a legal
branch as a single-system normative entity and a legal complex as a multi-svstem
conglomerate of norms seems to be theoretically noteworthy.
(2). By now, the concept of IEL as a branch of international public law has been
27perfectly proved and broadly shared in the legal doctrine . IEL possesses the same 
branch-making features as those of international maritime law, diplomatic law and
25. G.Schwarzenberger suggesting his considerations in favour of public IEL pointed out a common 
drawback of the "mixed" approaches: "they fail to comply with the, admittedly, rigorous test by 
which any legal discipline or branch of a such discipline must be judged: assuming a minimum of 
functional unity, can it count as its own a sufficient number of special legal rules and 
principles?" (G.Schwarzenberger. The Principles and Standards of International Economic Law. - In: 
Recueil des Cours, 1966-1, vol. 117, p. 7).
26. See B.I.Kucher. The Characteristics of Legal Regulation of International Economic Relations. - 
In: Vestnik of Kiev University. International Relations and International Law, 1981, vol. 13 (in 
Russian).
27. See G.Schwarzenberger. Economic World Order? A Basic Problem of International Economic Law. 
Manchhester University Press, 1970, p. 4; P.VerLoren van Themaat. The Changing Structure of 
International Economic Law. Hague/Boston/London, 1981, p. 9; B.M.Ashavsky. On the Problems of 
International Economic Law. - In: Soviet Yearbook of International Law 1984, Moscow, 1986 (in 
Russian); M.M.Boguslavsky. International Economic Law. Moscow, 1986 (in Russian); I.Seidl- 
Hohrenveldem. International Economic law. General Course of Public International Law. - In:
Recueil des Cours, 1986-III, vol. 198, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1987, p. 21; S.A.Voitovich.
International Economic Law: Concept, Structure, Specific Features (the Soviet Point of View). - In:
Jus Gentium -Kansainoikeus, Finland, 1987, N 3-4; G.Theodoropoulos. The Development of 
International Economic Law in the Context of Cooperation among States with Different Levels of 
Economic Development.- In: Indian Journal of International Law, 1988, N 1; The Course of 
International Law, vol.4, ed. by I.I.Lukashuk, Moscow, 1990, p. 211-265 (in Russian).
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other traditional branches. These are: (1) specific object of regulation
(international economic relations). (2) voluminous normative material. (3) special 
principles, and (4) ramified structure.
Thus, IEL may be briefly defined as a system of norms of public international 
law regulating international economic relations of prevailingly interstate 
character.
2.2. Structure of International Economic Law
IEL has a relatively complicated composition which reflects the structure of
international economic relations it regulates. From the viewpoint of genesis,
international trade was the first form of international economic ties. Hence, IEL
has emerged as commercial law. At the first stage it consisted of the ancient
primitive commercial customs and usages applied in different trading markets and
ports, as well as of some commercial provisions included from time to time into
ancient and medieval interstate treaties. In the 1 7 - 1 9  centuries it took the shape
of international lex mercatoria which was strongly influenced by the national codes
28of commerce of the primary trading nations . Nowadays, the numerous norms
29governing international trade constitute a considerable part of IEL . Therefore, 
it is understandable why some commentators considered international trade law a
28. See C.M.Schmitthoffs Selected Essays on International Trade Law. Ed. by Chia-Jui Cheng. 
Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1988, p. IX.
29. E.-U. Petersmann notes that "hardly any other area of the international economy has such a 
detailed national, regional and worldwide international legal framework as foreign trade" (E.- 
U.Petersmann. Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic Law. 
Fribourg, 1991, p. 17).
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separate branch of public international law . However, the present-day
international economic cooperation can not be confined to trade. Industrial,
investment, financial, transport, scientific and other varieties of international
economic relations are intensively developing now, and on this basis the relevant
sub-divisions of IEL are gradually forming up.
Trying to describe the structure of IEL and its relationships with other
components of international law one should bear in mind the prior attem pts made for
this purpose in the legal writings. Thus, B.M.Ashavsky distinguished international
trade law and international financial law as traditional subbranches of IEL from its
newly forming sub-branches, inter alia the law of scientific and technical 
31cooperation . In turn, M.M.Boguslavsky held the view, that international taxation
law in addition to trade law and financial law, are subbranches of IEL. He also
mentioned the law of IEOs and separate complexes of rules regulating industrial
cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation, transfer of technology,
investments, joint economic activities, peaceful settlem ent of international
economic disputes, prohibition of trade war and economic blockade, unlawful economic
32"sanctions" and other measures of economic coercion
2.2.1. Structural Sub-divisions of International Economic Law
The analysis of normative contents of IEL gives grounds to distinguish its 
following basic structural units: (1) sub-branches, (2) normative institu tes, (3) 
International economic development law, and (3) law of IEOs.
30. See G.M.Veljaminov. Legal Regulation of International Trade. Moscow, 1972, p. 16; 
V.I.Lisovsky. International Trade and Financial Law. Moscow, 1974, p. 3 (both in Russian).
31. B.M.Ashavsky. Op. cit., p. 44.
32. M.M.Boguslavsky. Op. cit., p. 43-44.
28
(a) Sub-branches
Sub-branches may be termed as the large bodies of norms regulating certain basic 
varieties of international economic relations. From this viewpoint, the most 
developed sub-branches of the present-day IEL are: international trade law. 
international financial law, international investment law, and international 
transport law. Certainly, these sub-branches do not have strict margins and deeply 
interpenetrate due to the close interrelationships between international economic 
issues they deal with. Trade, finance, investments, and transport can not be 
isolated from each other in the up-to-date international economic life and this is 
reflected in many normative acts, which simultaneously contain the rules relating 
to commercial, monetary, investment, and communication matters.
(b) Normative institutes
Normative institutes comprise the rules of a common function which operate in 
one or several sub-branches. For instance, the norms of the most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) institute relate to trade, financial, investment matters, etc. The same can be 
said about a relatively new institute of economic preferences for developing 
countries, comprising some customary legal rules and a number of treaty norms (e.g. 
the rules of the GATT, the Lome Conventions, etc.). The group of norms prohibiting 
or restricting certain forms of economic coercion, discrimination, dumping, etc. 
makes up another institute, th a t might be termed as "the institute of international 
economic security". This list of normative institutes of IEL is not exhaustive. 
Other relatively compact groups of the rules of common function may be classified 
within IEL.
(c) International economic development law
29
Speaking about the structure of IEL one should not miss the concept of
"international economic development law", once put forward by W. Friedmann and since
shared by many other authors using more often the term s "international development
33law" or "international law of development" . W.Friedmann considered international
economic development law as "a body of principles determining the legal
relationships of developing countries with foreign investors, and with national or
34international public development aid institutions"
Some commentators from developing countries trea t "international development
law", which embraces the norms relating to the State sovereignty over natural
resources, trade preferences and other aspects of the New International Economic
35Order, as an antithesis to classical IEL
However, it seems better to share the view of those scholars who consider
36international economic development law an integral part of IEL , though the
margins of this specific subdivision are not easily outlined. One of the most active
supporters of the international development law M.Bulajic stresses that it "has
emerged as part of universal international law... It is by nature a transitional
37body of law and its purpose is to establish the NIEO” . To put it another way,
33. See W.Friedmann. The Changing Structure of International Law. N.Y., 1964, p. 374; O.B.Rivero. 
New International Economic Order and International Development Law. Mexico, 1980, p. 141; 
M.L.Entin. International Law of Development: the Problems of Establishment and Realization. - In: 
Sovetskoje gosudarstvo i pravo, 1985,N 2, p. 139-144 (in Russian); International Law of 
Development: Comparative Prospectives. Ed. by Francis Snyder & Peter Slinn. Abingdon, 1987.
34. W.Friedmann. Op. cit., p. 374.
35. See O.B. Rivero. New International Economic Order and International Development Law. Mexico, 
1980, p. 141.
36. See J.Gilas. Op. cit., p. 93.
37. M.Bulajic. A Changing World Calls for International Development Law. - In: Legal Issues in 
International Trade, ed. by Petar Sarcevic and Hans van Houtte, London/Dordrecht/Boston, 1990, p.
5.
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this is a "goal-oriented" character of international economic development law
that specifies its structural position within general IEL. Proceeding from such
assumption, the concept of international economic development law may be
successfully evolved only in line with strengthening and improvement of existing
general IEL, since the development-oriented rules can be found in all traditional
subbranches and institutes of IEL. As M.M.Boguslavsky pointed out, "the
interrelation between the principles and norms of the NIEO and the principles and
39norms of IEL is the interrelation of a part and a whole"
(d) Law of International Economic Organizations
A special attention should be paid to the structural position of what is called 
"the law oflEOs".
The idea of an autonomous legal system created by an individual international
40organization has been reasonably suggested in the legal literature . There is also 
broad agreement among the international lawyers about the existence of the law of 
European Communities, the law of GATT and of some other IEOs. One can hardly 
challenge the fact tha t each particular IEO has its individual legal system 
comprising its constituent instrum ents and subsequent legal acts. A legal system of 
any IEO consists of two parts: (1) the so-called "internal law" of the organization
38. See: P. Slinn. Differing Approaches to the Relationship between International Law and 
Development. - In: International Law of Development: Comparative Prospective,p. 32.
39. M.M.Boguslavsky. Op. cit., p. 29.
40. See M. Sorensen. Autonomous Legal Orders: Some Considerations Relating to a System Analysis of 
International Organizations in the World Legal Order. - In: ICLQ, 1983, Part 3.
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dealing prevailingly with procedural, administrative and budgetary issues ; (2) 
substantive rules of conduct for the IEO and its Member States. However, the margins 
between the "internal" or prevailingly procedural law of an IEO and its substantive 
law cannot always be easily outlined, since the ’internal* rules may have an 
’external’ effect.
There is more risk to suggest th a t a "general part" of the law of IEOs is
emerging along with their individual legal systems. E.-U.Petersmann seems to be too
categorical saying: " There is no "general law" of international economic
, 42organizations; each organization has its own legal system" . Obviously, most 
fundamental issues of the existence and operation of each particular IEO are 
regulated by its own legal system. However, certain general rules relating to all 
IEOs and even to all intergovernmental organizations are gradually crystallizing 
from the common practice of international organizations. These are, for example, the 
rules codified in the 1986 Vienna Convention on Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations, the customary 
rules saying tha t the obligations of an international organization are distinct from 
those of the members, or tha t an international organization may not intervene into 
the competence of their Member States without their voluntarily expressed consent, 
etc. Apart from this, there are hundreds of rules of inter*IEOs agreements, as well 
as of the agreements between IEOs and other organizations and States, which go 
beyond the scope of the individual IEOs’ legal systems. Therefore, as a sectoral
41. On the ’internal’ law of an organization see: H.G.Schermers. International Institutional Law. 
Leiden, 1980, p. 585-597; Ph.Cahier. L’ordre juriduque interne des organisations internationales. -
In: A Handbook of International Organizations. Ed. by Rene-Jean Dupuy. Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 
1988, p. 237-257.
42. E.-U.Petersmann. Economic Organizations and Groups, International, p. 165. See also P.Verloren 
van Themaat. Op. cit., p. 29.
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sub-division of a more capacious international institutional law , the law of IEOs 
may be treated as a large, ra ther heterogeneous body of law dealing with IEOs, and 
comprising:
(1) numerous legal systems of individual IEOs ( each consisting of the "internal"
(prevailingly procedural) and substantive law of an IEO);
44(2) rules of inter-IEOs agreements ;
(3) general treaty  and customary rules (however few these may be) applicable to all 
IEOs.
Obviously, the suggested concept of the law of IEOs is not a result of a 
practical codification of the relevant legal rules. Any codification attem pts within 
this body of law might be taken only in some narrow limits (by analogy to the 1986 
Vienna Convention), since the individual IEOs’ legal systems are likely to remain of 
primary importance compared to general and inter-IEOs rules. However, there are both 
theoretical and practical arguments in favour of the "law of IEOs" concept.
The law of IEOs differs from the traditional branches of public international 
law. It occupies a specific inter-branch structural position being simultaneously a
43. More than thirty years ago Alexandrowicz wrote that, though the law of international 
organizations "has not grown to the level of a separate and self-contained discipline, a special 
place deserves to be (and in fact has been) assigned to it in the general framework of 
international law. The two most important parts of this new sub-discipline deal with the internal 
law of international organizations and with their contributions to the generation or strengthening 
of lasting principles or rules of international law capable of existence independently of their 
temporary treaty bases" (C.H.Alexandrowicz. World Economic Agencies. Law and Practice. L., 1962, p. 
302).
In turn, to quote Schwarzenberger, "...it appears safe to state that the Law of International 
Institutions has attained a functional and normative unity of its own. This justifies its claim as 
a distinct branch of international law" (Georg Schwarzenberger. International law As Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals. Vol. III. International Constitutional Law. L., 1976, p. 115).
It was noted during a discussion in the ILC that for the time being the law of international 
organizations as a "new branch of international law was in its infancy" (Yearbook of the ILC 1983. 
Vol.I, p. 247).
44. Certain intermediary position, as regards the law of IEOs and other subdivisions of 
international law, is occupied by the rules of agreements between IEOs and other subjects of 
international law.
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part of international institutional law and IEL (as a segment of the two 
intersecting circles). This is a logical argument proving tha t the law of IEOs is 
not an abstract construction, as it may seem at first sight, but a concept 
reflecting certain real phenomenon. Without this concept it would be difficult to 
define a structural position of the hundreds of legal rules dealing with IEOs within 
the system of public international law. As these rules apparently belong to both 
international institutional law and IEL, and may be graphically depicted as a 
segment of the two intersecting circles, then it is logical to suggest tha t this 
segment highlights a relatively autonomous inter-branch body of law which deserves 
its identification as the law of IEOs.
Along with this quite formal argument, a more substantial consideration in 
favour of the concept of the emerging law of IEOs is the functional need to 
distinguish within IEL a voluminous body of legal rules which set up the 
institutional framework for the world economic order. These rules, however diverse 
they may be from one organization to another, have much in common (e.g. mode of 
creation, addressees, contents, implementing peculiarities), tha t justifies treating 
them as a relatively autonomous body of law, as well as a special legal sub­
discipline within a more general course of IEL.
Moreover, the phenomenon described by E. Lauterpacht as "crossfertilization" of
constitutions and used as an argument in favour of a "common law of international 
45organizations" may be well applied to its integral part - the law of IEOs. To put 
in a wider context, the commonality of individual legal systems of various IEOs is 
taken into account in a number of ways in the process of rule-making, interpretation 
and application within each of them. For example, the constitutional acts of
45. E. Lauterpacht. The Development of the Law of International Organization by the Decisions of
International
Tribunals. - In: Recueil des Cours, 1976-IV, vol. 153, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1980, p. 396.
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comparable IEOs, like the UN specialized economic agencies, international commodity
organizations, organizations of producers and exporters, are drafted under similar
models with a m utual account of useful innovations. This can be illustrated by the
unsuccessful experience of the International Tin Council in 1985 which forced the
Member States of some other international commodity organizations to narrow the
46financial and contractual competence of these institutions . On the other hand, if 
an analogy with the International Tin Council case emerges with regard to any other 
international commodity organization, the precedent experience of the interpretation 
and application of the constitutional rules might be applied to a similar case. 
These examples demonstrate the existence of certain functional law-making and law- 
implementing links between comparable legal systems of individual IEOs.
Finally, the problem of compatibility, competitiveness and conflicts between the 
individual IEO’s legal systems, which inevitably emerges, for example, in the 
relationships between the "umbrella" and subregional IEOs in Africa and Latin 
America, as well as between the GATT law and the legal orders of regional 
integrational organizations (e.g. the EEC), gives more weight to the complex 
approach towards the law of IEOs.
2.2.2. Structural Position of International Economic Law 
in the System of Public International Law
IEL has a developed structure of links with other branches and normative 
institutes of public international law. Thus, the law of treaties regulates the 
conclusion, operation and termination of international economic agreements. The 
institute of peaceful settlement of international disputes deals with the use of 
procedural means of resolving international disputes in the economic field. The
46. See Chapter VII 2.2.
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institute of legal succession relates to international economic treaties, State 
property and international debts. The institute of international legal 
responsibility covers inter alia the responsibility for breaches of IEL rules. IEL 
also closely interrelates to international maritime law in the m atters of 
exploration and exploiting of the sea-bed resources, fishering, navigation. Some
other rules of international law that, using Zamora’s expression "carry indirect
„47 48economic implications" , can be found in international environmental law ,
international air law, international space law, etc. Therefore, economic aspects
naturally penetrate into practically all spheres of interstate relationships giving
IEL a somewhat specific "piercing" structural position in the system of public
international law.
2.3. Principles of International Economic Law
It may appear strange, but the sets of principles of IEL considered by many
authors who have written on this subject never completely coincided. And even two
collectively produced documents (the UNITAR study on the Progressive Development of
the Principles and Norms of International Law relating to the New International
49Economic Order of 1984 and the Seul Declaration of the International Law
47. See Stephen Zamora. Is There Customary International Economic Law. - In: GYIL 1989, Vol. 32, 
B., 1990, p. 15.
48. For the links between international trade law and international ecological law see: E.- 
U.Petersmann. International Trade Law and International Ecological Law - Prevention and Settlement 
of International Disputes in GATT. - In: 27 J.W.T.l (1993), 43-81.
49. The UNITAR study identifies the three principles of international law relating to the NIEO 
within the ambit of the fundamental principle of sovereign equality: (1) the right of States to
(Footnote continues on next page)
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Association of 1986 ), which are worth the highest appreciation, suggest somewhat
different lists of the relevant principles. An explanation to this may be found in 
the fact tha t the principles of I EL, having been crystallized from a voluminous 
normative material, exist at the universal level in the form of customary rules 
which are differently termed in numerous binding and recommendatory documents.
Apart from the basic principles of international law ruling, inter alia,
51international economic relations , the special principles of IEL which can not be 
challenged now are: the permanent sovereignty of a State over its natural resources, 
the free choice of a country’s economic system, economic non-discrimination, mutual 
economic benefit, free trade and economic cooperation, and the consensual principle 
of the most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatm ent. There are also enough grounds to speak 
about the formulation of the principle of economic preferences for developing
(Footnote continued from previous page)
choose their economic system; (2) permanent sovereignty by States over their natural resources;
(3) the principle of participatory equality of developing countries in international economic 
relations; and the five principles deriving from the general principle called the duty to co­
operate: (1) the principle of preferential treatment for developing countries; (2) the principle of 
stabilization of export earnings of developing countries; (3) the principle of the right of every 
State to benefit from science and technology; (4) the principle of entitlement of developing 
countries to development assistance; (5) the principle of common heritage of mankind.
50. The Declaration considers the following nine principles: (1) The rule of Public International 
Law in International Economic Relations; (2) Pacta sunt servanda: (3) The Principles of Equity and 
Solidarity and the Entitlement to Development Assistance; (4) The Duty to Co-operate for Global 
Development; (5) Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Economic Activities and Wealth; (6) 
The Right to Development; (7) The Principle of Common Heritage of Mankind; (8) The Principle of 
Equality or Non-Discrimination; (9) Participatory Equality of Developing Countries in International 
Economic Relations (see The International Law Association. Report of the Sixty-Second Conference 
held at Seul. August 24th to August 30th, 1986, p. 2-11).
51. These are: sovereign equality of States, non-intervention, non-use of force or threat of 
force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal rights and self-determination of 
nations and peoples, pacta sunt servanda.
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countries (substantive equality) and to raise the issue of gradual crystallization
of the special principle restricting the abuse of economic coercion (although, the
52latter is ra ther the m atter of lex ferenda than lex lata) . International legal 
practice brings to mind the examples when the Resolutions of the IEOs were the focal 
point for the development of the new special principles of IEL, namely, the 
principles of perm anent sovereignty over natural resources, and economic preferences 
for developing countries.
The principles of IEL are supposed to discharge a number of functions that are 
requisite for building a law-oriented international economic society:
(1) they formulate the basic minimum requirements to States and other subjects 
on proper economic conduct;
(2) they are important instrum ents for universal regulation in the economic 
field, promoting coordination among particular, regional and global rules;
(3) they perform a branch-organizing function outlining the margins for 
permissible law-making in IEL.
However, a t present, one should not idealize a practical regulatoiy impact of 
the principles on international economic relations. Life gives numerous examples of 
their breaches. Not only scholars, but the States themselves differ in their 
interpretation. It can be concluded, tha t nowadays the strengthening of the 
regulatory effect of principles is indispensable for the establishment of effective 
legal foundation for international economic order.
* * *
52. See S.A.Voitovich. Legitimacy of the Use of Economic Force in International Relations: 
Conditions and Limits.- In: World Competition, 1992, No 4, p.31-32.
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International legal regulation of economic relationships appears as two 
interpenetrating facets: (1) the system of three principal components: the subjects, 
object and mechanism of legal regulation ( a static aspect); (2) the process 
comprising two main phases: law-making and law-implementation (a dynamic aspect). If 
the glance is cast at international legal regulation in the economic field through 
the prism of IEOs, their active involvement in both the system and process would be 
easily found. As the subjects of international law, IEOs take part in law-making and 
law-executing, that way influencing the changes and developments in the mechanism 
and object of legal regulation. To know how th a t is done, the present writer has 
started to do this study.
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CHAPTER II. THE CONCEPT AND TYPOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AS SPECIAL SUBJECTS 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1 International I^gal Personality of IEOs
Even at first sight it is quite easy to notice those features of IEOs which
distinguish them from the other typical international institutions, i.e. conferences
and joint intergovernmental committees. Unlike international conferences convoked
for a limited time, IEOs have a permanent character ( as a rule, the duration of
53IEO’s functioning is not limited in their constituent documents ). Unlike joint
intergovernmental committees of mainly bilateral character, IEOs have multilateral
membership, as a minimum of three parties. More thorough analysis of IEOs’ statutory
acts and practice reveals their following typical features: (1) establishment on the
basis of international agreement in conformity with international law; (2)
54membership of sovereign States ; (3) perm anent functioning; (4) system of organs;
(5) the purpose for coordination of economic cooperation in certain fields; (6)
53. A rare exception is the ECSC created for 50 years (Art 97 of the ECSC Treaty).
54. The constituent acts of some IEOs assume the possibility of membership for other than States 
subjects of international law. Under Art.4(b) of the Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for 
Commodities of 1980, apart from States, a member of the Fund may be "any intergovernmental 
organization of regional economic integration which exercises competence in fields of activity of 
the Fund. Such intergovernmental organizations shall not be required to undertake any financial 
obligations to the Fund; nor shall they hold any votes". Membership in the EBRD is open, along with 
States, to the EEC and the European Investment Bank ( Art. 3 of the Establishing Agreement).
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international legal personality
56On this ground an IEO can be defined as a structurally organized, permanently 
operating international legal entity, which is established bv an agreement of 
sovereign States for the coordination of their economic policies in the specified 
fields.
Since there are few international legal rules laying down a concept of
"international legal personality", the legal science makes attempts to define it on
57the basis of existing practice . However, different initial criteria of what is
international legal person used by various authors do not allow to create a
generally accepted concept. Most often a legal person is associated with the
possession of legal rights and duties. According to H.Kelsen, a legal person "is
58that legal substance to which duties and rights belong as legal qualities" 
P.K.Menon suggests a similar interpretation: "Legal personality is an
55. On the essential features of international organizations see: E.T.Usenko. The Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance - a Subject of International Law. - In: Soviet Yearbook of International 
Law 1979. Moscow, 1980, p. 20; E.A.Shibaeva. The Law of International Organizations. Moscow, 1986, 
p. 23-26 (both in Russian); The Concept of International Organization. Ed. by G. Abi-Saab. P.:
UNESCO, 1981, p. 11-12.
56. Among other definitions of IEO it is worth to mention the one proposed by P.Verloren van 
Themaat: "any lasting form of cooperation in the economic field between at least five countries, 
which is based directly or indirectly on one or more treaties of public international law"
(P.Verloren van Themaat. The Changing Structure of International Economic Law, p. 12); and another 
by E.-U.Petersmann: "The term international economic organization denotes an association of States, 
established by agreement and possessing a permanent set of organs with autonomous functions and 
powers, which pursues common economic objectives by means of cooperation among its members” (E.- 
U.Petersmann. Economic Organizations and Groups, International, p. 161).
57. See International Legal Personality.Moscow, 1971; D.I.Feldman, G.I.Kurdukov. The Main Trends in 
the Development of International Legal Personality. Kazan, 1974; G.M.Veljaminov. International 
Legal Personality.- In: Soviet Yearbook of International Law 1986. Moscow, 1988, p. 77-97 (in 
Russian); P.K.Menon. The Subjects of Modern International Law. - In: Hague Yearbook of 
International Law 1990, The Hague, 1991, p.30-86.
58. Quoted from P.B.Moring. European Community - Financial Autonomy for the European Community: An 
Integrationist Approach to International Legal Personality. - In: Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law, 1982, vol. 15, p. 310.
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acknowledgement tha t an entity is capable of exercising certain rights and being
59subject to certain duties on its own account under a particular system of law"
That is right for both municipal and international laws. But this general quality of
legal persons neither shows their peculiarities in the different legal systems, nor
distinguishes the concepts of legal personality and legal status, both connected
with rights and duties.
Two criteria seem to be important for the definition of a traditional
international legal person. First, unlike most subjects of municipal law,
traditional international legal persons are not, as a rule, subordinated to any
superior power. The phenomenon of supranational power known, for instance, in the
EEC, has its functional limits allowing the Member States to m aintain their
sovereignty. Second, traditional subjects of international law are capable of not
only observing legal provisions and of bearing legal rights and duties deriving from
them, but also have a capacity to create legal norms themselves. As E.T.Usenko
stated: "the subjects of international law are simultaneously the creators of
objective international law and the bearers of subjective international rights. This
60is the peculiarity" . Therefore, in a traditional sense, "international legal 
personality" means the ability of autonomous international actors to perform 
independently international legal actions including law-making and implementation 
of legal norms . If one accepts the idea of distinguishing the law-making and non­
law-making subjects of international law (the latter term  applies to the nationals 
61of States) , then the above suggested definition of international legal
59. P.K.Menon. Op. cit., p. 31.
60. E.T.Usenko. The Correlation of the Categories of International and Municipal (National) Laws.
- In: Sovetskoje gosudarstvo i pravo, 1983, N 10, p. 51 (in Russian).
61. See N.V.Zakharova. An Individual as a Subject of International Law. - In: Sovetskoje 
gosudarstvo i pravo, 1989, N 11,p. 112 (in Russian); R.A.Mullerson. Human Rights and the Individual 
as Subject of International Law: A Soviet View. - In: 1 EJIL/JEDI (1990), p. 36.
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personality would be true only for the law-making subjects, to which IEOs, 
undoubtedly, belong.
After a well-known statem ent of the International Court of Justice in the
"Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations" case, which
62recognized the "objective" international personality of the UN , the fact that
international organization can possess international legal personality has no longer
63been seriously challenged . This is confirmed in the 1986 Vienna Convention on
Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International
Organizations. However, the question of whether all intergovernmental organizations
64possess international personality is not unambiguously answered in the doctrine
. The constituent documents do not always contain an explicit indication on this 
65m atter . That is why A.N.Talalaev, for instance, suggests to solve this problem
62. International Court of Justice Reports, 1949, p. 174. The Court stated that if the 
organization has personality, "it is an entity capable of availing itself of obligations incumbent 
upon its members". It also declared that "fifty States, representing the vast majority of the 
members of the international community, had the power, in conformity with international law, to 
bring into being an entity possessing objective international personality, and not merely 
personality recognized by them alone, together with capacity to bring international claims".
63. The attempt of R.Reutersward to prove that an international organization "does not act as a 
subject of law but as an international organ" does not look very convincingly especially after 
reading the comments on it by F.Seyersted (see R.Reutersward. The Legal Nature of International 
Organizations. - In: Nordisk Tiddskrift for International Ret, 1980, N 1-2, p. 14-30; F.Seyersted.
The Legal Nature of International Organizations. - In: Nordisk Tiddskrift for International Ret,
1982, N 3-4, p. 203-205).
64. See A.N.Talalaev. The Law of International Treaties. Treaties with Participation of 
International Organizations. Moscow, 1989, p. 59-59 (in Russian).
65. In many cases the founding documents of IEOs fix their international legal personality either 
explicitly:
"The Center shall have full international legal personality" (Art. 18 of the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID) 1965); "The 
Association shall have the capacity of a legal person under international law to perform any acts
(Footnote continues on next page)
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"only proceeding from the entire totality of the contents of functions and
competence of the concrete international organization which are fixed in its Charter
66and other relevant normative acts" . Without challenging the latter thesis one
can, however, assert tha t the absence of international personality can practically
impede performing the organization’s functions. It is hard to disagree with Kohona’s
view, th a t international personality of organizations is " an essential attribute in
67discharging the objectives for which they are established" . The authors who
contend tha t not all intergovernmental organizations possess international legal
personality, as a rule, do this in a hypothetical way and do not give any practical
examples. Much more persuading is Schermers’ conclusion:" At present it is generally
recognized th a t all public international organizations have some international legal
personality, limited to the fields in which they have competence to operate. In
practice, virtually all international organizations perform acts under international 
„68law
(Footnote continued from previous page)
appropriate to its purpose within the powers granted to it by the Constitution" (Art. II of the 
Constitution of the WARDA);
or implicitly by enumerating the concrete international rights and duties: "In order to achieve 
its aims the Organization may (a) take decisions which, except as otherwise provided, shall be 
binding on all the Members; (b) make recommendations to Members; and (c) enter into agreements with 
Members, non-member States and international organizations" (Art. 5 of the Convention on the OECD). 
But some of the IEOs’ constituent documents do not at all contain any provision on their 
international legal personality (e.g. the Statute of the OPEC of 1962, the Agreement Establishing 
the APPA of 1987).
66. A.N.Talalaev. Op. cit., p. 58-59.
67. P.I.B.Kohona. The Regulation of International Economic Relations Through Law. - 
Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1985, p.35.
68. H.G.Schermers. The International Organizations. - In: International Law: Achievements and 
Prospects. General Editor M.Bedjaoui, Paris - UNESCO, 1991, p. 74.
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Taking into account the functional necessity of possessing international legal
personality for each intergovernmental organization and a lack of the facts
witnessing tha t the founding States refrain from vesting any organization with this
quality, the present writer shares the concept of "objective" (erga omnes)
international personality of an intergovernmental organization possessing a number
of essential features (the first five qualities enumerated above). Such objective
international legal personality exists irrespective of its official recognition on
the part of any third persons including non-members.
Another thing is tha t the scope of the powers (the competence) of the
organization is to be determined in each particular case individually. The
difference between "personality" and "powers" was noted in the above mentioned
Advisory Opinion of the ICJ (1949) on Reparation for Injuries. Commenting on this
matter, E.Lauterpacht wrote: "...the mere possession of personality does not
dispense with the need to determine whether in the particular case the person
69possesses the appropriate power" . The same point was stressed by M.Rama-
Montaldo: "Special care must be taken not to confuse the field of rights arising
from international personality common to all international organizations, and the
„70field of implied powers or functions particular to each organization ’
It is well-known, tha t the foundation for international legal personality of a 
State is its sovereignty, i.e. the superiority of the State power within the S tates 
territory and its independence outside. As regards an organization not possessing 
sovereignty, two foundations for its legal personality - a legal and an objective 
one - may be distinguished. The legal foundation is the statutory act and other
69. E.Lauterpacht. The Development of the Law of International Organization by the Decisions of 
International Tribunals. - In: Recueil des Cours, 1976-IV, vol. 152, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1980, 
p.407.
70. M.Rama-Montaldo. International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of International 
Organizations. - In: BYIL 1970. Oxford, 1971, p. 155.
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relevant documents of the organization, which make the normative basis for its 
establishment and operating. The organization’s will being formed as a result of the
consent of the Member States was termed by M.K.Ivanov as "an objective foundation"
71for its international legal personality . The statutory documents fixing the order 
of decision-making endow the organization with a relatively autonomous will, without 
which no independent international legal actions are possible. The bearers of the 
IEO’s will are its organs. The will of the organization is determined by the wills 
of the Member States and in this sense is termed as relatively autonomous. However, 
it may considerably differ from the wills of the individual Member States (for
example, this is well seen in the way the Member States vote a resolution of the
72organization adopted by the majority) . Without an autonomous will a subject of 
international law is inconceivable, since international legal activities are the 
process of making decisions of will.
International legal personality of an IEO has a special functional character. It 
is not to be equated to the universal personality of a State. While sovereign States 
are able to perform any international legal actions not prohibited by international 
law, IEOs possess a capacity for only a limited scope of international legal 
activities which are necessary for the objectives of these organizations in 
conformity with their constituent documents. I.Seidl-Hohenveldern states, that 
"...international organizations may be subjects of international law only for
71. M.K.Ivanov. The Objective Foundation of International Legal Personality. - In: Pravovedenie, 
1988, N 6, p. 91 (in Russian). See also: S.A.Malinin, T.M.Kovaleva. The Legal Personality of 
International Organizations. - In: Pravovedenje, 1992, No 5, p. 61.
72. In the Individual Opinion on the Membership in the United Nations case (1948) Judge Alvarez 
noted: "an institution, once established, acquires a life of its own, independent of the elements 
which have given birth to it, and it must develop, not in accordance with the views of those who 
created it, but in accordance with the requirements of international life" (I.C.J.Reports 1948, p.
68).
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their acts intra vires” .
Here the difference between international legal personality and international 
legal sta tus of an IEO should be stressed. These concepts interpenetrate and are 
sometimes mixed. They are two closely connected, but different facets of the legal 
existence of a subject of international law. To be better understood, it is worth to 
begin with States, in which a correlation between legal personality and status is 
better visible.
Being sovereign entities, States are formally equal as the subjects of 
international law, though, in fact, they vary in many param eters (territory, 
population, economic and political systems,geographical position, level of economic 
development, etc.). And these actual distinctions are also taken into consideration 
by international law (e.g. the peculiarities of the legal position of developing and 
land-locked States, the veto right for the five permanent Members of the UN Security 
Council, "weighted" voting procedures in some IEOs, etc.). But in principle, States 
are equal from a viewpoint of their international legal personality as a capacity 
for independent international legal actions.
In the course of realization of this capacity States acquire and execute their
international rights and duties, which taken in complex are individual for each
State. This complex of international rights and duties of a subject obtained and
realized within the framework of its international legal personality is termed as
74international legal status . International legal status of a State covers a common 
for all the States "nucleus" (primary sovereign rights and duties embodied in the 
basic principles of international law) and an individual part containing the 
secondary rights and duties which are acquired in the course of realization of their 
primary rights and duties (for instance, each State has an individual system of
73. I.Seidl-Hohenveldern. International Economic Law. General Course of International Law, p. 105- 
107.
74. See G.M.Veljaminov. International Legal Personality, p. 94.
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treaty relations with other subjects, individual membership to international 
organizations, e tc .)^ .
A similar correlation between personality and status is true for IEOs. 
International legal personality is a premise for the international legal status of 
an IEO, whereas the latter is a result of possessing personality. International 
legal personality in general indicates of the existence of the organization’s 
capacity for independent international legal actions, while international legal 
sta tus characterizes the concrete legal position of the organization in the process 
of the realization of this capacity.
One of the components of an IEO’s legal sta tus is its competence, i.e. the 
powers of the organization in the person of its organs which derive from the 
constituent instrum ents and relate to the scope of subject-matter and the character 
of decision-making. The basic elements of an IEO’s competence are the subject 
competence, decision-making competence, treaty-m aking competence, interpretative 
competence and sanctional competence.
International legal status of an IEO covers its primary and secondary rights 
and obligations. The primary rights and obligations are fixed in the founding 
documents or derive from general international law. These are: the right to 
participate in legal standard-setting, the right to cooperate with other subjects, 
the right to make decisions and recommendations, the right to bring an international 
claim, the right for immunities and privileges, the right of representation, the♦
duty to refrain from interference into internal affairs of the Member States, etc. 
The secondaiy rights and obligations are acquired by the IEOs in the course of 
realization of their right for participation in international law-making. Their 
contents are specific for each particular IEO.
75. See International Law. Ed. by G.I.Tunkin. Moscow, 1982, p. 82-83 (in Russian).
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2. Classification of IEQs
Examining the present-day IEOs, one can find out a dialectical interrelation
between their common and specific features. Their general signs combining with
individual qualities result in a vast variety of IEOs’ types which, at first sight,
may seem as a disorderly conglomerate of numerous organizations. However, the
76classification distinguishing common and specific features of the analyzed 
objects helps to elaborate a more systematic notion of IEOs. The principal criteria 
for classification, relating to the most significant aspects of IEOs as special 
subjects of international law, are: (1) form of statutory act; (2) legal status; (3) 
volume of powers; (4) accession to membership; (5) character of membership; (6) 
subject of activities; (7) geographical sphere of activities; (8) decision-making 
competence.
2.1. Form of statutory act
All the IEOs are established by an agreement of the Member States. However, the 
forms of the expression of such agreement may vary. In this respect it is possible 
to distinguish: (1) the IEOs whose constituent documents are international treaties 
(the major part of the existing IEOs); (2) the IEOs established by a document other 
than a treaty  (e.g. the UNCTAD, the UNIDO founded by the UN General Assembly 
resolutions, the IEA established by the OECD Council decision, the ASEAN formed by 
virtue of the Bangkok Declaration of the Ministers of foreign affairs of the Member 
States); (3) the IEOs which do not have a single formal statutory act. The GATT may 
serve as an example of the latter type. Its organizational structure has been formed
76. On classification of international institutions see: Georg Schwarzenberger. A Manual of 
International Law. Sixth edition. Milton, 1976, p. 192-194.
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on the basis of a number of acts adopted in different years. Up to 1959 there also
had been no C harter of the CMEA. During the first decade this organization had been
functioning in accordance with the decision of the 1949 Moscow Economic Meeting
(i.e. informal intergovernmental agreement) and the customary rules expressed in the
77decisions of the CMEA organs .
It m ust be borne in mind, tha t international institutions other than IEOs may
also operate on the basis of an informal agreement. Thus, the COCOM (the
Coordinating Committee for M ultilateral Strategic Export Controls) formed in 1949
does not possess a clear legal status; it acts only through the Member States (the
NATO Members minus Iceland, plus Japan) and, as it was noted by some authors, can
78not be properly called an "international organization"
2.2. Le^al status
Each IEO has an individual legal status, though, there are some elements common 
for all of them. The most general division on this basis may be made for autonomous 
and quasi-autonomous IEOs.
Most IEOs possess independent status, i.e. do not have any form of legal 
subordination to any other institution (e.g. the OECD, the EFTA). The term  "quasi- 
autonomous" is somewhat conditional, since it is used for the indication of 
different forms of legal dependence of one IEO from another organization. For 
example, the UN specialized agencies being in principle independent organizations,
77. See E.T.Usenko. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance - a Subject of International Law, 
p. 22-23.
78. See Shinya Murase. Trade versus Security: The COCOM Regulations in Japan. - In: The Japanese 
Annual of International Law 1988. - Tokyo, 1988, p. 2; P.J.Kuyper. International Legal Aspects of 
Economic Sanctions. - In: Legal Issues in International Trade, ed. by Petar Sarcevic and Hans van 
Houtte, p. 172(145-175).
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to some extent are "subordinated" to the UN (in more detail see Chapter III). The
same can be said about the IBRD affiliates (the IFC, the IDA, the ICSID, the
79MIGA) , as well as about African regional economic communities in their
relationships to the AEC, which is what P.Verloren van Themaat called "umbrella 
80organization" . Another example is the IEA, which was established in 1974 as an
autonomous organization within the framework of the OECD. A specific form of legal
subordination exists between the OAPEC and OPEC. The Member States of the OAPEC,
even if they are not the members of the OPEC, are bound by the ratified resolutions
81of the latter organization . There are also some formally non-autonomous 
institutions which actually possess all essential features of IEOs (e.g. the UNCTAD, 
which according to UN General Assembly resolution 1995/XIX is the organ of the UN 
General Assem bly^).
2.3. Volume of powers
IEOs considerably vary in the volume of powers delegated to them by the Member 
States. At the extremes, ordinary intergovernmental and supranational organizations
79. See about the World Bank’s affiliates: H.G.Petersmann. The World Bank Contribution to the Law
of International Finance and Development (1944-1984). - In: Archiv des Völkerrechts, 1985,p. 244-
245; Ibrahim F.I.Shihata. The World Bank in a Changing World. Selected Essays. Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 
1991.
80. See P.Verloren van Themaat. Op. cit., p. 8.
81. See Article Three of the Agreement of the OAPEC of 1968.
82. K.de Vey Mestadagh stated in this regard:”UNCTAD is not an independent, separately established 
international entity. Although it functions as an international organization, being an organ of the 
General Assembly, it is subordinated to decisions and recommendations stemming from the latter" 
(K.de Vey Mestadagh. Supervision within the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development. - 
In: Supevisory Mechanisms in International Economic Organizations, p. 283).
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are often distinguished in this respect. Most of the existing IEOs are considered as
ordinary intergovernmental institutions, while the term  "supranational" is usually
associated with the EEC, which possesses certain volume of powers to act on the
behalf of the Member States and to take decisions binding directly upon the
nationals of the Member States. Supranationality should be differed from certain
elements of subordination tha t exist in international organizations, including most
IEOs, which take binding decisions upon the Member States in substantive matters.
The term  "supranationality" used to be applied only to those organizations that can
produce the rules binding on the Member States’ nationals without recourse to the
83national enforcement procedures .
Along with the EEC, a somewhat more limited pattern of "supranationality" can be 
observed in the Andean Group. Article 3 of the 1979 Treaty Creating the Court of 
Justice of the Cartagena Agreement states: "Decisions of the Commission are directly 
applicable in the member countries from the date of their publication in the 
Official Gazette of the Cartagena Agreement, unless the Decision provides for a 
later date.
In the event tha t the text of a Decision so provides, such Decision must be
adopted as internal law by means of an express act indicating the date of entry into
force in each member country". Here, the general principle of direct applicability
of the Commission’s Decisions in the member countries, provided in the first part of
this Article, may have exceptions, as it is specified in its second part.
Some authors noted tha t the term "supranationality" is used in a relative sense,
84since there is no one completely supranational organization . Even the Treaty on
83. Arbitral practice knows another manner of interpretation of the term "supranational", in the 
meaning that the interstate organization is not subject to the laws of the Member States. This way 
"the supranational status of the AOI" was interpreted by the Arbitral Tribunal in the case Westland 
Helicopters Ltd. v. API and others (1982). - In: 80 I.L.R. 610-612.
84. H.G.Schermers. International Institutional Law. Lieden, 1972, vol. 1, p. 21.
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European U nion, pro vidingfurther extension ofthe European Community powers, makes
a reservation for the principle of subsidiarity delimiting the Community competence
and the competence of individual Member States: "In area which do not fall within
its exclusive competence the Community shall take action, in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity, only if and so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by
reason of the scale of effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community. Any action of the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to
85achieve the objectives of this Treaty" (Article G (3b)
In other words, at present, most States remain very reticent to surrender their
powers to a supranational body and admit supranationality only in relatively narrow
limits. The more compatible are political and economic systems, the more integrated
are the States, the higher level of supranationality they afford. One can find
various facets of supranationality in the integrational units such as the European
86Communities, in the federations such as the former USSR . (However, the up-to-date 
practice witnesses that even in the integrational IEOs "supranationality" is so far 
ra ther an exception, than a general rule). The very supranationality is neither
blessing nor curse. This is a specific form of organization of interstate
relationships. All depends on the conditions under which it is used and on the 
contents it is filled with.
2.4. Accession to membership
85. See comments on the principle of subsidiarity in : Trevour C. Hartley. Constitutional and 
Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht Agreement. - ICLQ, 1993, Vol. 42, Part 2, p. 214-218.
86. Nowadays, the constituent instruments of the CIS emphasize that the Commonwealth "is neither a 
State nor a supra-State entity" (see 31 I.L.M. 148 (1992). Apparently, the CIS States had too much 
experience of excessive "supranationalism" within the former Soviet Union to be willing to renovate
it again.
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This criterion reflects a distinction between the open IEOs. the accession to 
which is not restricted by the statutory documents, and the IEOs of limited 
accession. The UNIDO is an example of the first type. According to Art. 3 of its 
Constitution, "membership in the Organization is open to all States which associate 
themselves with the objectives and principles of the Organization". As a rule, the 
term  "open organization" does not mean that an applicant State may enter into 
membership automatically. A positive decision of the competent body of the 
organization on the admission of a new member is necessary. However, some open IEOs 
provide different accession procedures for different categories of applicant States. 
Under Art. 3 of the UNIDO Constitution, the member States of the UN and its 
specialized agencies become the members of the UNIDO by depositing instrum ents of 
accession (i.e. according to their own will only), while other applicant States need 
the approval by the two-thirds majority of the Conference upon the recommendation of 
the Board.
Some formally open organizations have quite complicated accession procedures. 
Thus, according to Art. XXXIII of the GATT, a new party may accede to this Agreement 
on term s agreed upon by an applicant State and the Contracting Parties. The final 
decision on this m atter is to be taken by a two-thirds majority of the Contracting 
Parties. An applicant State submits a memorandum on its foreign trade system to the 
working group established for this purpose. According to the concept of "effective
reciprocity", the planned-economy countries were requested to make additional
87 88concessions in order to get the so-called "ticket of admission"
87. See E.R.Petterson. Improving GATT Rules for Non-Market Economies. In: JWTL, 1986, N 2, p. 185- 
205; W.Benedek., K.Ginther. Planned-Economy Countries and GATT: Legal Issues of Accession. - In: 
GYIL 1988. Berlin, 1989, p. 70-106; Feng Yu-Shu. China’s Membership of GATT: A Practical Proposal.
- In: JWT, 1988, N 6, p. 53-70; J.H.Jackson. State Trading and Non-Market Economies. - In: The 
International Lawyer, 1989, N 4, p. 891-908.
(Footnote continues on next page)
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The conditions for restricting accession to the membership of IEOs may be 
various. Thus, the Articles of Agreement of the IFC of 1955 (Art. 2) and the 
Articles of Agreement of the IDA of 1960 (Art. 2) prescribe that the membership to 
them shall be open only to the members of the World Bank. In turn, the Articles of 
Agreement of the IBRD of 1944 lay down a peculiar restriction on the membership: any 
member of the Bank "which ceases to be a member of the International Monetary Fund 
shall automatically cease after three months to be a member of the Bank unless the 
Bank by three-fourths of the total voting power has agreed to allow it to remain a 
member" (Art. VI, section 3).
The regional restrictions to the membership can be met rather often. Art. 237 of 
the Treaty of Rome of 1957, for instance, permits the EEC membership merely for the 
European States. According to Articles 2 and 46 of the Treaty for the Establishment 
of the PTA of 1981, the membership of this organization is open to 21 States of the 
subregion or to the immediately neighbouring African States. A sort of combination 
of regional and non-regional restrictions to membership can be found in the 
Agreement Establishing the EBRD. The membership in the Bank is open (1) to European 
countries and (2) non-European countries which are members of the IMF (Art. 3).
(Footnote continued from previous page)
88. The following formulas of admission were used by Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania and Hungary which 
joined GATT respectively in 1966, 1967, 1971 and 1973. Yugoslavia abrogated the State monopoly on 
foreign trade and declared the introduction of the market-economy system. Poland was obliged to 
increase the total value of its imports from the territories of the contracting parties by not less 
than 7 per cent per annum. Romania also agreed to increase its imports from the contracting parties 
proportionally to the growth of total Romania imports provided for in its five-year plan. Hungary 
reduced its customs tariffs and stated that its foreign trade enterprises could do business 
competitively in world markets, and foreign businessmen could also do business freely in Hungary.
At present, China and the independent republics of the former USSR endeavor to make their foreign 
trade systems compatible with the GATT provisions aiming at further accession.
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Sometimes, the IEOs’ founding acts contain provisions restricting accession to
the membership on the grounds of the subject of the organization’s activities. This
is mostly typical for the organizations of producers and exporters. Art. 2 of the
Agreement establishing the ITPA of 1977 stipulates, tha t it "shall be open to the
Government of any country that produces and is a net exporter of tea and that is a
Member State of the United Nations or a Member of any of its specialized agencies or
of the International Atomic Energy Agency". Membership to the ANRPC is open only to
89the countries producing natural rubber . Art. 7 of the Statute of the OPEC of 1962
restricts the opportunity to become a member of this organization for the countries
without a substantial net export of crude petroleum, and excludes such opportunity
for the country which does not fundamentally have interests and aims similar to
90those of Member Countries . The OAPEC may be joined solely by an Arab country in
91which petroleum constitutes a significant source of its national income . The 
membership to the ATPC is open only to 12 countries-net exporters of tin listed in 
Annex A to the constituent Agreement of 1983 which may be revised from time to time 
by the Conference (Art. 6). As regards the AIOEC, a new member may be accepted to 
this IEO only upon the unanimous decision of the existing Member Countries, provided
th a t the applicant State is an exporter or a holder of substantial reserves of iron
92 ore .
Finally, the accession to IEOs’ membership can be limited or prohibited as a 
form of international legal sanctions. A special resolution of the original members
89. Art. 2 of the Constitution of the ANRPC.
90. In 1965 the requirement of a developing country status was added to meet Saudi Arabia's 
concern about a possible application for membership by the USSR (see D.E.Pollard. Law and Policy of 
Producers’Associations. Oxford, 1984, p. 104-105).
91. See Article Seven of the Agreement of the OAPEC.
92. Art. 4 of the Agreement Establishing the AIOEC.
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of the AfDB of 1963 prohibited an admission to the members of the Bank for the South
93African Republic, until its Government has term inated its apartheid policies
2.5. Character of membership
This criterion reveals the distinction between the IEOs with a single status of 
Member States (e.g. the OECD, the EFTA) and the IEOs having different categories of 
membership. The examples of the latter type are the FAO, the WTO, the GATT, the 
OPEC, the Council of Europe.
Art. 2 of the FAO Constitution makes distinction between full and associate 
members. Unlike the first, associate members (non-selfgoverning territories) take 
part in the Conference deliberations without holding office and voting power (Art. 
3). After gaining independence the territory loses an associate membership and can 
be admitted to full members.
The Statutes of the WTO lays down three categories of membership: (1) full 
Members, (2) associate Members, and (3) affiliate Members (Art.4). The distinction 
between the first two categories is similar to that of the FAO. Affiliate membership 
is open to international bodies, both intergovernmental and non-governmental, 
concerned with specialized interests in tourism and to commercial bodies and 
associations whose activities are related to the aims of the WTO or fall within its 
competence (Art. 7). Affiliate Members may participate in the WTO organs as 
observers, without the right to vote.
In GATT developing countries (the former dependent territories that acceded to 
GATT through the "sponsorship" of the former metropolitan countries) having de-facto 
membership participate side by side with the full members. De-facto members can 
obtain the full membership by a declaration submitted to the Director-General.
93. UNTS, vol. 510, p. 44.
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The Statute of the OPEC also makes difference between the full members (which 
are the founder Members and the Countries with a substantial net export of crude 
petroleum accepted by a majority of three-fourths of full Members) and associate 
Members - the countries exporting petroleum in a limited volume. Associate Members 
may be invited by the Conference to attend any meeting of a Conference, the Board of 
Governors or Consultative Meetings, and to participate in their deliberations 
without the right to vote (Art. 7). A special status is provided for the OPEC 
founder members (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela) which are 
empowered to veto membership applications.
Associate membership in the Council of Europe differs from that in the FAO and 
OPEC. Pursuant to Art. 5 of the Statute, an associate Member is entitled to be 
represented in the Consultative Assembly, without participation in the Committee of
9 4Ministers. H.G.Schermers defines this as a "partial membership"
The PTA in principle has the single status of the Member States. However, the 
special temporary exemptions from the full application of certain provisions of the 
Treaty are granted to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland being the Members of the 
Southern African Customs Union (Articles 3 and 30 of the Treaty of 1981); and to the 
Comores and Djibouti in view of their specific economic conditions (Art. 31). A 
similar exemption as regards Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland is provided by 
Art. 78 of the Treaty Establishing the AEC.
A quite rare phenomenon of "group membership" should be also mentioned here. 
Under Art. 6 of the 1983 International Coffee Agreement, two or more Contracting 
Parties which are the net exporters of coffee may declare that they are joining the 
Organization as a Member group which conducts a common coffee policy.
And, finally, it m ust be borne in mind, as H.G.Schermers writes, tha t "within 
each group of participants there are large differences in power and influence. Some
94. H.G.Schermers. International Institutional Law. Alphen aan den Rijn, 1980, p. 97.
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full Members contribute more to expenses of the organization than others. Some have
privileged positions such as right of permanent membership in subsidiary organs or
95the right of veto"
2.6. Subject of activities
The most marked diversity of the IEOs can be found while analyzing the subject 
of their activities, which covers various forms of economic cooperation. On the 
ground of the subject competence IEOs are subdivided into the following types:
(1) Organizations of the general competence dealing, among others, with economic 
problems (e.g. the UN, the Council of Europe, the LAS, the OAU, the OAS, the CIS).
(2) Organizations of general economic competence (e.g.the OECD).
(3) Organizations for economic integration, including the free trade area 
associations (e.g. the EFTA), the customs unions (e.g. the UDEAC), and the economic 
communities (e.g. the EEC, the AEC).
(4) Specialized economic organizations:
(a) trade organizations including general trade organizations (the UNCTAD, the 
GATT) and international commodity organizations (e.g. the International Cocoa 
Organization, the International Organization on Natural Rubber);
(b) financial organizations (e.g. the IMF, the IBRD, the EBRD);
(c) investment organizations (e.g. the MIGA, the ICSID);
(d) organizations for industrial cooperation (e.g. the UNIDO);
(e) organizations for agricultural cooperation (e.g. the FAO, the IFAD);
(f) transport and communication organizations (e.g. the ITU, the UPU);
(g) organizations of producers and exporters (e.g. the OPEC, the IBA, the ATPC);
95. H.G.Schermers. International Institutional Law, Leyden, 1972, vol.l, p. 26.
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(5) Other organizations of economic character (e.g. the WIPO, WTO)96
2.7. Geographical sphere of activities
A sphere of IEOs activities is, as a rule, determined in the statutory documents 
due to the organizations’ objectives and subject of activities. The sphere of 
activities embraces both the membership and the geographical area of operating of 
the IEO. According to the criterion "sphere of activities", IEOs may be classified 
into universal, interregional, regional and subregional ones. Such classification is 
based on the term s "universality" and "region".
Being applied to international organizations the term "universality" covers both
geographical aspect (embracing all main geographical regions) and quantitative
aspect (the majority of the States of the world community). The latter one indicates
of the degree of universality which differs from one IEO to another. At present,
there is no one absolutely universal organization with the participation of all the
States. That’s why some scholars prefer to speak about "potentially universal" or
97"world" organizations . They are, first of all, the organizations of the UN 
system. Among the other IEOs approaching the criteria of universality GATT is worth 
to be mentioned. More than  100 States representing the main economic systems and 
geographical regions participate on the different grounds in this organization.
96. In this context, the classification of multilateral economic agreements which establish 
institutional regimes proposed by Kohona is worth mentioning. Combining a subject matter with a 
manner of regulation as the classification criteria, the author subdivides multilateral economic 
agreements into three types: (1) agreements that are comprehensive in scope and intensity of 
regulation (the EEC Treaty, the Montevideo Treaty, the Treaty Establishing the CARICOM, the 
Convention Establishing the EFTA, and some others); (2) agreements that are comprehensive in the 
scope but not in the intensity of regulation (the agreements establishing the CMEA, the OECD, the 
UNCTAD, the ASEAN, the UN regional economic commissions, etc.); (3) agreements that are intensive 
in the manner in which they regulate specific matters (the GATT, the agreements establishing the 
IMF, the IBRD, the FAO, commodity agreements, etc.). See P.I.B.Kohona. Op. cit., p. 43-80.
97. M.Virally. Definition and Classification of International Organizations: a legal approach. In:
The Concept of International Organization. Ed. by G.Abi-Saab. P.t 1981, p. 57, 60.
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However, by the degree of universality the GATT yields to another global trade
organization - the UNCTAD, uniting more than  180 States. In this connection, the
98GATT’s membership is sometimes qualified as "approaching quasi-universality" ,
9 9while the UNCTAD is characterized as "the only universal institution"
The contents of the term "region" in international law have been analyzed in
detail by A.F.Visotsky, who emphasized, that the regions are "distinguished on the
basis of the criteria reflecting the objectively existing features of those regions
as relatively separate units and for achieving some practical or scientific and
theoretical goals’’* ^ .
The most numerous among IEOs are the regional institutions. This is quite
understandable, since "regional cooperation is practiced between States with
comparable political systems and compatible cultural and economic backgrounds"
The regional IEOs have greater homogeneity, than universal institutions, and
102therefore, more powers can be transferred to them by the Member States . This 
point has been stressed by P.VerLoren van Themaat: "The main organizations with a 
limited territorial scope have a far more comprehensive area of operation as to 
subject m atter. Moreover, in a number of problem areas they often have access to far 
more effective instrum ents than the above-named specialized international 
organizations a t a world level"
98. W.Benedek., K.Ginther. Op. cit., p.76.
99. T.Weiss. UNCTAD: What Next? - In: JWTL, 1985, N 3, p. 253.
100. A.F.Visotsky. The Marine Regionalism. Kiev, 1986, p. 100 (in Russian). See also the discussion 
on regional organizations in Yearbook of the ILC 1983. Vol. I, p. 255-256.
101. H.G.Schermers. International Institutional Law, vol., 1, p. 17.
102. Ibid., p. 18.
103. P.VerLoren van Themaat. The Changing Structure of International Economic Law, p. 2.
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In order to designate an IEO having the sphere of activities within the vaster
region of another organization, the term  "subregional" is used. For instance,the
Benelux Economic Union is a subregional organization in relation to the EEC; the
Andean Group is a subregional organization within the framework of the LALA.
Finally, some IEOs have the sphere of activities extending over one region but
not covering all the geographical regions. This kind of IEOs may be called
104interregional or transcontinental (e.g. the OPEC, the OECD).
The question may be posed the following way: to what extent territorial sphere
105of the organization’s activities influences the efficiency of its operation ; and
what is the optimal interrelationship between universalism and regionalism in IEOs
in this connection. It is apparent, th a t the more global are the problems intended
to be covered by the organization, the more approaching to universalism is
desirable. Under otherwise equal conditions, "the closer an organization comes to
106universality, the stronger its position will be" However, the existing 
heterogeneity of interacting States limits the scope of issues available for 
effective regulation at the universal level. The greater homogeneity of regional and 
interregional IEOs resting on the unity of interests and purposes of the Member 
States is essential for efficiency of institutional instruments. Therefore, at 
present, the ideal of universalism for IEOs should be collated with the reality of 
regionalism in international economic relations.
2.8. Decision-making competence
104. See P. Verloren van Themaat. Op. cit., p. 2.
105. On the connection between the objectives and scope of operations of IEOs, on the one hand, and 
the territorial area of operations, on the other, see: P.VerLoren van Themaat. Op. cit., p. 105-
106.
106. H.G.Schermers. International Institutional Law, vol. 1, p. 16.
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The criterion of decision-making competence permits to subdivide IEOs in two 
major groups: (1) the organizations whose acts, except the decisions on procedural 
matters, are of recommendatory character (e.g. the UNCTAD); (2) the organizations 
making both recommendations and binding decisions on the m atters of economic 
cooperation (most of the existing IEOs). The legal force of the IEOs’ normative acts 
and their impact on international law-making will be examined in Chapter V of the 
present paper.
3. System of International Economic Organizations
By means of classification, IEOs can be divided into various groups which 
highlight their essential common and specific features. However, a mere 
classification does not reveal the character of inter-IEOs links (although, it 
suggests some initial information on this).
What are the existing IEOs as a whole: a disorderly conglomerate of individual 
institutions or a structurally organized system? This is not stricto sensu a legal 
question. However, a lawyer dealing with IEOs should have an idea of what structural 
links exist among numerous individual organizations and their groups.
The emergence of each particular IEO was determined by a unique combination of 
economic, political and historical reasons. The evolution of IEOs came about not as 
an effect of any systematically taken decisions, but as a result of spontaneously 
reached compromises and agreements among interacting States. However, such natural, 
unsystematic process of institutionalization has its internal logic of building a 
well-organized world economic order at regional, inter-regional and global levels. 
The more international economic society is ready for such an order, the more 
cohesive its institutional structure should be.
The present-day IEOs may be divided into several major blocks as regards their 
structural position and weight in the evolving institutional system:
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(1) The U.N. family of economic institutions which has the most diverse structure of 
inter-links among its elements and components.
It comprises several U.N. economic organs (e.g. the ECOSOC, the regional
economiccommissions,theUNCTAD,theUNDP)andspecializedeconomicagencies,which
are the autonomous IEOs legally linked with the U.N. Within the U.N economic
agencies there is a more compact group of IEOs called the World Bank Group (the
IBRD, the IFC, the IDA, the ICSID, the MIGA). The U.N. economic institutions
strongly differ in their real impact on international economic relations. Some of
them, like the IMF and the World Bank, make up the foundation for the world
financial system, while others, like the UNCTAD, are ra ther deliberative forums than
regulatoiy bodies. At present, the U.N. institutional structure can be hardly
considered a core of the evolving system if IEOs, since it does not possess enough
structural and functional capacities to coordinate the creation and operation of
107numerous specialized and regional IEOs . Although, such coordinating capacities 
would be desirable from the viewpoint of improving the existing institutional 
structure for the world economic order
(2) The OECD occupies a specific position in the system of IEOs as the only inter­
regional organization of the highly industrialized countries with a general economic 
competence, i.e. dealing with a wide spectrum of economic issues. However, this
107. To quote the UN Secretary General Mr. Boutros-Ghali, "the Economic and Social Council, despite 
its preeminence in the Charter, has proved too weak to provide coherence and form to the work of 
the specialized agencies, the Bretton Wood institutions, the regional economic commissions and the 
array of U.N. programs" (Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Empowering the United Nations. - In: Foreign 
Affairs, Winter 1992/1993, p. 100).
108. See proposals on the further development within the UN system in: P.Verloren Van Themaat. Op. 
cit., p. 211-215.
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organization places more emphasis on analytical and consultative work than on far- 
reaching standard-setting (albeit, it has accumulated an interesting experience of 
law-making and law-implementing).
(3) The GATT having a dual nature of a m ultilateral trade agreement and of an
organizational structure makes up the legal and institutional foundation for the
world trade. One can meet the GATT’s definitions as "de facto if not de jure
,109international trade organization", "paraorganization" , etc. It seems possible 
now to trea t GATT as an independent institution meeting the above six criteria of 
an IEO. The GATT’s functions and scope of activities have been considerably extended 
and can not be confined merely to the implementation of the General Agreement^"
(4) The organizations of producers and exporters do not present any coherent
112system . This is rather a group of IEOs with similar functions which make a 
notable impact on the world markets of certain commodities. Although, within this 
group one can find ra ther strong links between, for example, the OPEC and OAPEC. 
Furthermore, there are certain working relationships between the organizations of
109. See D. Johnson. The New International Economic Order (1). - In: Yearbook of World Affairs 1983.
L., 1984, vol. 37, p. 211; M.M.Boguslavsky. International Economic Law. Moscow, 1986, p. 166.
110. See F.Roessler. Law, De Facto Agreements and Declarations of Principle in International 
Economic Relations. - In: GYIL 1978, vol. 21, p. 48.
I l l  Although, the GATT’s institutional structure is comparatively weak and needs, in the view of 
some authors, serious modifications (See J.H.Jackson. Restructuring the GATT System. L., 1990). See 
more details on the proposals to improve the GATT institutional framework in: E.-U. Petersmann. The 
Uruguay Round Negotiations 1986-1991. - In: The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
Legal and Economic Problems. Second updated Edition. Ed. by E.-U.Petersmann, M.Hilf. 
Deventer/Boston, 1991, p. 501-577.
112. See more detail in D.E.Pollard. Law and Policy of Producers’ Associations. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984.
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producers and exporters and international commodity organizations
114(5) International commodity organizations are also rather a group of similar IEOs
115than a well-structured system . However, certain signs of a structure can be 
observed in view of the links between individual commodity organizations and, the 
UNCTAD, on the one hand, and the Common Fund for Commodities, on the other.
(6) A number of compact inter-IEOs structures exist a t the regional level (e.g. the
EEC-EFTA relationships expected to evolve into a European Economic Area, co-
116 117operation links among the African and Latin-American IEOs ). Certain inter­
regional relationships are also established between some IEOs belonging to the 
different regions
113
113. E.g. the Cocoa Producers’ Alliance has cooperation links with the International Cocoa 
Organization; the Inter-African Coffee Organization has the observer status with the International 
Coffee Organization; the Group of Latin-American and Caribbean Sugar Exporting Countries has the 
observer status with the International Sugar Organization.
114. These are: the International Cocoa Organization, International Coffee Organization, 
International Sugar Organization, International Natural Rubber Organization, International Olive 
Oil Council, International Tropical Timber Organization, International Wheat Council. The most 
visible difference between the commodity organizations and the above mentioned organizations of 
producers and exporters is that the former unite both exporters and importers of the relevant 
commodities, while the latter are the associations of solely producers and exporters.
115. See more details in: E.Emst. International Commodity Agreements. The Hague/Boston/London, 
1982; Kabir-Ur-Rahman Khan. The Law and Organization of International Commodity Agreements. The 
Hague/Boston/London, 1982.
116. For example, Articles 4, 28 and 88 of the Treaty Establishing the AEC of 1991 make stress on 
"the strengthening of existing regional economic communities and the establishment of other 
communities where they do not exist" as one of the AEC objectives.
117. For example, the preamble of the Treaty of Asuncion of 1991 (establishing the MERCOSUR) makes 
reference to the objectives of the Montevideo Treaty of 1980 (establishing the LAIA). Pursuant to
Art. 7 of the Cartagena Agreement (Official Codified Text of 1988), the Commission (the highest 
body of the Agreement) shall, among others, "monitor the harmonious fulfillment of the obligations 
deriving from this Agreement and the Montevideo Treaty of 1980".
118.See e.g. the Co-operation Agreement between the EEC and the Member countries of the ASEAN of 
1980.
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These major structural blocks of IEOs, as well as some other IEOs left beyond
the scope of this systematization, have a diverse structure of inter-links by virtue
119of various inter-IEOs co-operation techniques , that allows to treat them as a 
120forming system . Obviously, this system is still weak. It is neither centralized 
nor strongly cohesive, since many inter-IEOs links are quite fragmentary and not 
enough close. In the meantime, the existing system of IEOs possesses a considerable 
potential for improvement. In the post-World W ar II period IEOs have demonstrated a 
good deal of dynamics and flexibility quickly responding to the changing economic 
and political exigencies. The system of IEOs has a number of strong elements at both 
regional and global levels (e.g. the EEC, the GATT, the IMF, the IBRD) which make a 
sensible impact on the economic environment.
* * *
Therefore, the definition, classification and systematization of the IEOs are 
the first steps in their research, which allow to observe the evolving system of 
IEOs from the various points, to distinguish their common and specific qualities. 
Classification and systematization suggest a generalized legal vision of IEOs and
119. The IMF-GATT links can be an illustration to this. The constituent instruments of both 
organizations contain relevant provisions on cooperation (Art. X of the IMF Agreement and Art. XV-I 
of the General Agreement). However, in practice, to quote Roessler, "there are cordial and 
intellectually fruitful relations between the staffs of the Fund and the GATT and an extensive 
exchange of information between them, but there is nothing that could be described as policy 
coordination between the governing bodies of the two institutions" (Frieder Roessler. The 
Relationship Between the World Trade Order and the International Monetary System. -In: The New GATT 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Legal and Economic Problems. Second updated Edition. Ed.
by E.-U.Petersmann, M.Hilf. Deventer/Boston, 1991, p. 385).
120. The central chapter of the fundamental study by P.Verloren van Themaat is entitled "The 
Existing System of International Economic Organizations" (see P.Verloren van Themaat. Op. cit., p. 
67-219).
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show that in their natural variety IEOs accumulate an experience necessary for 
moving towards more elaborate institutional forms.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS TO THE FIRST PART
The central idea of the First Part was to envisage a general picture of existing 
IEOs within the international economic environment through the prism of law. The 
analysis has shown that the emergence and evolution of IEOs has been basically 
determined by the changing international economic realities. The most general 
determinants of the process of institutionalization have been the increasing 
economic interdependence of States, the growing scope, intensity and complication of 
international economic co-operation in the 20th century, which in turn  have been 
strengthened in the post-World War II period by such factors as the economic 
restoration of Europe, decolonization, scientific and technical revolution, regional 
economic integration, global economic problems, as well as the radical reforms in 
Eastern and Central Europe. These reasons have caused a striking rise of global and 
regional international economic institutions, whose number is constantly growing up. 
Accordingly, the existing international economic relations appear to be the most 
institutionalized sphere of international life.
Although the emergence of each particular IEO is a consequence of a unique 
combination of economic, political and historical reasons resulting in spontaneously 
reached compromises and agreements among interacting States, this seemingly 
unsystematic process has its internal logic of building an adequate institutional 
framework for a well-organized world economic order. Consequently, the process of 
institutionalization of the last decades has shown, along with a quantitative rise 
of individual IEOs, a definite trend for strengthening the inter-IEOs relationships. 
The diverse structure of inter-IEOs links established by virtue of various 
cooperation techniques gives grounds to treat the existing IEOs as an evolving 
system, which is still ra ther weak, but has a number of strong elements at the 
global and regional levels and possesses a considerable potential for improvement.
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Plainly, the more international economic society is ready for a law-oriented world 
economic order, the more cohesive its institutional structure is expected to be.
The process of institutionalization has, among others, a notable legal context. 
IEOs emerge and operate within law, as well as create and implement the legal rules 
themselves. For the purpose of the present study, an IEO has been defined, basically 
from a legal viewpoint, as a structurally organized, permanently operating 
international legal entity, which is established bv an agreement of sovereign States 
for the coordination of their economic policies in the specified fields. Moreover, 
it has been emphasized that the international legal personality of an IEO as a 
capacity for independent legal actions is indispensable for a proper discharge of 
its functions. That is why, although not all constituent instrum ents of the IEOs 
explicitly state their international legal personality, in practice one can hardly 
find an IEO which does not possess at least an implied capacity for independent 
international legal actions.
Trying to expose the IEOs’ legal nature, one should distinguish, at least 
theoretically, the two interrelated concepts: an international legal personality of 
an IEO and its international legal sta tu s. Both concepts are closely linked with 
legal rights and duties of an international legal person, and hence are sometimes 
confused. However, these are quite distinct facets of the legal existence of an IEO. 
The international legal personality is a premise for international legal status, 
whereas the latter is a result of possessing personality. International legal 
personality in general indicates the organization’s capacity for independent legal 
actions. In turn, the legal status specifies the concrete legal position of the 
organization in the course of realization of this capacity. To put it another way, 
within the framework of its international legal personality an IEO acquires and 
executes its international rights and duties, which, taken as a whole, are 
individual for each particular IEO and may be termed as its international legal 
status. An important component of an IEO’s legal sta tus is its competence, i.e. the
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powers of the organization’s bodies in relation to the scope of subject-matter and 
the character of decision-making. In order to denote various facets of an IEO’s 
competence, this study deals with its subject competence, decision-making 
competence, treaty-making competence, interpretative competence, and sanctional 
competence.
Observing the existing IEOs from the various points, one can easily find out 
tha t their common features are sophisticatedly combined with specific and individual 
qualities. This gives a special weight to the classification of IEOs through the 
prism of legally significant criteria, which helps to elaborate a more systematic 
legal notion of this functional group of international organizations. The suggested 
classification of IEOs reveals the following picture:
1. Form of statutory act: (1) the IEOs whose constituent documents are international 
treaties; (2) the IEOs established by a document other than a treaty; (3) the IEOs 
which do not have a single formal statutory act.
2. Legal sta tus: (1) autonomous IEOs; (2) quasi-autonomous IEOs.
3. Volume of powers: (1) ordinary intergovernmental IEOs; (2) supranational IEOs.
4. Accession of membership: (1) open IEOs; (2) IEOs of limited accession.
5. Character of membership: (1) IEOs with a single status of Member States; (2) IEOs 
with different categories of membership.
6. Subject of activities:
(1) Organizations of the general competence dealing, among others, with economic 
problems.
(2) Organizations of general economic competence.
(3) Organizations for economic integration: (a) free trade area associations;
(b) customs unions; (c) economic communities.
(4) Specialized economic organizations: (a) trade organizations including
general trade organizations and international commodity organizations; (b) financial 
organizations; (c) investment organizations; (d) organizations for industrial
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cooperation; (e) organizations for agricultural cooperation; (f) transport and 
communication organizations; (g) organizations of exporters and producers.
(5) Other organizations of economic character.
7. Geographical sphere of activities: (1) universal or global IEOs; (2)
interregional or transcontinental IEOs; (3) regional IEOs; (4) subregional IEOs.
8. Decision-making competence: (1) the IEOs whose acts, except the decisions on 
procedural matters, are of recommendatory character; (2) the IEOs making both 
recommendations and binding decisions on the m atters of economic cooperation.
The above classification does not merely present the author’s vision of how IEOs 
can be grouped, but what is more important, gives some initial data for the further 
analysis of the IEOs’ law-making and law-implementing facilities.
Finally, in the First P art of this study an attem pt has been made to outline the 
IEOs’ place within the international legal environment, their relationship with IEL. 
The basic conclusion suggested in this regard is the concept of the emerging law of 
IEOs as a specific inter-disciplinary body of law, which simultaneously makes up a 
part of international institutional law and IEL, and comprises: (1) legal systems of 
individual IEOs; (2) rules of inter-IEOs agreements; (3) few general customary rules 
applicable to all IEOs.
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SECOND PART: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING
The capacity to participate in the international legal standard-setting is one 
of the basic attributes of the IEOs’ international legal personality. Their norm- 
making activities are realized either directly, or as a participation in the norm- 
creating process of the Member States^. IEOs are involved into three main forms of 
international norm-making:
(1) conclusion of treaties with other subjects of international law;
(2) m ultilateral convention-making under the auspices of IEOs;
(3) adoption of the IEOs’ own normative acts (decisions, recommendations, etc.) 
influencing the formulation of international legal rules.
CHAPTER III. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
WITH PARTICIPATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS
1.Treatv-Makiny Competence of IEOs
The conclusion of treaties with other subjects of international law is the most 
typical form of direct participation of international organizations in the 
international law-making. In general outline, this problem has been a subject of
1. See International Law. Ed. by G.I.Tunkin, p. 176.
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numerous studies . In the present paper the analysis begins with a less examined 
aspect of the problem, which is the treaty-making competence of IEOs.
1.1. Treatv-making capacity and treaty-making competence
It seems logical, firstly, to tackle the correlation between the terms "capacity
to conclude treaties" and "treatv-making competence" (or powers) of organization,
which are closely connected and, because of this, sometimes confused.
Treaty-making capacity is an essential feature of an international organization
as a subject of international law. In this connection, A.N.Talalaev states that
"without possessing the capacity to conclude treaties an organization can not be
3considered a subject of international law" . According to the preamble of the 1986 
Vienna Convention, ’international organizations possess the capacity to conclude 
treaties which is necessary for the exercise of their functions and the fulfillment 
of their purposes". Art. 6 of the same Convention stipulates: "The capacity of an
international organization to conclude treaties is governed by the rules of that
. . „4organization
2. See: I.I.Lukashuk. The Parties to International Treaties. - Moscow 1966, p. 118-144; 
E.A.Shibaeva. The Law of International Organizations. - Moscow, 1986, p. 106-110; S.A.Malinin,
T.M.Kovaleva. The Treaty-Making Capacity of International Organizations. - In: Pravovedenie, 1988, 
N 4; L.B.Arhipova. The Treaties of International Economic Organizations of the Socialist Countries.
- Moscow, 1989; A.N.Talalaev. Op. cit. (all in Russian); G.E. do Nascimento e Silva. The Vienna 
Convention and the Treaty-Making Power of International Organizations. - In: GYIL 1986. - Berlin, 
1987., p. 68-85; G.Gaja. A "New" Vienna Convention on Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations: A critical comments. - In: BYIL 1987. - 
Oxford, 1988., p. 253-269.
3. A.N.Talalaev. Op. cit., p. 60.
4. Art. 2 of the 1986 Vienna Convention interprets "the rules of the organization" as "the 
constituent instruments, decisions and resolutions adopted in accordance with them, and established 
practice of the organization".
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The term "capacity to conclude treaties" denotes in general a legal right of a 
subject of international law to enter into international agreements. This is an 
attribute of its international legal personality (see Chapter II). Accordingly, it 
may be presumed tha t the capacity of international organization to conclude treaties 
is governed not only by the rules of tha t organization, but also by general 
international law, especially when the rules of the organization keep silence on 
this matter. The rules of the organization, as interpreted in Article 2 of the 1986 
Vienna Convention, may change in the course of the organization’s evolution. But 
irrespective of such changes, as it follows from general international law and is 
partly reflected in the preamble of the 1986 Vienna Convention, the capacity of the 
organization to conclude treaties has a special functional character compared to the5universal, in principle, treaty-making capacity of a State . It means that no 
organization is legally capable: (1) to exceed its functional treaty-making
necessity (e.g. at the extreme, a specialized financial organization would hardly 
ever have a functional need to enter into an agreement on State borders), and (2) to 
intervene into the treaty-making competence of the Member States without their 
voluntarily expressed consent.
At the same time, as a party to a particular treaty, an international
gorganization is equal in rights and duties with a State .
In order to realize duly the organization’s treaty-making capacity, its treatv- 
making competence should be laid down in the constituent instrum ents and/or 
subsequent rules. In the 1986 Vienna Convention the term  "competence to conclude 
treaties" is briefly mentioned in Art. 46 : "An international organization may not
5. States also can be limited in their treaty-making capacity. For instance, a continental State 
is physically unable to conclude a treaty delimitating continental shelf. However, as regards 
States, such limitations to their treaty-making capacity are rather an exception, than a rule.
6. See I.I.Lukashuk. The Parties to International Treaties, p. 125.
75
invoke the fact th a t its consent to be bound by a treaty  has been expressed in 
violation of the rules of the organization regarding competence to conclude treaties 
as invalidating its consent unless tha t violation was manifest and concerned a rule 
of fundamental importance". This provision, which mirrors the relevant rule of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, can hardly suggest a clear 
understanding of what is the treaty-making competence of an international 
organization. More helpful is the analysis of constituent instrum ents and practice 
of IEOs, which gives every reason to define treaty-making competence as the powers 
of the organization, distributed among its bodies, to conclude the particular kinds 
of treaties, which are regulated by the rules of tha t organization.
Therefore, though not so clearly distinguished in the 1986 Vienna Convention, 
treaty-making capacity and treaty-making competence correlate by analogy to the 
relationship between international legal personality and international legal status 
of an IEO (see Chapter II, paragraph 1). The term  "treaty-making capacity" denotes 
the mere fact of possession by a particular IEO of a functionally determined legal 
right to enter into international agreements with other subjects, while "treaty- 
making competence" is a measurable category, which specifies the types of the 
treaties to be concluded, the distribution of treaty-m aking powers among the bodies, 
as well as the procedures applied within them.
The constituent instrum ents of IEOs reveal various formulas of their treaty- 
making competence due to the peculiarities of their establishment, subject of 
activities, functions, as well as the legal skills of the drafters of those 
instruments.
1.2. Scope of treatv-m aking competence
By the scope of treaty-m aking competence, the IEOs with a relatively wide- 
ranging competence and the IEOs with a more limited competence may be distinguished.
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The drafters of the IEOs’ constituent instrum ents often face the dilemma: to choose 
between a broadly shaped formula of treaty-making competence, which may appear 
obscure, and a more detailed description, which in turn  may happen to be incomplete. 
Each option has its pros and cons.
(a) IEOs with a wide-ranging treaty-making competence
A wide-ranging formula of treaty-making competence can be observed in some
general economic organizations and integrational organizations, whose constituent
instrum ents do not make any limitations as to the types of the treaties to be
concluded or to the list of the potential parties to such treaties. For example,
pursuant to Art. 5 of the founding Convention, the OECD may enter into agreements
with Member States, non-members and other international organizations. A similar
7regulation is provided by the Treaty Establishing the CARICOM . The Treaty 
Establishing the AEC suggests a somewhat more specified formula, under which the 
Community may conclude the cooperation agreements with the third States and shall 
ensure the establishment of relations of cooperation with the UN system, 
particularly the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the UN specialized agencies, and 
any other international organizations with a view to attaining the objectives of the 
Community (Art. 92).
It appears to be presumed tha t even a broadly shaped treaty-making competence of 
an IEO is limited by its subject-matter and functional peculiarities, and cannot be 
equated to tha t of a State. An advantage of a wide-ranging treaty-making competence 
is that there is no need for an IEO to resort to the concept of "implied powers" in
7. Article 8.4. of the Treaty reads: "Subject to the relevant provisions of this Treaty, the 
Conference shall be the final authority for the conclusion of treaties on behalf of the Community 
and for entering into relationships between the Community and International Organizations and 
States".
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its treaty-making practice. On the other hand, there may be disagreements between 
the Member States and the IEO on proper interpretation of the IEO’s wide-ranging 
treaty-making powers in view of the consequences for the Member States. The
gconflicts of this sort have been seen in the EEC practice .
(b) IEOs with a limited trpatv-making competence
Many IEOs have limited treaty-makingpowers, when the constituent documents more
or less definitely enumerate the types of the possible treaties and/or the list of
the subjects with which these may be concluded. Most often such limitations are
determined by the subject of activities and functions of the organization.
Thus, the OAPEC "may conclude agreements with members, or with other countries,
or with a federation of States, or with an international organization, and
especially agreements for establishing joint projects in various phases of economic
9activity in the petroleum industry" . A wide-ranging treaty-making competence 
indicated in the first part of this formula is specified in the second part by the 
reference to the prevailing type of agreements supposed to be concluded by the 
OAPEC.
The Convention Establishing the EFTA lays down more strict limits to the treaty- 
making competence of the Council, which may conclude only an agreement relating to 
the legal capacity and the privileges and immunities of the Association (Art. 35), 
and negotiate an agreement between the Member States and any other State, union of 
States or international organization, creating an association. An agreement of the
8. See e.g. Opinion 1/78 given pursuant to Article 228 ( 1) of the Treaty of Rome (International 
Agreement on Natural Rubber), 1979 ECR 2871.
9. Article Five of the Agreement of the OAPEC.
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latter type, however, is to be submitted to the Member States for acceptance and 
shall enter into force provided tha t it is accepted by all Member States (Art. 41).
The statutory acts of some IEOs of the UN system fix only two kinds of 
agreements to be concluded: agreements with the UN on the status of a specialized 
agency and agreements on cooperation with other international organizations 
operating in the relative fie lds^ . The Constitution of the UNIDO adds a 
headquarters agreement to this short list (Articles 18, 19, 20).
Some IEOs’ constituent instruments definitely mention a single type of agreement 
to be concluded with other subjects. Thus, the Treaty for the Establishment of the
ECCAS of 1983 deals only with the cooperation agreements with the third African
11 12 13States . The Charter of the CCASG and the Agreement Establishing the ATPC
make references only to a headquarters agreement.
In sum, the method of enumerating a limited number of the types of treaties 
within the IEO’s competence, being attractive for its preciseness and clearness, may 
appear not that perfect when the need arises to conclude an agreement not foreseen 
by the narrow formula. In such case a possible way-out is either amending the 
constituent instrum ents or resort to the implied powers.
1.3. Manner of formulating treaty-making competence
10. See e.g. Art. 4, sec.7 of the Articles of Agreement of the IFC of 1955; Art.8 of the Agreement 
Establishing the IFAD of 1976; Art. 29 of the Agreement Establishing the CFC of 1980.
11. Article 89 reads: "(1) Any African State wishing to conclude cooperation agreements with the 
Community shall make application to the Conference which, having taken the Council’s advice, shall 
take a unanimous decision. (2) Such agreements shall be subject to ratification by Member States in 




The character of the wordings of IEOs’ constituent instruments gives grounds to 
distinguish: (a) IEOs with the treaty-making competence defined in detail; (b) IEOs 
with the treaty-making competence outlined in general; (c) IEOs with implied treaty- 
making powers.
(a) Treatv-making competence defined in detail
The FAO and the EEC may serve as the examples of the IEOs with the most 
thoroughly formulated treaty-making powers. Their constituent instrum ents specify 
the types of the possible agreements, the distribution of treaty-making powers among 
the relevant organs and the appropriate procedures.
FAO
The Constitution of the FAO delimits the treaty-making powers of the Conference 
(the plenary organ) and of the Director-General. The Conference may enter into 
agreements with international organizations with related responsibilities about the 
methods of cooperation, whereas the Director-General may, subject to any decision of 
the Conference, enter into agreements with other intergovernmental organizations 
for the maintenance of common services, for common arrangements in regard to 
recruitment, training, conditions of service and other related matters, and for 
interchanges of staff. The Conference may also approve arrangements placing other 
international organizations dealing with questions relating to food and agriculture 
under the general authority of the FAO (Art. XIII). Apart from this, the Conference 
by a two-thirds voting may authorize the Director-General to enter into agreements 
with Member States for the establishment of international institutions dealing with 
questions relating to food and agriculture (Art. XV).
EEC
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According to the Treaty of Rome, the agreements between the Community and one 
or more States or an international organization are to be negotiated by the 
Commission and concluded by the Council, after consulting the European Parliament 
where required by the Treaty (Art. 228). Such agreements are binding on the 
institutions of the Community and on the Member States. This general formula 
provided by Art. 228 is specified with regard to the tariff and trade agreements 
(Articles 113,114) and agreements establishing an association (Art. 238). The 
Commission of the European Communities makes recommendations to the Council 
concerning the tariff and trade agreements with the third States. In its turn, the 
Council authorizes the Commission to open the necessary negotiations and conduct 
them in consultations with a special committee appointed by the Council (Art. 113). 
The Agreements on the behalf of the Community are concluded by the Council (Art. 
114), which in these cases acts by a qualified majority vote. In its turn, the 
association agreements with a third State, a union of States or an international 
organization are concluded by the Council, acting unanimously and after receiving 
the assent of the European Parliament which shall act by an absolute majority of its 
component members (Art. 238 in the wording of the 1986 Single European Act).
It is easy to notice that taking decisions on the conclusion of the Community’s 
agreements, the Council applies different voting procedures under Art. 114, on the 
one hand, and Article 238, on the other. The unanimous voting of the association and 
relevant agreements, compared with the tariff and trade agreements concluded through 
a qualified majority voting, may be reasoned, at least, in two ways.
First, the individual Member States have more concern about the decision-making 
relating to the more global association agreements in order not to lose a control 
over their conclusion (to a certain extent this is explained by the differences in 
the regional policy approaches of the individual Member States). That is why these 
agreements have a mixed scheme, i.e. the Member States and the Community participate 
in them  together. As it has been noted in the literature, "the Mixed Agreement is in
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fact a federal method of treaty-making. It may well be a suitable model for other
14federal or supra-national units" . On the other hand, "the price of mixity is
15uncertainty" , i.e. it may be unclear how the competence and, hence, the liability 
burden are shared between the "mixed" partners.
Second, the tariff and trade agreements, being the main treaty-making product of 
the EEC, need a "green light" procedure in order to avoid an obstructionism of an 
individual Member’s veto right. These considerations of the draftsmen of the EEC 
constituent documents are quite understandable. However, such a voting procedure 
(that is good in terms of the promptness of conclusion) is hardly regarded as 
optimum, since it admits tha t a tariff or trade agreement may be imposed by a 
majority on a minority. And one can not be sure tha t such agreement will be properly 
implemented by the dissentient minority. The problem of implementation seems to be 
extremely important in this case, moreover, tha t the Community agreements under Art. 
228 are binding upon both the institutions and the Member States.
Meanwhile, life goes ahead, and even a relatively clearly formulated treaty- 
making competence may need some changes and developments. This necessity has been 
foreseen by Art. 235 of the Treaty of Rome, under which "if action by the Community 
should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common 
market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the 
necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate 
measures". Such measures may concern, among others, an extension of the EEC treaty- 
making competence.
14. Mixed Agreements. Edited by David O’Keeffe and Henry G.Schermers. Deventer, 1983, p. IX.
15. Ibid., p. X.
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Apart from this, the treaty-making powers of the Community have been extended
by the decisions of the ECJ. In case 22/70 (Commission v Council on the European
Road Transport Agreement) the Court came to the conclusion, that the treaty-making
powers of the Community were not confined to m atters covered by Articles 113 and
238, but embraced in addition an implied power to conclude treaties with third
countries, which may "flow from other provisions of the Treaty and from measures
adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by the Community
16institutions" . A similar view was upheld by the Court in its Opinion "Re the
European Laving-up Fund Agreement" (1976): "Authority to enter into international
commitments may not only arise from an express arbitration by the Treaty, but
equally may flow implicitly from its provisions", when it is necessary for the
17attainm ent of the Community’s objectives
18On the other hand, the ECJ in its Opinion 1/91 on the EEA Draft Agreement 
demonstrated tha t the EEC treaty-making competence can not extend beyond the limits 
of the "constitutional foundations". To quote David O’Keeffe, "the sovereignty of 
the treaty-makers has been curtailed in so far as they cannot make amendments which
„19conflict with the Very foundations’ of the Community" .
(b) Treatv-making competence outlined in general
16. ECR 1971, p. 263.
17. Common Market Law Reports 1977, N 2, p. 279-280.
18. See 31 I.L.M. 442(1992).
19. David O’Keeffe. The Agreement on the European Economic Area. - In: Legal Issues of European 
Integration, 1992/1, p. 16.
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The constituent instrum ents of many IEOs formulate their treaty-making 
competence only in general features. For example, the Agreement Establishing the 
EBRD contains only a brief reference to the treaty-making power of the Board of 
Governors to authorize the conclusion of general agreements for co-operation with 
other international organizations (Art. 24). The above mentioned Art. 5 of the OECD 
Convention defines its treaty-making competence not only widely, but also as a brief 
general formula on the possibility to enter into agreements with the Member States, 
non-members and other international organizations.
Such general wordings can not be considered perfect from the juridical technique 
viewpoint, since they keep open the questions of which organs are involved in 
drafting, negotiating and concluding treaties, what is the procedure of decision­
making, and, finally, who are bound by such agreements: merely an organization or,
20as in the EEC case, the Member States as well .
(c) Implied treatv-making powers
Owing to the peculiarities of establishment of some IEOs, their constituent 
instrum ents lack clear indications of the treaty-m aking powers. For instance, the 
basic text of the GATT, which initially was not meant to become an international 
organization, contains only Art. XV:6 directly saying about the powers of the 
Contracting Parties to enter into special exchange agreements with any contracting
20. The question of whether the Member States are third parties to the treaties concluded by the 
organization, if the constituent instruments do not provide any special rules, was discussed in the 
ILC (see Yearbook of the ILC 1982, vol. 1, N.Y., 1983, 26+). To quote Francis, "in a strictly legal 
sense, the member States of an international organization were third States in relation to treaties 
concluded by the organization. However, they were third States of a unique kind: third States with 
a special interest" (p.51).
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party which is not a Member of the IMF. In conformity with this provision, in 1950-
1952 the Contracting Parties entered into special agreements with Ceylon, Haiti,
21Indonesia and the Federal Republic of Germany . However, the GATT treaty-making
practice extends over the framework of the Art. XV:6. In 1948 the GATT entered into
arrangements on the cooperation, consultations, etc. with the IMF. In 1964 the GATT
concluded the administrative agreement with the UNCTAD on joint operating the
International Trade Center, and in 1977- the agreement with the GATT’s host country,
Switzerland. Taking into account this practice, some commentators deduce the GATT
22treaty-making competence by means of an extended interpretation of Art. XXV: 1 ,
which reads: "Representatives of the contracting parties shall meet from time to
time for the purpose of giving effect to those provisions of the Agreement which
involve joint action and, generally, with a view to facilitating the operation and
furthering of the objectives of this Agreement".
There is also a number of IEOs, whose founding acts keep silence on their
treaty-making competence (e.g. the OPEC, the PTA, the APPA, etc.). Up to 1974 the
CMEA Charter also had no relevant provisions, and it was considered sufficient to
23deduce the CMEA treaty-making capacity from the Charter as a whole . However, in 
1974 when the question of the framework agreement between the EEC and the CMEA 
appeared on the agenda, the CMEA Charter was supplemented by a general wide-ranging
21. See Joseph Gold. Membership and Nonmembership, p. 426-445.
22. See F. Roessler. The Competence of GATT. - In: JWTL, 1987, N 3, p. 80.
23. See E.T. Usenko. 25 years of the International Organization of the New Type. - In: Soviet 
Yearbook of international law 1974. -Moscow, 1975, p. 31 (in Russian).
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formula of treaty-m aking powers similar to tha t of the OECD Convention
Therefore, the existing practice of IEOs has seen numerous examples of extended
interpretation of the IEOs’ statutory acts in relation to their treaty-making
competence. In general, such practice rests on the fundamental rule of
interpretation, which was formulated by Judge Lauterpacht in his Separate Opinion in
the South West Africa: Voting Procedure case (1955): "A proper interpretation of a
constitutional instrum ent must take into account not only the formal letter of the
original instrument, but also its operation in actual practice and in the light of
25the revealed tendencies in the life of the organization" . Normally, if an implied
exceeding of the expressed competence of the organization is functionally necessary
and well motivated, it should not be qualified as illegal (although, it may well
cause a question of reasonable limits for such interpretation which must neither be
ultra vires with regard to the powers of the organ giving the interpretation, nor go
26beyond the objectives and purposes of the organization as a whole ).
24. Art. 111:2 of the Charter stipulated: 'The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ... may 
enter into international agreements with the Member Countries of the Council, other Countries and 
international organizations". This provision was confirmed in Art. 2 of the Convention on the legal 
capacity, privileges and immunities of the CMEA of 1985, which also stated, that "conclusion by the 
Council of an international agreement creating the rights and obligations for the concerned Member- 
Countries of the Council requests for this purpose the powers (the consent expressed specially and 
explicitly) of the respective Countries". However, the CMEA Charter in its final edition did not 
define neither the types of treaties to be concluded by the Council, nor a clear procedure for
their conclusion.
25. I.C.J. Reports 1955, p. 106.
26. Judge Spender in his Separate Opinion in the Certain Expenses of the United Nations case 
(1962) pointed out that the right to interpret the Charter does not give the power to alter it (see 
I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 196-197).
In the Case Concerning the Land. Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras, 
1990) the ICJ emphasized: " However elastic may be the test to be applied in determining the 
existence and extent of implied powers - and undue rigidity is surely to be avoided - it seems in 
any event clear that a constituent instrument cannot be read as implying the existence of powers
(Footnote continues on next page)
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On the one hand, it is undoubtedly preferable when the organization’s powers to 
conclude treaties are explicitly formulated in its constituent documents in order to 
avoid unnecessary complications in interpretation. On the other hand, a cautious and 
well-grounded "implied powers" approach to the organizations competence may be 
justified in those cases, when the constituent provisions are either initially 
imperfect or have become out-of-date, and an adequate subsequent rule-making, 
amending the constituent instruments, for some reason, is unlikely.
2 .Typology of International Agreements with the 
Participation of IEOs
During the recent decades IEOs have accumulated a valuable treaty-making
experience, which covers hundreds of international agreements. However, the
activities of various organizations in this respect are not equal, depending mostly
on their functional needs. Some IEOs (for instance, the EEC, the UNIDO) have an
27intensive and diverse treaty-making practice , while others conclude a quite 
limited number of agreements.
(Footnote continued from previous page)
which contradict the essential nature of the organization which it creates to exercise them"
(I.C.J. Reports, 1990, p. 42-43).
See also Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Implied Powers of International Organizations. - In:
International Law at a Time of Perplexity. Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne. Ed. Yoram Dinstein. 
Dordrecht, 1989, p. 855-868.
27. For instance, only in 1988 the UNIDO concluded cooperation agreements with 15 Member 
Countries, and 14 agreements with other organizations (See Annual Report of UNIDO 1988, p. 137- 
139).
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Compared to other international organizations, the agreements concluded by IEOs 
hardly have any peculiarities in procedural matters, tha t are regulated by the norms 
of the law of treaties. The contents and sometimes the form of the IEOs’ agreements 
are of more interest.
Undoubtedly, the present writer can not pretend to make an exhaustive analysis 
of the numerous treaties concluded by IEOs. The task is more modest: to overview the 
main types of them with the illustration of some noteworthy examples. According to 
the character of vis-a-vis contracting parties, these types are:
(1) co-operation agreements with non-member States;
(2) agreements with Member States;
28(3) co-operation agreements with other international organizations
2.1. Cooperation agreements with non-member States
The agreements of this type are often concluded by the integrational 
organizations establishing special economic regimes with non-member States. Such 
agreements vary in scope, methods and forms of cooperation. Some of them formulate 
the rights and obligations for both the IEO and its Member States. The practice of 
the CMEA and EEC suggests some typical examples.
(a) Agreements between the CMEA and non-member States
The agreements of the CMEA with its non-members (Finland, Iraq, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Angola, People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, 
Afghanistan) were framed according to a ra ther simple scheme. They proclaimed a
28. One can also meet the agreements with a simultaneous participation of IEOs, their Member 
States and non-members (e.g. the 1974 Agreement between the UNIDO, the OPEC and the Austrian 
Federal Government Regarding the Access of the Officials of the OPEC to the Commissary of the UNIDO 
(UNTS, vol. 952, p. 152-153).
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general purpose of developing multilateral economic, scientific and technical 
cooperation, and provided for the establishment of the bilateral Commissions which 
made recommendations to the parties on the particular m atters of such cooperation. 
TheCommissions’recommendationswere implemented through conclusionofthe relevant 
agreements. The parties accepted the obligations to assist the Commissions in their 
activities subm itting to them all necessary m aterials and information. All the 
problems arising in connection with the implementation of the agreements were to be 
settled by negotiations. In sum, the agreements between the CMEA and its non-members 
contained the guidelines for economic cooperation, rather than detailed contractual 
provisions.
(b) Agreements between the EEC and non-member States
Among the existing IEOs the EEC has the broadest network of agreements with non­
member countries on the wide range of issues. Some of these structurally remind of 
the above mentioned CMEA agreements, thus outlining the purposes and directions of
cooperation, ra ther than any precise mechanisms (e.g. the Cooperation Agreement
29between the EEC and the Member countries of ASEAN of 1980 ). At the same time, in
the EEC treaty-making practice one can find the examples of comprehensive regulation
of a large-scope cooperation between the EEC and its Member States, on the one
part, and non-members, on the other part.
One of the most remarkable of them is the Lome Conventions between the EEC and
30the ACP (African, Carribbean and Pacific) States . Without going into details of
29. See Collection of the Agreements concluded by the European Communities 1980, vol. 10, p. 1365- 
1378.
30. The first, second and third Lome Conventions were concluded respectively in 1975, 1979, and 
1984, each for five years. The fourth Convention, signed in 1989, will remain in force for a period
(Footnote continues on next page)
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the EEC-ACP cooperation, which deserves to be an object of an individual study, it 
can be noted that the Lome Conventions have proved to be a working mechanism in 
spite of some vague verbosity of the texts and certain controversies among the 
parties. Certainly, the EEC is moved not by a philanthropy granting the ACP 
Countries some non-reciprocal concessions and financial aid. This special 
preferential treatm ent entails the deeper involvement of the ACP Countries into the 
sphere of the EEC economic influence. However, at the same time, those preferences 
work for the ACP Countries’ development needs, thus, ensuring a sufficient balance
(Footnote continued from previous page)
of 10 years. It covers the EEC members and 68 ACP countries, and gives a detailed description of 
the forms and instruments of the cooperation in the areas of environment, agriculture, fisheries, 
industrial, mining and energy development, enterprise development, services, trade, cultural and 
social cooperation, regional cooperation, etc. The Convention fixes the principle of free access to 
the Community market for products originating in the ACP States, with special provisions for 
agricultural products and a safeguard clause. This principle does not comprise reciprocity for the 
ACP States which, in view of their development needs, accord to the Community the most-favoured- 
nation treatment.
The Convention establishes a special institutional mechanism for facilitating the cooperation 
between the parties. The Council of Ministers composed, on the one hand, of the members of the 
Council and the Commission of the European Communities and, on the other hand, of a member of the 
government of each of the ACP States, establishes the broad lines of the work to be undertaken in 
the context of the application of the Convention. It is assisted by the Committee of the 
Ambassadors consisting, on the one hand, of each Member States’ Permanent Representative to the 
European Communities and one representative of the Commission and, on the other hand, of the head 
of each ACP State’s mission to the European Communities. The Joint Assembly, a consultative body, 
is formed of equal numbers of members of European Parliament and members of parliament or, failing 
this, of representatives designated by the ACP States. The Convention also provides for setting up 
a number of special committees and other bodies.
The key economic instruments of the Lome Conventions are the STABEX and SISMIN systems aimed 
the stabilization of the ACP Countries' export earnings from agricultural commodities and mineral 
products. The overall amount of the EEC financial assistance to the ACP States for the first 5 
years of the Convention is supposed to be 12 billion ECU.
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of interests of all the parties to the Conventions
Another example of a voluminous treaty from the recent EEC practice is the
32Agreement on the European Economic Area . The draft agreement between the EEC and
the EFTA States was reached in October 1991 after two years of intense and complex
negotiations. However, the Opinion of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities of 14 December of 1991 declared that " the system of judicial
supervision which the agreement proposes to set up is incompatible with the Treaty
33establishing the European Economic Community" . This postponed signing of the 
agreement and necessitated further negotiations on its judicial mechanism. The 
amended version of the Agreement was approved by the Court in Opinion of 10 April
Q A1992 and signed by the parties on 2 May 1992 
The EEA Agreement in a number of ways resembles the EEC Treaty. It lays down the 
detailed provisions on the four freedoms: free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital, thus creating a global free trade association. It also sets up a system 
ensuring tha t competition is not distorted, and establishes closer co-operation 
among the parties in such fields as research and development, the environment, 
education and social policy. In the meantime, the EEA Agreement has serious 
limitations compared to the EEC Treaty. For example, it does not cover the Common 
Agricultural Policy, and does not intend to create a customs or monetary union.
31. See more details on Lome Conventions in: M.K.Addo. A Critical Analysis of the Perennial 
International Economic Law Problems of the EEC-ACP Relationship.- ln: GYIL 1990, Vol. 33, Berlin, 
1991,p. 37-68.
32. The EEA Agreement consists of the basic Agreement with 129 Articles, 47 protocols, 22 annexes, 
29 Joint Declarations, an Agreed Minute, 39 Declarations, and additional exchange of letters 
agreements.
33. See 31 ILM 465 (1992)
34. See Symposium: The EEA Agreement. - In: 3 EJIL/JEDI (1992), p. 285-353; David O’Keeffe. The 
Agreement on the European Economic Area, p. 1-27.
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Though, formally, the Agreement on the EEA is concluded not between two IEOs,
but between the EEC and its Member States, on the one part, and the EFTA States, on
the other part, it suggests a unique institutional mechanism comprising the EEA 
35institutions and the interacting institutional structures of the EC and the
36EFTA . It is not clear, however, how viable this cumbersome institutional model 
and the whole Agreement will be in view of the possible accession of the most EFTA 
countries to the EEC. The most likely scenario, in case the ratification 
difficulties do not hinder it from the very beginning, is a temporal transitional 
character of the EEA Agreement as adapting the EFTA States to the EEC membership.
2.2. Agreements with Member States
The most typical kinds of agreements concluded by IEOs with their members are:
(a) agreements on technical assistance, (b) financial agreements, (c) agreements on
37headquarters
35. These are: (1) the EEA Council responsible for giving the political impetus in the 
implementation of the Agreement, whose decisions shall be taken by agreement between the Community, 
on the one hand, and the EFTA States, on the other;
(2) the EEA Joint Committee which shall ensure the effective implementation and operation of the 
Agreement, whose decisions shall be taken by agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and 
the EFTA States speaking with one voice, on the other;
(3) the EEA Parliamentary Committee which shall contribute through dialogue and debate, to a better 
understanding between the parties, expressing its views in the form of reports or resolutions, and 
examine annual report of the EEA Joint Committee;
(4) the EEA Consultative Committee which shall promote co-operation between the parties in the 
social and economic fields expressing its views in the form of reports and resolutions.
36. The EEC Commission and the ECJ, on the one hand, and the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the 
EFTA Court, on the other hand, shall participate in the mechanism of administrative and judicial 
supervision provided by the EEA Agreement.
37. Apart from the above most typical kinds of treaties, the IEOs* treaty-making practice has 
seen some more specific agreements with the Member States (see e.g. the Exchange of Letters 
Constituting an Agreement between the USA and the OECD Relating to the Reimbursement of Income 
Taxes (UNTS, vol. 1072, p. 196-197).
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(a) Agreements on technical assistance
This kind of agreements is typical for the IEOs of special competence, most of
38all for the UN economic institutions . Various in the contents of the assistance,
these are aimed, as a rule, at the arrangement of seminars, teaching programmes,
research work, experts’ services, equipment supply, etc. Such agreements also
determine the distribution of expenses among the IEOs granting the assistance and
the beneficiary States. The IEOs practicing intensive treaty-making in the field of
technical assistance apply standard agreements (e.g. the UNDP Standard Basic
Assistance A greem ent^). Some IEOs conclude agreements with developed S ta te s^  or
41other IEOs on joint technical assistance for the third developing countries.
In sum, the agreements on technical assistance, possibly quite complicated with 
regard to the contents of the technical projects, have a narrowly specialized
38. See e.g. the Agreement on technical assistance between the UN, the ILO, the FAO, the UNESCO, 
the ICAO, the WHO, the ITU, the WMO, the 1AAE and Somali of 1961 (UNTS, vol. 387); the Agreement 
concerning assistance by the UNDP to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam of 1974 (UNTS, vol. 
933/934); Standard Basic Agreement between the UN and the LADB concerning the UNDP technical co­
operation activities for development of 1987 ( UNTS, vol. 1106, p. 307-323).
39. See e.g. Agreement between the Government of Ghana and the UNDP of 1978. - In: UNTS, vol.
1119, p. 212-222.
40. For example, in 1978 the UNIDO and Czechoslovakia signed the Memorandum of understanding on a 
joint programme for international cooperation in the field of ceramics, building materials and non- 
metallic minerals based industries, under which the Czechoslovakian institute took an obligation to 
co-operate with the respective organizations in the developing countries in teaching engineers and 
technicians, testing raw materials, technological and geological researches, transfer of technology 
(UNTS, vol. 1106). A similar example is the 1976 Memorandum of Understanding in the Establishment
by the Government of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria and by UNIDO of a Joint Programme for 
International Cooperation in the Metalworking Machine Tool Industry for the Benefit of the 
Developing Countries ( UNTS, vol. 1031, p. 196-199).
41. For example, the Agreement between the UNDP and the AfDB of 1977 provided for joint efforts 
and close working relationships between the parties in order to achieve the purposes of the UNDP 
(UNTS, vol. 1037, p. 370-383).
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functional character and strongly differ from the above considered global 
association agreements with non-members, known to the practice of integrational 
organizations. The obligations of the parties to such agreements resemble short-term 
contractual provisions, rather than any long-term fundamentals for cooperation.
(b) Financial agreements
There are hundreds of loan, credit and guarantee agreements of various types and
42forms concluded between IEOs and their Member States . International financial 
organizations often use the standard forms of agreement in order to simplify the 
process of treaty-making. In this connection, the General Conditions Applicable to 
Loan and Guarantee Agreements of the IBRD and the General Conditions Applicable to 
Development Credit Agreements of the IDA are worth mentioning. These documents are 
applied as general standard forms of dispositive character, i.e. the parties to the 
concrete agreement may specify their terms, concerning the loan (credit) account, 
charges, repayment, currency, withdrawal of proceeds of loan (credit), taxes, 
financial and economic information, etc. Another example of a standard loan
42. For instance, L.Nurick suggested the following classification of the main formal agreements 
used in the lending operations of the IBRD:
(D Loan Agreement (between the Bank and the borrower);
(2) Guarantee Agreement (between the Bank and the Member State in case the borrower is not a 
Member State);
(3) Project Agreement (between the Bank and the entity carrying out the project if such entity 
is not the borrower);
(4) Supplementary Letters (exchanged between the parties amplifying, when necessary, the above 
agreements);
(5) Additional contractual arrangements (e.g. security arrangements such as mortgages, etc.);
(6) In certain cases, there may be a complex of agreements between a government and a private 
party, which the Bank, although not a party to the agreement, will rely on in making a loan (Lester 
Nurick. Certain Aspects of the Law and Practice of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. - In: The Effectiveness of International Decisions. Ed. by Stephen M. Schwebel. 
Leyden, A.W.Sichhoff, 1971, p. 104).
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agreement is the Model Agreement forBalance ofPayments Support Loans from the OPEC 
43Special Fund .
Unlike the specialized financial organizations oriented to financial needs of
their Member States, the EEC practices the agreements (protocols) on financial and
technical co-operation with non-members. Within only 1992 the Community entered in
such agreements with seven Arab countries: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
44Syna, and Tunisia .
Some IEOs conclude both credit and borrowing agreements. For instance, the IMF 
adopted the General Arrangements to Borrow which are applied as standard agreement 
form in cases when the main industrial countries make loans to the Fund to forestall 
or cope with the impairment of the international monetary system (under Art. VII, 
Section 1 of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF).
Like agreements on technical assistance, most financial agreements have a 
narrowly specialized character. They normally contain merely functional contractual 
clauses and avoid any general standards which are not directly relevant to the 
particular subject-matter. For this reason, the standard forms are widely applicable 
for these types of agreements.
43. See 16 ILM 643-659 (1977).
44. These are of a standard, quite simple composition. The key provision fixes the amount of 
financial means which is to be rendered for specified purposes in the form of loans, grants, and 
contribution to risk capital formation. The country eligible for financial aid must fit some 
criteria, such as to carry out reform programmes approved by the Bretton Wood institutions, or 
implement programmes recognized as similar. The account is also taken of the following factors: the 
economic situation of the country, with particular reference to its level of indebtedness and dept 
service burden, balance of payment situation and the availability of foreign currency, budgetary 
situation, monetary situation, per capita GDP, social situation and, in particular, level of 
employment. The parties by mutual agreement deaw up an indicative programme determining the 
specific objectives of financial and technical co-operation, the priority sectors for intervention
and the action programmes envisaged. The parties also agree to examine the priority development 
objectives adopted at national level, the sectors on which the Community contribution will be 
focussed, measures and schemes best suited to achieving the objectives. The results of co-operation 
may be examined within the Co-operation Council (see OJ 1992. L 18, L 94, L 352).
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(c) Agreements on headquarters
Since each international institution is supposed to establish relevant
relationships with the host State (that is, most often, a Member State), it usually
does this in the form of an agreement on headquarters. The headquarters agreements
provide for the recognition of the IEO’s international legal personality by the host
State and enumerate the IEO’s immunities and privileges (namely, the exemption from
the host State’s jurisdiction, the inviolability of property and archives, the
liberty for communications, the immunities and privileges for the personnel,
45etc.) . Some agreements oblige the organizations not to use their headquarters as
an asylum for the persons sheltering from arrest or subjected to extradition to the 
46other State .
Normally, the headquarters agreements do not strongly vary from one IEO to
another. Some formal peculiarities can be seen in the 1977 agreement between the
47GATT and Switzerland, concluded in the form of an exchange of letters . It had a 
reference character and granted to the GATT the privileges and immunities by analogy 
to the 1946 Agreement between the UN and Switzerland on the UN privileges and 
immunities.
45. The immunities and privileges of the IEOs were the subject-matter of numerous judicial cases: 
e.g. Porru v. FAQ (1969). - 71 I.L.R. 240-241; FAQ v. INPDAI (1982). - 87 I.L.R. 1-10; Bank 
Bamiputra Malaysia Bhd. v. International Tin Council and Another (1987). - 80 I.L.R. 24-30; 
International Tin Council v. Amalgament Inc. (1988). - 80 I.L.R. 30-38; Maclaine WiHson v.
Department of Trade (1987). - 80 I.L.R. 39-180.
46. See e.g. Art. 2 of the Protocol of Privileges and Immunities for the AMF between the State of 
the United Arab Emirates and the AMF of 1977; Art. 3 of the Agreement between the UN and Iraq on 
the Headquarters of the UN Economic Commission for the West Africa of 1979.
47. Up to 1977 the legal status of the GATT had been regulated by a unilateral declaration by the 
Swiss authorities, under which the GATT, provisionally using the office of the Interim Commission 
of the International Trade Organization, enjoyed the same treatment as the European office of the
UN. In 1977, when the GATT moved into its own headquarters, it signed an appropriate agreement with 
Switzerland (see F. Roessler. The Competence of GATT, p. 80-81).
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Sometimes, a headquarters agreement is followed by a more particular agreement
relating to the IEO’s status in the host country. The Agreement between the
Philippines and the AsDB regarding the AsDB Staff Housing Requirements of 1982 may 
i  4 8serve as an example .
Unlike agreements on technical assistance and financial agreements, which 
basically serve for the needs of the Member States using the accumulated resources 
and facilities of the relevant "donor" IEOs, a headquarters agreement works 
primarily for the internal needs of an IEO itself, laying down the essential 
elements of its legal status. Accordingly, as an integral part of the IEO’s 
constituent instruments, the headquarters agreement has an individual character and 
can be subject to standardization only in a sense of applying similar forms of 
agreement to comparable organizations.
2.3. Co-operation agreements with other international
organizations
(a) Agreements between the UN and its Specialized Economic
Agencies
48. According to this agreement, the Bank may acquire land for its Staff Housing facilities by 
purchase or otherwise. The Government of the Philippines provides to the Bank all necessary 
assistance to facilitate the importation of the materials and equipment which may be needed for the 
construction, furnishing, maintenance and operation of the Staff Housing facilities. All operations 
and transactions relating to the Staff Housing facilities are exempt from all taxes, custom duties 
and other charges and levies, as well as from all prohibitions and restrictions. The Government 
provides to the Bank necessary assistance in obtaining approvals, licenses and permits for public 
utility and other services connected with the operation of the Staff Housing facilities. The 
Agreement also regulates the conditions of termination and occupancy of the Staff Housing 
facilities (see 21 ILM 697-701 (1982).
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The agreements between the UN and its specialized economic agencies are of a 
standard composition with some slight distinctions:
The UN recognizes the respective IEO as its Specialized Agency. The UN 
representatives are invited to the sessions and meetings of the Specialized Agency’s 
organs, as well as the representatives of the Specialized Agency take part in the 
deliberations of the UN organs on the items of the agenda relating to the competence 
of the Specialized Agency. The UN and the Specialized Agency may propose the items 
for the agenda in the organs of each other. The Parties agree to cooperate in the 
fields of their common competence. The Specialized Agency agrees to take into 
account the UN recommendations in the shortest possible time and to consult the UN 
on the matters relating to such recommendations, as well as to report to the UN on 
the measures taken for their implementation. The Specialized Agency submits to the 
UN the annual reports on its activities. The parties exchange all necessary 
documents and information. They also strive to avoid duplications in statistics and 
to exchange statistic data. The parties take obligations on mutual technical 
assistance including transfer of technology in the relevant spheres. They agree to 
consult each other on the most effective use of the service means, to cooperate in 
exchange of personnel. The Specialized Agency participates in the UN Pension Fund.
The UN and the Specialized Agency express their willingness to establish close 
financial relations, including making financial arrangements. The Specialized Agency 
agrees to submit its draft budgets to the UN General Assembly for consideration. It 
also agrees to submit any information at the request of the ICJ. The UN General 
Assembly authorizes the Specialized Agency to request the ICJ for consultations on 
legal issues. In th a t case the Specialized Agency is to inform the ECOSOC of each 
such inquiry. It also informs the ECOSOC on any official arrangement which is
49. The agreements between the UN and its specialized economic agencies were concluded 
respectively: with the IMF, the World Bank, and the FAO in 1947; with the IFC in 1957; with the IDA 
in 1961; with the WIPO in 1974; with the IFAD in 1977; with the UNIDO in 1985.
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planned to be made with the other UN system entities. In order to implement the 
agreement between the UN and the Specialized Agency the chief officials of the two 
organizations may enter into additional arrangements which they consider reasonable.
Some constituent instruments of the Specialized Agencies provide a special 
procedure of subsequent approval for the agreements with the UN. For instance, under 
Art. 6 (f) of the Convention Establishing the WIPO, "the approval of an agreement 
with the United Nations under Articles 57 and 63 of the Charter of the United 
Nations shall require a majority of nine-tenths of the votes cast". As P.I.B.Kohona
states, "such a resolution of an organization might in this instance amount to a
• »50ratification
(b) Memorandums of understanding
The cooperation agreements between the IEOs and other international
51organizations, often called the "memorandums of understanding" , also have some 
common features. Normally, they lay down the purposes and fields of co-operation, 
establishment of working relations, joint actions on assistance*to the common 
Member States in the achievement of the organizations’ objectives, the exchange of 
necessary information, documents, statistics, personnel, mutual representation, 
joint research and technical cooperation, working meetings and consultations, 
setting up joint functional units, etc. Some memorandums specify more complicated
50. P.I.B.Kohona. Op. cit., p. 27.
51, See e.g. the Memorandum of understanding concerning co-operation between the FAO and the UNEP 
of 1977 (UNTS, vol. 1126), the Memorandum of understanding between the IFAD and the UNDP of 1978 
(UNTS, vol. 1080).
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joint programmes and their co-financing . Among the measures of implementation
provided by the memorandums of understanding one can meet institutional
arrangem ents^ .
On the whole, the memorandums of understanding, seemingly simple as to the 
55form and contents, discharge an important function of the inter-IEOs coordination 
in the fields of their common competence. Such coordination, evolving from 
elementary to more elaborate forms, contributes to the improvement of the overall 
institutional framework for the world economy.
(c) Joint Declarations
52. For example, pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding with Respect to Working Arrangemer 
between the UNIDO, and the IBRD and IDA of 1973, the Joint IBRD/UNIDO Co-operative Program 
consisted of the following activities to be carried out in respect of developing countries of the
common membership in the field of manufacturing industry:
(a) industrial sector studies and assistance to Governments in formulating industrial policies and 
plans;
(b) assistance to Governments in commissioning and supervising project feasibility studies;
(c) identification, preparation and appraisal of projects under consideration for financing by the 
IBRD;
id) provision of technical advice in connection with projects financed by the IBRD;
(e) other related activities as agreed between the IBRD and UNIDO ( see UNTS, vol. 1031, p. 302).
53. See e.g. the Agreement between the IBRD and the IDA and the IFAD of 1978 (UNTS, vol. 1090, p. 
310-314).
54. Thus, according to the Memorandum of understanding concerning cooperation between the ILO and 
the UNIDO of 1976, the Joint Working Party was set up to review all technical cooperation projects
of mutual interest, and to consider, whenever necessary, issues of policy and make recommendations 
to the Executive Heads of the two organizations (UNTS, vol. 1031, p. 308-313).
55. In certain cases, the cooperation agreements between the IEOs are concluded in a simplified 
form of exchange of letters (see e.g. Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement between the 
UNIDO and the European Communities of 1976 (UNTS, vol. 1031, p. 330-333); Letter of Understanding 
Constituting an Agreement between the UNIDO and the Inter-American Bank for Coordination and 
Cooperation between the two institutions of 1971 (UNTS, vol. 1031, p. 296-297).
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Life gives birth to the new forms of agreements between IEOs, one of which is
the Joint Declaration on the establishment of the official relations between the EEC
and the CMEA of 1988. Despite the fact that the CMEA does not any longer exist, this
document is worth to be mentioned as an innovation, at least in a formal sense, to
56the IEOs’ treaty-making practice . Judging from the title and form of the
Declaration one might conclude that it belonged to the so-called "international
understandings" (communiques, declarations, etc.) which formulate the general
guidelines when there is no reason or no chance for the parties to conclude an
international agreement. However, more thorough examination of the document gives
grounds to affirm that by legal nature it was analogous to an international treaty
in a simplified form with all relevant consequences. There are at least two reasons
for such conclusion: first, "the territorial clause" concerning West Berlin (item
5), which would have been hardly appeared in a non-legal document; and, second, the
procedure of adopting the Declaration through two stages typical for international
57treaties - initialing and then full signature
56. The Declaration was preceded by the lengthy negotiations started in 1973, when the CMEA 
offered to conclude a framework agreement between the two organizations which was responded by the 
EEC proposal of a standard agreement with separate Member States of the CMEA. Because of the 
initial differences in the parties’ positions the first stage of the negotiations failed to give
any practical effect. An abnormal state of mutual non-recognition caused some strange consequences 
in the regimes of multilateral treaties to which both the EEC and the CMEA Member States 
participated. Thus, up to 1986 the USSR used to make reservations to such agreements (e.g. the 
International Agreement on Tropical Timber of 1983, the International Sugar Agreement of 1984, the 
International Wheat Agreement of 1986), pointing out that it did not consider itself to be bound by 
those treaties’ provisions with the EEC. In its turn, the EEC objected the USSR reservations.
Only in 1985 the previously suspended contacts between the two organizations were renewed. The 
parties agreed upon the principle of parallelism which meant the establishment of the official 
relations between the EEC and the CMEA with the subsequent opening of the CMEA Member States’ 
diplomatic missions at the EEC. The first stage was marked by the 1988 Joint Declaration.
57. The conclusion that the Joint Declaration had a legally binding effect upon the parties can be 
found in: G.Lysen. The Joint Declaration by the EEC and the CMEA. - In: North Carolina Journal of 
International Law and Commercial Regulation, 1989, N 3, p. 388; S.Voitovich, Aleksandros Holevas. 
The Joint EEC-CMEA Declaration: international legal aspects. - In: Foreign Trade, Moscow, 1989, N
9.
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The primary legal effect of the Joint Declaration consisted in the mutual 
official recognition of the two IEOs, which created a real premise for the more 
comprehensive realization of their international legal personality through 
participation in new agreements and other forms of international cooperation. The 
political and legal conditions created by the Declaration entailed the conclusion of 
the cooperation agreements between the EEC and individual members of the then CMEA.
One can also meet another type of joint declarations known to traditional 
treaty-making practice of States and international organizations. Such joint 
declarations of the contracting parties specify or interpret certain provisions of 
the basic treaty and may be attached to it as an annex. A number of joint 
declarations of this sort has been made by the contracting parties to the Agreement 
on the EEA of 1992.
♦ * *
It can be concluded that, nowadays, States, previously the only law-creating 
subjects, transfer some of their treaty-making powers to the IEOs, which possess 
better opportunities for the establishment of certain kinds of treaty regimes with 
other international legal persons. This concerns, primarily, the opportunities for 
collective technical and financial assistance, for the establishment of special 
economic regimes of m ultilateral cooperation. Other IEOs’ agreements are concluded 
for the organizations’ "internal" needs (the agreements on the status of the UN 
specialized agency, the headquarters agreements) and for more effective realization 
of their functions (the agreements between IEOs on cooperation in the m atters of 
their common competence).
IEOs strongly vary in the scope and intensity of treaty-making. For some of them 
(e.g. financial organizations) international agreements occupy a central place among 
the legal means applied for achieving their purposes. Consequently, these IEOs have
102
a regular and voluminous treaty-making practice, normally using standard treaty 
forms. Many other IEOs, due to their functional peculiarities, treat international 
agreements as a secondary legal instrument, giving preference to binding decisions 
and recommendations. Hence, their participation in treaty-making is more fragmentary 
and sporadic.
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CHAPTER IV. MULTILATERAL CONVENTION-MAKING 
UNDER THE AUSPICES 
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS
Along with the involvement in direct treaty-making with other subjects, many
IEOs reasonably serve as the forums for negotiating multilateral economic agreements
among the Member States. The elaboration of treaties under the auspices of IEOs is a
form of preparatory law-making. In this case IEOs participate in producing
international legal norms not directly, but as a prefatory institutional base
possessing necessary technical facilities, competent experts, information from the
Member States, etc. In principle, the relevant organs of IEOs may take part in the
58preparation, examination and adoption of multilateral conventions . However, a
final decision on a convention’s entering into force is a prerogative of the States
which are supposed to become its contracting parties. Consequently, stricto sensu
States are the primary law-makers in this case, while an IEO executes an important
but auxiliary law-making function.
The 1985 UN publication entitled "Review of the Multilateral Treaty-Making
Process” revealed a long list of stages and procedures of multilateral convention-
59making within international organizations . This description was based on the
58. See C.H.Alexandrowicz. The Law-Making Functions of the Specialized Agencies of the United 
Nations. Sydney, 1973, p. 20.
59. These are:
(A) Initiation of treaty-making, that includes:
(1) Proposals for new treaty instruments from Governments, subsidiary organs, expert groups, 
Secretariats, and other organizations;
(2) Pre-initiating studies on advisability and feasibility of convention-making prepared by 
Secretariats, committees of experts;
(3) Formal initiating of treaty-making by virtue of decisions of specified organs;
(Footnote continues on next page)
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treaty-ineiking experience of various international organizations, including some 
IEOs, and envisaged a generalized procedural scheme of convention-making on the 
institutional base.
Apparently, the existing IEOs strongly vary in their convention-making 
capacities and practice. Some of them have special provisions relating to 
convention-making in the constituent instruments (e.g. the UN, the FAO, the UNCTAD), 
while others are oriented to the arising practical needs without any preliminary 
formulated provisions (e.g. GATT). There are few permanent specialized draft-making 
bodies (e.g. the ILC, the UNCITRAL). In the meantime, most of IEOs recourse to ad 
hoc organs as far as a convention-making necessity emerges.
(Footnote continued from previous page)
(4) Decision as to the type of instrument to be elaborated: convention, recommendation or a 
combination of both types of instruments;
(B) Formulation of multilateral treaties, that includes:
(1) Initial draft prepared by a group of experts;
(2) Negotiating process embracing various stages of convention-making;
(3) Consultations with Governments;
(4) Setting up expert or representative drafting committees;
(5) Decision as to working languages and languages in which the treaty will be authentic;
(6) Standard final clauses prepared by some organizations that are active in treaty-making;
(7) Preparation of summary records and commentaries on the deliberations in the organs that 
consider a treaty;
(8) Identification of the possible conflicts between the existing legal instruments and 
proposed treaties;
(C) Adoption of multilateral treaties including the definition of the competent organ, setting 
up voting and special procedural rules;
(D) Post-adoption concerns with the non-ratification or slow ratification of treaties, attempts 
to improve the negotiating process with a view of arriving at texts most acceptable to the 
potential parties, to increase the flexibility of treaties;
(E) Supplementing and updating treaties by virtue of annexes, opt-out procedures, simplified 
procedures for amendments, etc. (See UN Legislative Series. Review of the Multilateral Treaty- 
Making Process. N.Y., 1985, p. 23-38).
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This Chapter analyzes how IEOs contribute to the elaboration of: (1) 
codification conventions; (2) unification conventions; (3) special multilateral 
agreements among the Member States.
1. Codification Conventions
Codification and progressive development of international law are two closely 
interrelated processes of harmonization and improvement of the international 
normative legal system. According to Art. 15 of the Statute of the ILC, 
"codification" means "the more precise formulation and systematization of rules of 
international law in fields where there already has been extensive state practice, 
precedent and doctrine", while the term "progressive development of international 
law" is used "for convenience as meaning the preparation of draft conventions on 
subjects which have not yet been regulated by international law or in regard to 
which the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of States". 
Virtually, these two processes can hardly be separated, since most codification 
conventions contain both elements.
One may reasonably ask, how IEOs contribute to the codification of IEL, which 
appears to be the largest branch of public international law as to the quantity of 
norms, but what is paradoxical, has one of the lowest levels of codification 
compared to other branches. There is no general multilateral treaty comprising the 
basic principles and norms of IEL. This gap is just partially filled by some quasi­
codification treaties (e.g. the GATT, the constitutions of some global IEOs, some 
transport conventions) and pre-codifying recommendations of international 
organizations (e.g. the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, non-binding 
codes of conduct). An acute necessity in a general economic convention laying down
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the basic universally acceptable rules of interstate economic conduct or, at
61least the World Trade Charter has been repeatedly stressed in economic and legal
studies. However, the existing differences in positions of States that are potential
parties to codification conventions remove the codification of the IEL to the
subject-matter of lex ferenda.
IEOs are reasonably expected to make their contribution to the codification of
IEL. The first preparatory steps have been already made within the UN. These are:
the UNITAR analytical document on legal principles and norms of a New International
62Economic Order presented at the 39th General Assembly session , and the draft
convention on the most-favoured-nation clauses prepared by the ILC in 1978. But the
future fate of these documents is still vague because of considerable divergence in
the States’ attitudes to the matters concerned.
Unfortunately, the ILC, which is supposed to occupy "a pivotal place in the
63United Nations law-making system" , does not pay an adequate attention to the 
problems of IEL, while some issues included to its agenda seem to be less important. 
The ILC’s draft on the most-favoured-nation clauses, the only one directly relating 
to IEL, has rather weak chances to turn  into convention. Neither has there been any
60. See, for example, J.Tinbergen. Reshaping the International Order. Moscow, 1980, p. 145; 
V.P.Shatrov. International Legal Problems of the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order. - In: Sovetskoje gosudarstvo i pravo, 1986, N 8, p.96 (both in Russian).
61. See Meinhard Hilf. Settlement of Disputes in International Economic Organizations: Comparative 
Analysis and Proposals for Strengthening the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures. - In: The New GATT 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Legal and Economic Problems. Second updated Edition. Ed. 
by E.-U.Petersmann, M.Hilf. Deventer,/Boston, 1991, p. 322.
62. See UN doc. A/39/504/Add. 1.
63. M.E1 Baradei, T.M.Frank, R.Trachtenberg. The International Law Commission. The Need for a New 
Direction. N.Y., UNITAR, 1981, p.3. See also B.G.Ramcharan. The International Law Commission. Its 
Approach to the Codification and Progressive Development of International Law. The Hague, 1977;
I.Sinclair. The International Law Commission. Cambridge, 1987. B.Graefrath. The International Law 
Commission: Improving its Organization and Methods of Work. - In: AJIL, 1991, vol.85, N 4, p. 595- 
612.
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considerable impact on the IEL codification on the part of other IEOs’ organs. At 
present, the only plausible expectation is a global trade agreement, which might 
appear in the case of successful outcome of the GATT Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations.
In the meantime, it must be admitted that unlike unsatisfactory codification of
the IEL at the global level, successful examples of regional codification can be
seen within some IEOs. Thus, the 1987 Quito Protocol incorporated an official
codified text of the Cartagena Agreement, which introduced fundamental reforms into
64the Andean Group integrational process
2. Unification Conventions
Unification may be defined as the process of creating uniform national laws on 
particular m atters by virtue of international model law conventions. This process of 
law harmonization relates primarily to technical legal issues which need to be 
uniformly regulated by national laws of different States in order to avoid 
undesirable law collisions. A peculiarity of the model law conventions is that most 
of their rules are addressed not to the contracting States, but to their nationals, 
thus resembling the rules of national law. In the meantime, the contracting States 
take general obligations (which are basically fixed in the final clauses): to 
promote appropriate enforcement for the rules of such conventions on the national 
and international scales.
Commercial transactions between the nationals of different States is one of the 
areas in which unification is acutely needed and actively provided. In 1966 a 
special UN organ - the UNCITRAL - was set up on the proposal of Hungary by the 
General Assembly Resolution 2205/XXI. The Commission’s objective is to promote 
progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade in forms
64. See: 28 I.L.M. 1165 (1989).
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of international conventions, uniform laws, standard contract provisions, etc.
Unlike the ILC, whose members act in their individual capacity, the UNCITRAL is
65composed of 36 States’ representatives elected by the General Assembly for a term 
of six years according to the principle of equitable geographical distribution of 
seats and adequate representation of the principal economic and legal systems of the 
world, and of developed and developing countries. The UNCITRAL allows participation 
of the observers from other interested UN Member States and international 
organizations, which may join all discussions without a voting right.
Normally, the UNCITRAL holds its annual sessions that last from two to four 
weeks. The initial task on convention-drafting is usually intrusted to a working 
group which uses for this purpose the materials on existing law and legal practice 
prepared by the secretariat and generated by its members. After completing the 
drafting and editorial work, the working group circulates the draft text together 
with the commentary to governments and interested international institutions. Then, 
the draft with the received comments is submitted to the Commission for detailed 
review during its session. Once the text has been approved by the UNCITRAL, it 
presents it to the General Assembly for consideration and recommendation to the 
Member States.
Among the conventions drafted by the UNCITRAL it is worth to mention: the
Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods of 1974, the
UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by the Sea of 1978, the UN Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods of 1980, and the UN Convention on
66International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes of 1988
65. See the UN General Assembly Resolution 28/3108 of 12 December 1973.
66. See, for instance, G.Herrmann. The Contribution of UNCITRAL to the Development of 
International Trade Law. - In: The Transnational Law of International Commercial Transactions. Ed. 
by N.Horn, C.M.Schmitthoff. Vol. 2, Deventer, 1982, p.35-50; A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model law on 
International Commercial Arbitration. By H.M.Holtzmann and J.E.Neuhas. The Hague, 1989.
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The unification acts of the CMEA also deserve brief notice. Initially, these
acts had been passed as the CMEA recommendations and afterwards incorporated into
the legal systems of the concerned Member Countries by virtue of their national
legal acts. Some writers treated the CMEA unification acts as international treaties
68sui generis arisen on the basis of the Council’s recommendations . Unlike the 
UNCITRAL conventions, whose rules are of prevailingly optional character, the CMEA 
unification acts contained numerous imperative (peremptory) rules. After the CMEA 
dissolution, the former Member Countries agreed that, owing to the high quality of 
some CMEA unification acts (e.g. the CMEA General Conditions for Delivery of Goods), 
their provisions might be applied to the commercial contracts in case of relevant 
contractual references to them.
The UNIDROIT is another international institution specialized in unification 
relating, among others, to economic issues. Its treaty-making procedure is quite 
typical. Once a topic proposed by Member States, interested international 
organizations, Members of the Governing Council of the UNIDROIT or the Secretariat 
has been included in the Work Program of the Institute, either the Secretariat or a 
group of consultant experts prepares a preliminary study of the subject. The report 
on such study may be circulated among interested States and institutions with a view 
of receiving observations and comments. At the next stage, depending on the degree 
of governmental interest to the subject and its ripeness for convention-making, the 
Governing Council may either set up a Study Group of experts or immediately convene 
a Committee of Governmental Experts with the mandate to prepare draft uniform rules. 
Once the draft is approved by the Governing Council, it is submitted to the
67. The CMEA General Conditions for Delivery of Goods, General Conditions for Technical 
Maintenance, General Conditions for Erection, and General Conditions for Specialization and 
Cooperation are meant here.
68. See M.P.Bardina. CMEA Unification Acts in the Foreign Trade Regulation Field. - In: Soviet 
Yearbook of International Law 1987, Moscow, 1988, p. 247 (in Russian).
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participating Governments and other interested institutions which make relevant 
proposals and suggestions to it. Then, the Governing Council considers the best way 
of convening a Diplomatic Conference to examine the draft. In some cases the drafts 
initially prepared by the UNI DROIT were transm itted to another international 
organization for its further adoption within the framework of the latter one (e.g. 
the UNIDROIT draft of a Law for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the 
Validity of Contracts of International Sale of Goods was transmitted to the 
UNCITRAL)
Therefore, unlike codification, which is still expected to turn into a serious 
subject-matter of the IEOs’ treaty-making, the unification work of some 
organizations, most of all in the area of international commerce, is known for its 
notable results. This once again proves the fact that a successful convention-making 
appears in those fields, where both the subject is ripe for an agreement and the 
treaty-makers strive for it.
3. Special Multilateral Agreements
The treaties of this type are negotiated within many IEOs, which, as a rule, do 
not have any special permanent treaty-making organs (like the ILC or the UNCITRAL), 
but recourse to ad hoc draft-making groups. Such approach is rational in view of a 
highly specialized character of the drafted agreements which require different 
categories of legal experts for each case. In other words, compact negotiating 
groups dealing with particular issues are preferable for drafting, while large 
conferences are supposed to be used only at the conclusive stage of the convention-
69. See Review of Multilateral Treaty-Making Process, p. 478-482.
I l l
making, when the final agreements based on the drafts are specified and approved
3.1. FAQ
The FAO appears to have the most detailed statutory provisions relating to 
71convention-making . Art. XIV of its Constitution lays down the following
procedure. A technical meeting or conference comprising Member Nations makes a draft
which is submitted through the Director-General after proper consultations with the
Member States to the Conference or the Council. The Conference may, by a two-thirds
majority of the votes cast, approve and submit to the Member States a draft of any
convention or agreement relating to food and agriculture. The relevant competence of
the Council is more limited and relates only to : (a) agreements of particular
interest to the Member States of a specified geographical area; (b) supplementary
conventions or agreements designed to implement a previously adopted convention or
agreement. Any convention or agreement approved by the Conference or the Council for
submission to the Member States comes into force in the order prescribed by this
convention or agreement. There is a uniform procedure for amending conventions and
72agreements concluded under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution
The FAO may also approve conventions to which non-members of the Organization, 
but Members of the UN may participate. On the whole, 11 conventions and agreements 
had been concluded under Art. XIV of the FAO Constitution by 1990.
70. See R.Krishnamurti. UNCTAD as a Negotiating Institution. - In: JWTL, 1981, N 1, p. 23.
71. See more details in: Jean Pierre Dobbert. Decisions of International Organizations. - 
Effectiveness in Member States. Some Aspects of the Law and Practice of FAO. - In: The 
Effectiveness of International Decisions. Ed. by Stephen M. Schwebel. Leyden, A.W.Sijhoff, 1971, p. 
206-276.
72. According to the document entitled "Principles and Procedures which should govern Conventions 
and Agreements concluded under Articles XTV and XV of the Constitution", such amendments, provided 
priorly approved by at least two-thirds majority of all contracting parties, require the Council’s 
approval, unless the Council considers it desirable to refer these amendments to the Conference for 
approval. The amendments involving new obligations for the contracting parties shall come into
force in respect of each contracting party only on acceptance by it.
112
3.2. UNCTAD
An active role in convention-making is played by the UNCTAD. Among its principal
functions listed in the constituent Resolution 1995/XIX of the UN General Assembly
one can read: "to initiate action, where appropriate, in cooperation with competent
organs of the United Nations for the negotiation and adoption of multilateral legal
instruments in the field of trade".
The first multilateral treaty negotiated under the auspices of the UNCTAD was
the Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked Countries. At the initial stage, the
Sub-Committee on Land-Locked Countries set up within the Fifth Committee of the
UNCTAD-I considered several proposals, including a draft convention on transit trade
sponsored by 11 Afro-Asian countries. Afterwards, pursuant to the UNCTAD
recommendation, the UN Secretary-General established a Committee on the preparation
of a Draft Convention relating to Transit Trade of Land-Locked Countries. The
Committee’s report was adopted for submission to the Conference of the
Plenipotentiaries held at the UN Headquarters in 1965. In the result of
deliberations within four working groups and Drafting Committee, the Convention was
73adopted by the Conference and opened for signature on 8 July 1965
Since 1965 the UNCTAD Committee for Primary Commodities in cooperation with the
specialized commodity organizations has considerably contributed to the negotiation
of new commodity agreements on wheat, sugar, tin, olive oil, cocoa, natural rubber, 
74and jute . The 1974 Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences was also
73. See: Review of Multilateral Treaty-Making Process,p. 332-334.
74. See E.Ernst. International Commodity Agreements. The Hague, 1982, p. 104, 123; UNCTAD: Current 
Legislative Activities. Journal of World Trade Law Report. - In: Third World Attitudes Towards 
International Law. Ed. by F.E.Snyder and Surakiart Sathirathai. Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1987,
p. 398.
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a result of intensive efforts on the part of UNCTAD . The UNCTAD Secretariat 
assisted the Negotiation Conference to do preparatory work for the 1980 Agreement 
Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities. The adoption of the 1988 Agreement on 
the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries was preceded by 
the lengthy negotiations within the Group of 77 supported by the UNCTAD 
S ecre ta ria t^ .
75
3.3. GATT
Unlike the UNCTAD, the GATT was not initially intended to be a convention-making
forum and the text of General Agreement does not contain any relevant provisions.
But in the course of its evolution the GATT several times recoursed to elaboration
„77of special agreements which were incorporated into "the law of GATT” . These
agreements were of two types: (1) the agreements specifying and modifying the basic
78text of the General Agreement, and (2) the so-called sectoral agreements . There
75. See: Lawrence Juda. The UNCTAD Liner Code: United States Maritime Policy at the Crossroads. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983.
76. See the text in: 27 ILM 1204-1226 (1988).
77. See, for instance, J.Jackson, Mitsuo Matsushita. Implementing the Tokyo Round. National 
Constitutions and International Economic Rules. The University of Michigan, 1984.
78. The first Anti-Dumping Code negotiated during the Kennedy Round entered into force in 1968. It 
interpreted Art. VI of the General Agreement laying down the conditions under which anti-dumping 
duties may be imposed as a defence against dumped imports. The revised version of the Anti-Dumping 
Code appeared among six non-tariff barrier agreements of the Tokyo Round in 1979. The other five 
were: the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the "Standards Code"),the Agreement on 
Government Procurement, the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI,XVI and 
XXIII (the "Subsidies Code"), the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII (the "Customs 
Valuation Code") and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. The four others agreements 
concluded within the framework of GATT related to certain sectors of international trade: the 
Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles (the "Multifibre Agreement") of 1974, the 
Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat, the International Dairy Arrangement and the Agreement on Trade 
in Civil Aircraft (the latter three reached in the Tokyo Round). Each of the above mentioned 
agreements has an overseeing committee or council which reports annually to the Contracting Parties
on the course of implementation.
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can be hardly observed any uniform negotiating procedure which differs from one
agreement to another. Some of them were negotiated initially outside GATT (e.g. the
Subsidies Code was a result of the compromise between the USA and the EEC), other
were drafted by special working groups in the GATT (e.g. the Standards Code, the
Customs Valuation Code).
The non-tariff barriers and sectoral agreements, on the one hand, demonstrate a
flexibility of the GATT system modifying and adapting itself to the newly emerging
conditions. On the other hand, they considerably complicate the "law of GATT", since
each of these agreements covers different participants, both contracting parties and
the third States, and, moreover, certain agreements (for example, the Multifibre
Agreement) contain rules which are not completely compatible with the General
79Agreement . Another aspect of the problem is tha t some of these agreements
(particularly the Subsidies Code) "contain very ambiguous language, which reflects
80the lack of real agreement among the negotiating partners in the Tokyo Round"
At present, a voluminous global trade agreement of the Uruguay Round is expected 
to become the most ambitious treaty-making product of the GATT.
3.4. Customs Co-operation Council
One of the statutory purposes of the Customs Co-operation Council is "to prepare
draft Conventions and amendments to Conventions and to recommend their adoption by
81interested Governments" . Following this requirement, the CCC has drafted a number 
of m ultilateral conventions concerning questions of customs technique. In its work
79. See O.Long. Op. cit., p. 32-36.
80. J.H.Jackson. Op. cit., p. 37.
81. See Art. Ill of the 1950 Establishing Convention.
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the CCC has applied the following procedure. The treaty-making initiative arrives
either from Member States (e.g. the 1973 International Convention on Simplification
and Harmonization of Customs Procedures) or from another international organization
( e.g. the 1964 Customs Convention Concerning Welfare Material for Seafarers, which
was elaborated in response to the ILO initiative; the 1968 Convention on the
Temporary Importation of Scientific Equipment, which was worked out in close
82consultation with the UNESCO) . The decision to elaborate a new multilateral 
instrum ent is taken at a Council meeting on a proposal by the Permanent Technical 
Committee composed of technical custom officials representing the Member States. 
Once the decision has been taken, the General Secretariat of the Council prepares a 
preliminary draft treaty, which is first submitted for comment to the Member States 
and interested institutions, and then examined by a Working Party, consisting of 
governmental experts, who finalize the text of the draft treaty. The final version 
of the treaty is produced by the Permanent Technical Committee, which may create, if 
necessary, a drafting group for the improvement of certain provisions. Finally, the
Council adopts the text and submits it to Member States for signature or
. 83accession
3.5. Other IEOs
Some illustrations from the practice of other IEOs deserve brief notice.
A notable convention-making work has been carried out by some UN Regional
82. The international legal practice has seen other examples of the convention-making initiatives 
directed by one organization to another. For instance, in 1990 the EEC tabled a draft General 
Agreement on Trade in Services in the Geneva GATT Uruguay Round negotiations (see Common Market 
Reporter, 5 July 1990, N 660, p. 9-10).
83. See Review of Multilateral Treaty-Making Process, p. 468-470.
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Economic Commissions, especially the E C E ^  and the ESCA P^.
International legal practice has seen the examples of joint convention-making by
two IEOs. In 1988 the OECD and the Council of Europe drafted the Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters tha t is open for the Member States
86of these organizations . It should be noted that, unlike the Council of Europe
that has accumulated an extensive convention-making practice, the OECD, despite a
number of agreements concluded under its auspices, does not consider multilateral
treaties the principal means by which it achieves its aims (it gives obvious
87preference to binding decisions and recommendations)
The EEC-EFTA legal co-operation gives more examples of joint convention-making. 
These are: the 1985 Convention on the Simplification of Formalities in Trade in 
Goods that introduced a single administrative document for goods passing through
84. An example from the ECE practice might be a noteworthy illustration of how complicated and 
lengthy the treaty-making process can be. It took about seven year to draft the 1961 European 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, which was proposed by the ECE Member States. At 
the initial stage, the ad hoc Working Party of Experts on Arbitration, set up by the ECE Committee
on the Development of Trade in 1954, collected information on the existing legal instruments for 
international commercial arbitration and examined problems relating to the arbitral settlement of 
the commercial disputes. In 1959, after two readings, the Working Party submitted the draft 
convention accompanied by the explanatory commentaries to the ECE Committee on the Development of 
Trade. The results of the Committee’s deliberations on the draft were summarized in the Annual 
Report of the ECE to the ECOSOC in 1960. This was followed by a Special Meeting, which prepared an 
agreed text of Article IV of the draft convention that had caused some differences of opinion among 
governmental experts. Thereafter, in 1961 the Special Meeting of Plenipotentiaries for the purpose 
of negotiating and signing a European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration was held 
in Geneva under the auspices of the ECE , at which the Convention was opened for signature (see:
Review of the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process, p. 260-263).
85. A number of multilateral treaties were elaborated with the involvement of the ESCAP. Among 
these are: the Agreement Establishing the AsDB of 1965, the Agreement Establishing the Asian 
Coconut Community of 1969, the Agreement Establishing the Asian Rice Trade Fund of 1973, the 
Agreement on Trade Negotiations among the Developing Countries of ESCAP of 1975, and some others.
86. See the text in: 27 I.L.M. 1160 (1988).
87. See a written comment by the OECD on the Report of the UN Secretary General entitled "Review 
of the Multilateral Treaty-Making Process (A/36/553, p. 49-50).
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customs, the 1987 Convention on a Common Transit Procedure for the customs treatm ent 
of goods in transit between the EFTA and EEC countries, and Lugano Convention of 
1988 concerning jurisdiction and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial 
♦ 88 m atters
Among the non-European IEOs, the ASEAN strikes by its extensive experience in
this field covering numerous agreements on economic, ecological, and other 
89issues . Most of these agreements provide for the establishment of institutional
90bodies supervising their implementation
* * *
Therefore, m ultilateral treaty-making is a lengthy and complicated process 
requesting thoroughness and patience on the part of participants. It can be 
expected, that convention-making within the framework of IEOs will be an 
intensifying trend in IEL. Since interstate economic relations are one of the most 
institutionalized fields of international life, it is logical that multilateral
88. See F.Weiss. EC-EFTA Relations: Towards a Treaty Creating a European Economic Space. - In: 
Yearbook of European Law 1989, vol. 9, Oxford, 1990, 347-350.
89. The most noteworthy agreements produced within the framework of this organization are: the 
Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights of Non-Scheduled Services among ASEAN of 1971, the 
Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements of 1977, the Agreement on the ASEAN Food 
Security Reserve of 1979, the Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Projects of 1980, the Basic 
Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures of 1983, the ASEAN Customs Code of Conduct of 1983, 
the Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources of 1985, the Agreement on ASEAN 
Energy Cooperation of 1986, the ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement of 1986, etc. (See ASEAN 
Documents Series 1987-1988. Geneva, 1989).
90. For instance, under Art. 13 of the Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements, "the 
ASEAN Committee on Trade and Tourism ... is hereby directed and authorized to conduct trade 
negotiations within the framework of this agreement and to review and supervise the implementation 
of this Agreement. In respect of all matters concerning the implementation of the Agreement, all 
decisions of the Committee shall be taken by the consensus”.
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treaty-making is developing on the institutional base of IEOs, which possess 
financial, expert and technical facilities necessary for this purpose.
One should admit, that, nowadays, convention-making process within IEOs has a 
sporadic, rather than a systematic character. Perhaps, for the nearest future the 
existing methods and procedures of convention-making, which do not strongly differ 
from one IEO to another, will still suffice the needs of Member States. But as far 
as global economic problems will, not to say prevail over, but obtain a comparable 
importance with individual, group and regional economic interests of the States, a 
need for the establishment of a convention-making center for codification and 
progressive development of IEL may arise. Even at present, codification and 
progressive development of IEL in such m atters as the principles and norms of a New 
International Economic Order, the most-favoured-nation treatm ent, economic 
preferences for developing countries and some others, would be desirable. Of course, 
at any time the IEL will need such a combination of concentration and 
diversification in convention-making, which keeps the balance between the global, 
regional and individual economic interests of States and ensures an adequate legal 
response to them.
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CHAPTER V. NORMATIVE ACTS 
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING
The new tendencies and developments in the present-day international law-making 
are often connected with the norm-creating activities of international 
organizations. While the organizations’ involvement in the treaty-making process 
basically falls within the framework of a traditional law-making with some new 
elements ( new actors, contents, institutional base), the organizations’ own 
normative acts are absolutely new, unknown to the old international law, "sources" 
of international standard-setting. The legal nature of organizations’ decisions and 
recommendations, international "soft" law and internal law of an organization belong 
to the most controversial and disputable problems of the international legal theory 
and practice.
It may be supposed tha t in the nearest future the IEOs’ regulations are unlikely
to replace treaties which still carry the main regulatory burden in IEL. But due to
their formal and functional peculiarities and some advantages, the IEOs’ normative
acts are being more and more actively involved in the rule-making process in IEL. By
virtue of the IEOs’ regulations, Member States get the opportunity of operative,
competent and in many cases comparatively less costly m ultilateral ruling of the
general and special issues of international economic relations. Normally, the IEOs’
91normative acts need less time than a treaty or a custom to be formulated . Being 
issued by the competent specialized institutions, these acts are supposed to be 
enough well-grounded. Furthermore, they are less expensive than treaties passing
91. It has been noted in the legal literature, that the primary disadvantage of international law 
is the slowness of the decentralized law-making process (see M.Bothe. International Obligations, 
Means to Secure Performance. - In: Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 1981, vol. 1, p. 101-
102).
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through the lengthy procedure of drafting, negotiating and entering into force. 
Finally, the IEOs’ regulations are extremely helpful in cases when a treaty on the 
particular m atter has no chances to be concluded.
Of course, the organizations’ normative acts must not be neither under-, nor 
overestimated. Their sometimes ambiguous legal nature, a great deal of rhetoric and 
shortcomings in wordings, as well as the lack of the authority of some organs 
issuing them, decrease the effectiveness of such IEOs’ regulations.
1. Procedural Aspects of the IEOs’ Decision-making
There is no need to give at length proof of the importance of procedure as
regards the IEOs’ decision-making. Figuratively speaking, substantive and procedural
m atters interrelate like train  and railway. If the latter is out of order, the
former could not move. Because of imperfect procedure, a substantive decision may be
either blocked, or inefficient being contrary to the interests of certain Member
92States . The task of the draftsmen of constituent instrum ents is to invent such a 
proceduralmechanism,whichwouldkeepbalancebetweenoperativedecision-makingand 
adequate protection of the Member States’ interests.
1.1. Decision-making1 initiatives, draft-making bodies.
negotiations
92. Compare: Stephen Zamora. Voting in International Economic Organizations, p. 566: "Moreover, 
the way in which these decisions are made - the formal procedures and informal practices followed 
by the organization’s members - will have a direct and immediate effect on the members’ observance 
of them. Even the generally accepted substantive rules of an organization are not likely to be 
observed if they are perceived as arbitrarily applied without proper voting safeguards".
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Decision-making in IEOs usually passes through a number of stages. A starting 
point is an initiative of a Member State or of an IEO’s organ to put the m atter on 
the agenda. In general, such initiative is presumed in all IEOs, though their 
constituent documents provide various formulas for particular matters.
93Normally, the Member States submit proposals on the agenda of the organs , on
94the convocation of special and extraordinary meetings , on the amendments to the
95constituent documents . One can also meet some other provisions relating to
decision-making initiatives of a Member State. At the request of a Member State of
96the IMF its quota may be adjusted by the Board of Governors . On the application
of a Member State the Commission of the EEC investigates any cases of discrimination
97concerning transport carriage within the Community and takes necessary decisions 
In the urgent cases a constituent document may fix the term within which a decision 
must be taken on the m atter raised by a Member State. Art. 5 (3) of the Convention 
Establishing the EFTA illustrates this: "If a deflection of trade of a particularly 
urgent nature occurs, any Member State may refer the m atter to the Council. The 
Council shall take its decision as quickly as possible and, in general, within one 
month".
Quite often the organs of IEOs initiate decision-making. Such procedure is 
thoroughly regulated by the Treaty of Rome. Many of its Articles provide for the 
following formulas: "the Council on a proposal from the Commission shall adopt";
93. See, for instance, Art. 3 of the Rules of procedure of the Supreme Council of the CCASG.
94. See: Articles 12 and 18 of the Statute of the OPEC, Art. 14 of the Treaty for the 
Establishment of the ECCAS, Art. 7 of the Charter of the CCASG.
95. See: Art. XX of the FAO Constitution, Art. VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the IBRD, Art. 
IX of the Articles of Agreement of the IDA, Art. 22 of the Agreement Establishing the ITPA.
96. See Art. Ill, section 2 of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF.
97. See Art. 79 of the Treaty of Rome.
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"the Council on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European
Parliam ent decides"; "the Council at the request of the Court of Justice and after
consultingthe Commission and the European Parliament may amend", etc. In some cases
a more comprehensive procedure is applicable. Art. 149 (2) of the Treaty dealing
with the relationships among the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission
98in the process of decision-making, may be an illustration of this .
According to the most traditional scheme used in the constituent documents of
IEOs, an executive organ makes proposals to a plenary organ, or an administrative
99organ submits recommendations and drafts to the executive organ
Some IEOs consult other institutions of a similar competence on the m atters of 
decision-making. In this respect, the relevant constitutional provisions of the
98. Emphasizing the lengthy and intricate nature of the EEC decision-making, F. Weiss enumerates 
the following procedural stages: "1. Preparation of the Commission proposals (contacts between the 
Commission, other Community institutions, governments of Member States, government experts, 
interest groups, lobbies); 2. Commission proposal to the Council; 3. First reading by the European 
Parliament; 4. Opinion by the Economic and Social Committee; 5. Amendments of the proposal by the 
Commission in the light of the opinions received from the EP and ECOSOC; 6. Revised proposal 
submitted to the Council... for adoption” (F.Weiss. EC-EFTA Relations: Towards a Treaty Creating a 
European Economic Space. - In: Yearbook of European Law 1989, vol. 9, Oxford, 1990, p. 355).
99. For instance, Art. XVIII, section 4(a) of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF reads:
"Decisions... shall be made by the Board of Governors on the basis of proposals of the Managing 
Director concurred in by the Executive Board”. The same Article requires the Managing Director, 
before making any proposals, to conduct such consultations as will enable him to assert that there 
is a broad support among participants for the proposal.
Under Art. 38 of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty, the Secretariat of the LALA submits "proposals to 
the corresponding Association bodies, through the Committee, leading towards a better 
accomplishment of the objectives and duties of the Association”.
Under Articles 12 and 15 of the Charter of the CCASG, the Ministerial Council makes 
arrangements to the Supreme Council’s meetings and prepares its agenda, while the Secretariat 
General prepares reports and studies ordered by the Supreme Council or Ministerial Council, makes 
preparations for meetings and prepares agendas and draft resolutions for the Ministerial Council, 
and recommends to the chairman of the Ministerial Council the convocation of an extraordinary 
session of the Council whenever necessary.
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IB R D ^^, I F C ^ \  and GATT are to be borne in mind.
In order to facilitate the elaboration of the decisions on the issues which need
a special preparation, the permanent or ad hoc consultative and draft-making organs
may be set up within the framework of IEOs ( e.g. the specialized organs in the
OPEC; examining committee in the EFTA; committees, working parties and panels of
experts in the FAO; committees and working parties in GATT; the Consultative
Commission in the ECCAS, the Consulting Committee in the Andean Group, etc.).
An interesting institutional phenomenon is the Consultative Group of Eighteen in
GATT established on a temporary basis in 1965 and made permanent since 1979. It
represents all major groups of the contracting parties at the level of the senior
officials responsible for trade policy. This body has a consultative status.
However, its recommendations made by consensus are likely to be repeated by the
Council and the CONTRACTING PARTIES. As O.Long concludes, "legal rights and
103binding obligations can eventually result from positions taken in the Group"
A special decision-making procedure is used in the UNCTAD. Under the UN General 
Assembly Resolution 1995/XIX, the Member States of the UNCTAD are distributed into
lOOArt. V, section 8(b) of the Articles of Agreement of the IBRD stipulates that: "In making 
decisions of applications for loans or guarantees relating to matters directly within the 
competence of any international organization of the type specified in the preceding paragraph and 
participated in primarily by members of the Bank, the Bank will give considerations to the views 
and recommendations of such organization".
101. Art. Ill, section 7 of the Articles of Agreement of the IFC says: "Whenever it shall become 
necessary under this Agreement to value any currency in terms of the value of the other currency, 
such valuation shall be reasonably determined by the Corporation after consultation with the 
International Monetary Fund".
102. Article VII of the General Agreement states: "The Contracting Parties, in agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund, shall formulate rules governing the conversion by contracting parties 
of any foreign currency in respect of which multiple rates of exchange are maintained consistently 
with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund" (see also Art. XV).
103. O.Long. Law and its Limitations in the GATT Multilateral Trade System. Dordrecht, 1985, p. 51.
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four groups on geographical and economic criteria for the purpose of elections of
the members to the Trade and Development Board (group B - developed capitalist
countries, group D - planned-economy countries, groups A and C united into the group
of 77 - developing countries). Practically, not only elections, but all substantive
m atters are first discussed in the groups and then at the official meetings of the
104UNCTAD organs . As K.de Vey Mestadagh noted, "the group system method filters
every issue through layers of deliberations, helps to harmonize the demands and
105reduce inconsistences among many different countries"
The stage of negotiations and consultations on the questions at issue in the
106IEOs’ organs may be either open or secret . A requirement of confidentiality may
relate to certain m atters or bodies. For example, the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the
GATT provide for the utmost secrecy on the conduct of any consultation under Art.
107XII on restrictions to safeguard the balance of payment . According to Section 9 
of the Rules of Procedure of the EBRD Board of Directors, "the proceedings of the 
Board are confidential and shall not be published except when the Board decides to 
authorize the President to arrange for suitable publicity on any m atter relating 
thereto". The groups’ meetings at the UNCTAD and the meetings of the Council of 
Europe Committee of Ministers are also closed for a wide public.
In some IEOs preliminary informal consultations among the most powerful Member 
States may be of more importance for actual decision-making than official meetings
104. See Autar Krishan Koul. The Legal Framework of UNCTAD in World Trade, Leyden, 1977.
105. K.de Vey Mestadagh. Op. cit., p. 294.
106. For instance, Art. 28 of the Rules of Procedure of the Ministerial Council of the CCASG 
states: "The Council shall decide whether the the meetings shall be open or secret”.
107. See Notes and Supplementary Provisions Ad Article XII of GATT. - In: International Economic 
Law. Basic Documents. Ed. by Ph.Kunig, N.Lau, W.Meng. Berlin,1989, p. 479.
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in organs. Thus, during the Tokyo Round the major decisions were first negotiated by
the USA, the EEC and Japan. The other contracting parties of GATT could make little
influence on the drafting of proposed decisions until near the end of the process
108when it was difficult to get changes made . The same happened during the Uruguay 
Round, whose fate was determined a t the hard negotiations between the USA and EEC.
1.2. Voting
(a) Quorum
Once an IEO’s act has been drafted and passed through negotiations, it must be
voted in the competent body. Normally, the constituent instrum ents determine a
quorum for decision-making. It varies from a simple majority (e.g. the Governing
Board of the ITPA, the Assembly of the ANRPC) to three-quarters of the members (e.g.
the Conference of the OPEC) or even to the presence of all Member Countries (e.g.
the Council and the Conference in the LAIA). Most often, the quorum makes up two-
thirds of the members of the organ (e.g. the Commission of the Andean Group, the
Conference of the ATPC, the Supreme Council and the Ministerial Council of the
CCASG). In the organizations using "weighted" voting, the quorum is counted of both
the number of members and their voting power (e.g. for the meetings of the Boards of
Governors of the IMF and the IBRD the quorum is a majority of Governors having not
less than two-thirds of the total voting power). A special mechanism of attaining
109quorum is provided by Art. 6 (b,c) of the Convention Establishing the WIPO
108.See J.H. Jackson. Restructuring the GATT System. L., 1990, p. 23.
109. A general rule for quorum is one half of the States members of the General Assembly. Even if 
this number is equal or more than one-third, the General Assembly may make decisions. But, with the 
exception of decisions concerning its own procedure, such decisions may take effect after the
(Footnote continues on next page)
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(b) Unanimity, consensus and majority votinpr
Voting machinery in international organizations draws considerable attention of
the scholars, primarily, within the context of the ’contradiction’ between unanimity
and consensus, on the one hand, and majoritarianizm, on the other Actually, when
looking a t numerous IEOs established over a period of years, some trends in the
ongoing struggle between these voting methods might be o b se rv e d * M a jo r ity  voting
in various formulas dominated the global IEOs founded in the 1940s and 1950s when it
was to the benefit of Western countries, the major initiators and participants of
112those organizations (the IMF, the IBRD, the FAO, the GATT) . But since the 1960s 
the shift towards unanimity and consensus has become apparent. This tendency was 
determined not only by the majority change in the international arena as a result of 
decolonization, though this reason was, undoubtedly, important. The first experience
(Footnote continued from previous page)
States members of the General Assembly which were not represented express in writing their vote or 
abstention within a period of three months. If the number of States having thus expressed their 
positions reaches the number of States which was lacking for attaining the quorum in the session 
itself, such decisions shall take effect provided that the required majority of the votes cast 
still obtains.
110. See Change and Stability in International Law-Making. Ed. by A.Cassese and J.Weiler. - Berlin, 
1988.
111. See with regard to the correlation between unanimity and majority voting within the earlier 
period in: Stephen Zamora. Voting in International Economic Organizations, p. 571-576.
112. The majority voting domination was not absolute for the regional IEOs established at that 
period. A certain combination of unanimity and majority voting can be found in Art. 20 of the 
Statute of the Council of Europe: the Resolutions of the Council of Ministers relating to the 
enumerated important matters should be subject to a unanimous vote of the representatives casting a 
vote, while the Resolutions on other matters require a simple or qualified majority of the 
representatives entitled to sit on the Committee.
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of majoritarianizm in IEOs appeared to prove not only its advantages, but some
drawbacks as well. The IEOs’ Member States realized that decisions taken against the
minority’s will could cause problems of proper implementation. It is quite
understandable tha t only mutually beneficial agreements can produce effective rules
of conduct. As potential tools of protection of the minority’s interests, unanimity
and consensus became a counterweight to majoritarianism in decision-making to keep
the balance of interests and opportunities of the IEOs’ Member States. The
Luxembourg compromise of 1966 in the EEC was a serious victory of unanimity even in
113the organization usually called "supranational"
If a glance is cast at the IEOs established between the 1960s and the 1990s, the
proliferation of unanimity and consensus becomes obvious. The trend to strive for
114unanimity and consensus can be observed in the OECD, theEFTA , the OPEC, the 
ITPA, the CARICOM, the ATPC, the CCASG, the PTA, the ECCAS, the APPA, 
the MERCOSUR, etc. The Council of GATT since its establishment in 1960 takes 
decisions by consensus. In most cases even the CONTRACTING PARTIES of GATT 
prefer consensus to voting, although, formally, consensus is not provided by the 
General Agreement. Many decisions of the IMF are also taken by consensus. Even
113. See K.Mason. European Community. - Luxembourg Compromise. - Council of the European Communi 
Ignores British Attempt to Exercise Implied Veto Power of Luxembourg Compromise. - In: Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative Law, 1983, vol. 13, p. 134-141.
114. Pursuant to Art. 32.5 of the Convention Establishing the EFTA, "decisions and recommendations 
of the Council shall be made by unanimous vote, except in so far as this Convention provides 
otherwise". Apart from this the Convention does not indicate any clear criteria distinguishing the 
issues that request unanimous and majority vote. Anyhow, during the first twenty five years of the 
EFTA existence, only on two occasions the Council decided unanimously to take decisions by majority 
vote in matters of substance (see: F.Weiss. The European Free Trade Area after Twenty-Five Years. - 
In: Yearbook of European Law 1985, vol. 5, Oxford, 1986, p. 306).
A similar rule can be seen in Art. 9 of the 1975 Agreement Establishing the AIOEC: "All 
decisions of the Conference of Ministers shall require unanimous agreement of the Representatives 
of Member Countries present. Each Member Country shall be entitled to one vote. The Conference may, 
however, determine from time to time, by unanimous agreement, the matters which may be decided 
otherwise and the manner of doing so".
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within international commodity organizations, traditionally applying majority
115voting, a preference may be given to consensus . However, it would be premature,
not to say wrong , to consider unanimity and consensus as the dominant voting
methods in present-day or even recently created IEOs. L.Condorelly seems to be too
116categorical saying, th a t majoritarianism is a dead duck . P.I.B.Kohona tends to be
more realistic : "There appears to be a tendency at present to adopt norms with the
broad agreement of the vast majority (if not all) of the parties despite the
existence of provisions in some agreements which require norms of conduct to be
117adopted by majority votes" . Majority voting, in particular, is unlikely to be 
completely avoided, at least formally, in the global organizations where unanimity 
and consensus are not so easily attained.
According to the constituent instruments, the UNCTAD and the UNIDO established 
in the 1960s apply majority voting (though, in the UNCTAD practice many decisions 
are taken by consensus). Majority voting was also provided by the statutory acts of
11 Q 1 I QtheCAEU formed in 1964 , the WTO established in 1970 , and the MIGA founded in
1201985 . In some IEOs set up in the recent decades the general voting rule is
121consensus, but if this fails, majority voting takes effect
115. See e.g. Art. 12 of the 1989 International Agreement on Jute and Jute Products.
116. See Change and Stability in International Law-Making p. 118.
117. P.I.B.Kohona. Op.cit., p. 8-9.
118. See Art. 4.4 of the Agreement on Arab Economic Unity of 1957 (entered into force in 1964).
119. See Articles 28, 29 and 30 of the Statutes of the WTO.
120. See Articles 40, 42 of the Convention on the MIGA.
121. E.g. simple majority in the Governing Board of the ITPA, three-quarters majority - in the 
Council of the APPA, two-thirds of the votes cast in the Conference of Ministers and the Executive 
Committee of the ATPC, two-thirds majority of Member States in the Assembly and the Council of the 
AEC.
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An interesting combination of unanimity and majority voting is applied in the
Council of Ministers of the IBA: binding decisions are made by affirmative vote of
all members, recommendations require a two-thirds majority, while a simple majority
122is sufficient for the decisions on internal m atters
A real competition between majoritarianism and consensus takes place in the EEC.
To some extent it reflects the contradiction between a "supranational" tendency
within the Community and individual self-interests of the Member States. Thanks to
123the Single European Act that caused a considerable shift towards majoritarianism
in the up-to-date version of the EEC Treaty there is approximately a fifty-fifty
correlation between unanimity and majority voting in the Council. This proportion is
supposed to be changed in favour of majority voting after the Treaty on European
Union enters into force. In any case, certain balance between majority voting and
unanimity will be most likely preserved in future. The Community Member States will
hardly agree to surrender their basic powers in the field of economic policy to the
EEC institutions without having procedural instrum ents to protect their individual
interests when they are threatened by the position of a majority. In practice,
however, most decisions are taken by consensus. "But, - as Weiler rightly notes, -
reaching consensus under the shadow of the vote is altogether different from
reaching it under the shadow of the veto. The possibility of breaking deadlocks by
voting drives the negotiators to break the deadlock without actually resorting to
124the vote"
122. Art. IX of the Agreement Establishing the IBA.
123. However, as G.A.Bermann writes, the drafters of the Single Act "could not secure agreement to 
introduce majority voting in the area of fiscal harmonization, or in the Community’s exercise of 
implied powers under Article 235 of the EEC Treaty" (G.A.Bermann. The Single European Act: A New 
Constitution for the Community? - In: Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1989, N 3, p. 573.)
124. J.H.H. Weiler. The Transformation of Europe. - In: The Yale Law Journal, 1991, vol. 100, p.
2461.
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In general, both majoritarianism and unanimity have their advantages and
125shortcomings . On the one hand, majority voting is good for operative decision­
making in order to avoid an obstructive approach by one or a few Member States, but 
it may cause the problems of protection of minority’s interests and implementation 
of decisions taken. On the other hand, unanimity and consensus are the best methods 
of generating mutually beneficial rules of conduct. However, these are fraught with 
danger of obstructionism or, at least, of the lowest level of compromise and vague
wordings of the adopted regulations. The effect of the acts passed by consensus may
126be also weakened by proceeding reservations of the Member States . Finally,
unanimity and consensus can hardly work if a decision is to be taken against a
127 128Member State in the case of dispute settlement or the use of sanctions
This contradiction may seem like a vicious circle, but in practice, the IEOs, on
the basis of acquired experience, seek for an optimal way-out. At present, the IEOs,
at least, many of them, are not facing a pure dilemma: either majoritarianism, or
unanimity. They are, instead, striving for the most reasonable combination of both
methods, taking into account the subject-matter and the importance of the decisions,
129as well as the conditions under which those decisions are to be taken
125. See O.G.Zaitseva. International Organizations: decision-making., Moscow, 1989, pp. 71,78 (in 
Russian).
126. See A.Leroy Bennet. International Organizations: principles and issues. New Jersey, 1980, p.
93.
127. The GATT dispute settlement practice is a rare exception (see more details in Chapter VIII).
128. See an example of the CIS sanctional competence in Chapter IX.
129. The IEOs’ voting practice is so much varied that even such a rare phenomenon as "minority 
voting" can be found. The Meeting of the Ministers of the LAEO, for instance, takes its decisions 
by the affirmative vote of at least one-third of the Member States (Art. 14 of the 1973 Agreement 
Establishing the LAEO). However, the LAEO constituent Agreement does not clarify whether this 
scheme works if the rest two-thirds of votes are negative and what are the consequences of a 
decision taken under such procedure for the dissentient and abstaining Member States.
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There are some technical juridical means aimed at diminishing the possible 
negative effects of both majority voting and unanimity, namely, a combination of 
simple and qualified majority voting, "weighted" voting, "relative unanimity" and 
contracting-out procedures.
(c) Simple and qualified majority voting
In comparison with a simple majority (more than  50 percent), a qualified
majority voting raises the degree of concordance of the Member States’ positions
and, under other equal conditions, is supposed to give a better regulatory effect.
Consequently, it is widely applicable for the principal decision-making m atters in
the IEOs using the method of majoritarianism.
A qualified majority voting is provided for the most important decisions in the
IMF (70, 75, 85% of the voting power) and the IBRD (two-thirds, three-fourths, four-
fifths of the voting power), though formally, a simple majority voting is a general
130rule according to the constituent instrum ents of these organizations . In the
131Council of the EEC a qualified majority voting is also often required . In such 
cases 54 votes in favour must be cast for the adoption of acts of the Council on a 
proposal from the Commission; and the same number of votes cast by at least eight 
Members in other cases, while the total number of votes is 76 (Art. 148 of the 
Treaty of Rome). Here a qualified majority voting is complicated by a request for a
130. Each Member of the Fund has 250 votes plus one additional vote for each part of its quota 
equivalent to 100000 special drawing rights (Art. XII, section 5 of the Articles of Agreement of 
the IMF); each Member of the Bank has 250 votes plus one additional vote for each share of stock 
held (Art. V, section 3 of the Articles of Agreement of the IBRD).
131. Under Art. 148 of the Treaty of Rome, where the Council is required to act by a qualified 
majority, the votes of its Members shall be weighted as follows: Belgium - 5; Denmark - 3; Germany
- 10; Greece - 5; Spain - 8; France - 10; Ireland - 3; Italy - 10; Luxembourg - 2; Netherlands - 5; 
Portugal - 5; United Kingdom - 10.
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minimal number of Members casting their votes in favour of the act to be adopted.
This condition is also aimed at the fuller participation of the EEC Member States in
decision-making, as the minimal number of the Council’s Members potentially able to
132cast the required 54 votes is seven . The International Coffee Council applies a
special procedure of additional voting if a two-thirds majority required for a
decision is not obtained in order to overcome the negative vote of three or less 
133members . In some IEOs a qualified majority voting is required either when 
consensus fails to be achieved (e.g. the AEC, the ATPC, the APPA), or in a 
combination with a simple majority (e.g. the FAO, the IFC, the IDA, the GATT, the 
WTO, the UNIDO).
(d) "Weighted" voting
While most existing IEOs apply the rule "one State - one vote" (e.g. the OECD, 
the UNIDO, the OPEC), some others give preference to the so called "weighted"
132. In this part Art. 148, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Rome was amended by Art. 14 of the Act of 
Accession ESP/PORT.
133. Art. 15 of the International Coffee Agreement of 1983 reads:
"(2) The following procedure shall apply with respect to any decision by the Council which under 
the provisions of this Agreement requires a distributed two-thirds majority vote:
(a) if a distributed two-thirds majority vote is not obtained because of the negative vote of 
three or less exporting or three or less importing Members, the proposal shall, if the Council so 
decides by the majority of the Members present and by a distributed simple majority vote, be put to 
vote again within 48 hours.;
(b) if a distributed two-thirds majority vote is again not obtained because of the negative vote 
of two or less exporting or two or less importing Members, the proposal shall, if the Council so 
decides by a majority of the Members present and by a distributed simple majority vote, be put to 
vote again within 24 hours;
(c) if a distributed two-thirds majority vote is not obtained in the third vote because of the 
negative vote of one exporting Member or one importing Member, the proposal shall be considered 
adopted, and
(d) if the Council fails to put a proposal to a further vote, it shall be considered rejected”.
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voting , when the voting quota of a Member State depends on its financial deposit
to the budget of the organization or other economic indexes (e.g. international
financial organizations, international commodity organizations). In some IEOs using
the rule "one State - one vote" the economic indexes are also taken into account in 
135d ecision -m a k in g . In sum, "weighted" voting is a notable procedural innovation of 
IEOs which can be hardly applicable to the international organizations operating in 
other fields.
A "weighted" voting procedure has been often criticized in legal studies as
136incompatible with the principle of sovereign equality . However, there is a vast 
practice of "weighted” voting, which gives grounds to suppose, that most States 
consider it as economically reasonable for some types of IEOs and a legitimate 
exception from the principle of sovereign equality. I.Seidl-Hohenveldern, commenting 
on the ’weighted” voting in the IMF and the IBRD, wrote: "...as these institutions 
act like banks, it does not seem inequitable that they take their decisions 
according to the principle that decisions should be taken by those who take the
134. Some more details on "weighted" voting in: Stephen Zamora. Voting in International Economic 
Organizations, p. 590-594.
135. Thus, the Assembly of the ANRPC takes decisions by a majority voting of the Members, each 
having one vote. No decision, however, shall be effective unless the Members voting in the favour 
together represent not less than half of the total annual Members’ production of natural rubber in 
the calendar year, two years preceding (Art. 13 of the Constitution).
The Governing Board of the ITPA takes decisions by a simple majority vote in the cases, when a 
consensus can not be reached. However, "should any Member of the Board or a group of the Members of 
the Board which represents at least one-tenth of the total volume of exports of all the Members 
consider that the decision so arrived at is of major importance affecting its interests, it shall 
have the right, during the same meeting of the Board, to request that a new decision be taken by a 
two-thirds majority vote and the vote shall be taken accordingly. For the purposes of this 
paragraph, the required two-thirds majority shall also account for at least two-thirds of the total 
volume of exports of all the Members” (Art. 9 of the Agreement of the ITPA of 1977).
136. See, for example, E.Osieke. Majority Voting Systems in the International Labour Organization 
and the International Monetary Fund. - In: ICLQ, 1984, Part 2, p. 404.
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financial risks in proportion to their risks" . To put it another way, powerful
industrial States, in the case they do not belong to majority, would be unlikely to
follow decisions made by virtue of "one State - one vote" procedure. This could
138paralyze functioning of the overall system
Obviously, "weighted" voting cannot apply without some reasonable limitations.
In particular, it must not lead to a legalized domination of one or a few powerful
Member States in decision-making. For example, the USA still possesses a de facto
right of veto for certain decisions in the IMF. Potentially, such evident voting
imbalance may be fraught with the danger of blocking the organization’s decisions.
However, in practice, the Member States of the IMF have strived to avoid voting
139conflicts by achieving a preliminary consensus on a decision to be taken . Here, a 
provision of the 1986 Seul Declaration of the International Law Association relating 
to the principle of participatory equality is pertinent: "in international
organizations this should lead to such schemes of decision-making, that an equitable 
balance is realized between all the interests present".
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(eV'Relative unanimity"
The so-called "relative unanimity" voting in its prevailing variant means that 
abstentions do not prevent the adoption of the act which requires unanimity (e.g.
137.1.Seidl-Hohenveldern. Op. cit., p. 118.
138. See J.H.Jackson. Restructuring the GATT System, p. 96-97.
139. To quote J.Gold, "...maximum efforts are made to avoid voting and to reach a consensus on any 
important decision of the Fund. Even when the decision is of less importance, voting is avoided, 
and an executive director who feels that he cannot concur in the decision merely accords his 
abstention, but even these occasions are rare. The adoption of decisions by this process of general 
collaboration, involving as it does a reasonable give and take among all executive directors 
whatever their voting strength, is an important factor in the high degree of compliance by members 
with Fund decisions” (J.Gold. Certain Aspects of the Law and Practice of the International Monetary 
Fund. - In: The Effectiveness of International Decisions. Ed. by Stephen M. Schwebel. Leyden, 
A.W.Sijhoff, 1971, p. 85(71-99).
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the EEC, the Benelux Economic Union, the EFTA, the OECD) . A slightly different
formula of "relative unanimity", namely, the unanimity of those present, is fixed in
141the statutoiy acts of the OPEC and the WARDA
A "relative unanimity" may be applied in a combination with a qualified majority 
voting as it is provided in Art. 11 of the Cartagena Agreement of 1969 establishing 
the Andean Group (in its codified version of 1988). As a general rule, the Andean 
Group Commission adopts its decisions with the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the 
Member Countries. Decisions on some m atters require a two-thirds affirmative vote
without a negative vote. A similar scheme is provided for the decisions taken in the
142 143LALA and at the CARICOM Conference . However, in the latter case it is
specified that "abstentions shall not be construed as impairing the validity of
decisions or recommendations of the Conference provided that not less than three-
144quarters of its members including at least two of the More Developed Countries 
vote in favour of any decision or recommendation".
It is clear tha t this kind of unanimity may be achieved somewhat more easily 
than an absolute unanimity requiring all votes to be affirmative. Unless otherwise 
specified in the constituent instruments, a "relative unanimity" voting has the same
140
140. See Art. 148 of the Treaty of Rome, Art. 18 of the Treaty Establishing the Benelux Economic 
Union, Art. 32 of the Convention Establishing the EFTA, Art. 6 of the Convention on the OECD.
141. Art. 11 of the Statute of the OPEC and Art. IX of the WARDA Constitution.
142. Art. 43 of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty.
143. Art. 9 of the Treaty Establishing the CARICOM of 1973.
144. For the purpose of the Treaty Establishing the CARICOM, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and 
Trinidad and Tobago shall be designated "More Developed Countries" until such time as the 
Conference otherwise determine by majority decision (Art. 3).
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effect as consensus (approval without voting in its classical form ), though they 
slightly differ from the viewpoint of procedural technique. A unanimity voting, even 
in its relative form, explicitly reveals the positions of the States (either 
affirmative, or abstentive) on the act which is to be adopted, while consensus 
merely states the absence of a negative attitude.
(f) Contracting-out procedures
The most logical compromise between majoritarianism and unanimity seems to be
found in the contracting-out procedures. The term "contracting-out" in its
traditional sense means: a Member State is allowed to declare within a specified
term  its not being bound by a majority decision. In this connection, references are
146usually made to the constituent instrum ents of the ICAO, the WHO, the WMO . It 
would appear more reasonable to use "contracting-out" (or "opt-out") in a broader 
sense: for all cases where a Member State is permitted to avoid being bound by the 
organization’s decision. Various formulas of such contracting-out were provided by 
constituent instrum ents of the OECD, the CCASG, and the CMEA.
Under Art. 6 of the OECD Convention, its decision or recommendation requiring 
relative unanimity shall not be applicable to the abstaining Member.
The Rules of Procedures of the Supreme Council of the CCASG reveal a somewhat 
more complicated scheme: "Its resolutions in substantive m atters shall be carried 
out by unanimous agreement of the Member States present and participating in the 
vote, while resolutions in procedural m atters shall be carried by majority vote. Any
145. With regard to consensus see: K.Zemanek. Majority Rule and Consensus Technique in Law-Making 
Diplomacy. -In: The Structure and Process of International Law, p. 857-887; A.Cassese.
International Law in a Divided World., Oxford, 1986, p. 196-198; G.J.H.van Hoof. Rethinking the 
Sources of International Law. Deventer: Kluwer, 1983, p. 226-234.
146. See K. Skubiszewski. Enactment of Law by International Organizations. - In: BYIL 1965-1966, 
Oxford, 1968, p. 210-220.
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member abstaining shall document his being not bound by the resolution" (Art. 5).
However, the time, within which an abstaining Member is authorized to document his
being not bound by the resolution, is not specified.
The principle of "being interested" in the Charter of the CMEA suggested another
147variant of contracting-out . The acts adopted by the Council were of consensual
nature binding only upon those Member Countries which stated their interest in the
question at issue and had a positive attitude to it. If a Member Country interested
in the m atter opposed the act, the latter could not be adopted. This was a kind of 
148veto . And finally, if a Member Country declared tha t it had no interest in the 
question at issue, the act could be adopted, but it was not applicable to this 
Member Country.
It is remarkable that the CMEA decision-making procedure has been basically 
reproduced in the 1993 Charter of the CIS (Art. 23). In this connection, the 
potential shortcomings of this model should be reminded. As some commentators 
pointed out with regard to the CMEA, the absence of any criteria for the definition 
of "the interested member" can cause an abuse of the veto right. It is also 
preferable to combine the principle of "being interested" with an absolute unanimity 
rule on some fundamental issues and majority voting on the less important 
*♦ 149 m atters
147. Art. IV of the Charter stated: "All recommendations and decisions of the Council shall be 
adopted only with the consent of the interested Member Countries of the Council, each Country being 
entitled to state its interest in any question under consideration of the Council. Recommendations 
and decisions shall not apply to Countries which state that they have no interest in the question
at issue. Nevertheless, each such Country may subsequently associate itself with the 
recommendations and decisions adopted by the remaining Member Countries of the Council".
148. See Socialist Economic Integration and State Sovereignty. Moscow, 1987, p. 15 (in Russian).
149. Ibid, p. 15-17.
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What is the general attitude to the contracting-out procedures? Undoubtedly, its 
main advantage is the consensual character of the adopted acts, which at any rate 
gives them a better chance of being implemented. No Member State which is either not 
interested in the issue, or does not want to participate in its regulation, can be 
forced by the other Member States to comply with the organization’s act. At the same 
time, and this is also very important, the abstentions of one or a few Member States 
can not invalidate the act as the whole. However, the contracting-out method, being 
a clever invention, is hardly able to be universally applicable to IEOs. On the one 
hand, the IEO’s Member States may face problems which need a uniform decision only, 
and the contracting-out of one or a few Members would thw art this decision. For 
instance, contracting-out is unlikely to be used by the Members of a customs union 
with regard to a principal decision concerning the elimination of customs duties 
between them and setting up a common customs tariff. On the other hand, unlimited 
application of contracting-out, especially in the IEOs with a large number of Member 
States, will inevitably lead to the establishment of a multitude of complicated 
regimes among various combinations of the Member States on the basis of adopted, 
acts. Finally, the consensual rule can hardly work if a decision is to be taken 
against a Member State in the cases of dispute settlement or the use of sanctions 
(as it is provided for in the CIS Charter). In general, contracting-out must be 
treated by analogy with reservations to the m ultilateral treaties: in some cases 
they are permissible, in others - prohibited.
1.3. Procedures for amending constituent instruments
A special, more complicated, procedure is provided for amendments to the IEOs’ 
constituent instruments. An amendment may be proposed by either a Member State or an 
organ of the IEO. Such a proposal is to be submitted to a competent organ which 
transm its it to the Member States for examination. A decision on amendment is taken
139
either by a supreme organ of the IEO or by the Member States after the approval by a
relevant IEO’s organ.
In the first case, an amendment becomes effective if adopted by a supreme organ 
150(1) unanimously , (2) by consensus with the further ratification by all Member 
151States , (3) by consensus or, failing that, by a two-thirds majority with the
152 153further ratification by all Member States , or (4) by a qualified majority
Some constituent documents stipulate tha t an amendment adopted by a qualified
154majority shall take effect only for the Member States accepting the amendment . In 
the WIPO the latter rule acts only in regard to the amendments increasing the 
financial obligations of the Member States. Any other amendment accepted by three- 
fourths of the Member States after its approval by the Conference is binding upon 
all the Member States.
Some constituent instrum ents lay down additional requirements concerning time­
limits and/or amendment-making initiatives. For example, an amendment of the 
Agreement of the OAPEC may be considered eveiy ten years or upon the request of the 
half of the members (Art. Thirty Six).
Taking into account the importance of the issue, most IEOs’ charters do not 
authorize their organs to take decisions on amendments, but reserve this power for 
the Member States. In this case the IEOs’ organs only examine and recommend the
150. E.g. Art. 20 of the Charter of the CCASG.
151. E.g. Art. 90 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the ECCAS.
152. E.g. Art. 103 of the Treaty Establishing the AEC.
153. For example, Art. XX of the Constitution of the FAO; Art. 17 of the Convention Establishing
the WIPO, Art. 28 of the Agreement Establishing the ATPC, Art. 10 of the Agreement Establishing the 
OPEC Fund for International Development of 1980, Articles 59,60 of the Convention on the MIGA, Art. 
Thirty Six of the Agreement of the OAPEC.
154. Art.XX of the Constitution of the FAO.
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proposed amendments to the Member States which take a final decision either
ined
157
155 156unanimously , or by a qualified majority, both "pure" and comb  with a
unanimity rule provided for amendments to certain constituent provisions
A somewhat different voting procedure for amendments is laid down by Art. 23 of 
the UNIDO Constitution. An amendment comes into force and is binding on all Members 
when it is recommended by the Board of the Conference, approved by the Conference by 
a two-thirds majority of all Members, and two-thirds of the Members have deposited 
instrum ents of ratification, acceptance or approval of the amendment. Amendments 
relating to certain Articles of the Constitution require three-fourths of the 
Members deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval.
1.4. Procedures for enforcing the IEOs’ normative acts
Voting or consensual approval of an IEO’s act does not necessarily mean that the 
final step has been taken in decision-making. Some additional procedural 
requirements may be provided by the constituent instruments for an act to come into 
effect. Such requirements include either a period of time after which the act 
becomes enforceable, or passing through the constitutional procedures of the Member 
States.
For instance, the decisions of the AEC Assembly and the regulations of the AEC
Council are automatically enforceable 30 days after the date of their signature by
158the Chairmen of the respective bodies . The decisions of the Conference and the
155. E.g. Art. 236 of the Treaty of Rome, Art. 44 of the Convention Establishing the EFTA.
156. E.g. Art. 41 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, Art. 22 of the Agreement Establishing 
the ITPA.
157. E.g. Art. XXVIII of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF.
158. See Articles 10 and 13 of the Treaty Establishing the AEC.
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regulations of the Council of the ECCAS come into effect 30 days after their
159publication in the official bulletin of the Community . The resolutions of the
Conference of the OPEC become effective after 30 days from the conclusion of the
meeting or after such period as the Conference may decide unless, within the said
period the Secretariat receives notification from Member Countries to the 
160contrary
The OECD decisions become enforceable only having met with the requirements of 
the Member States’ constitutional provisions. Pursuant to Art. 6.3 of the OECD 
Convention, "no decision shall be binding on any Member until it has complied with 
the requirements of its own constitutional procedures. The other Members may agree 
tha t such a decision shall apply provisionally to them". A similar rule derives from 
the Agreement of the OAPEC: " Statutes or resolutions of a binding nature which are 
issued by the Council shall be subject to the ratification by the competent 
authorities in the member countries according to the legal rules in force" (Article 
Twelve).
♦ * *
The above survey gives every reason to conclude that the overall arsenal of 
procedural means amassed by the IEOs suffices the most strict requirements for 
effective decision-making. The reasonable combinations of procedural instruments, 
with the account of the IEO’s subject-matter and functional needs, make it possible 
to shape such decision-making models, which can minimize the negative effects of 
reaching compromises among diverse and numerous interacting subjects.
159. See Articles 11 and 15 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the ECCAS.
160. See Art. 11 of the OPEC Statute.
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It can be also observed that certain procedural mechanisms provided by the IEOs’ 
founding acts often have a potentially protective and stimulating character (e.g. 
majority voting, "weighted" voting), i.e. Member States prefer to use them rather as 
a shadow under which the consensual decisions can be reached easier.
Another important consideration for the IEOs’ decision-making is the fact that 
formal procedures may be viable only if they account the actual correlation of 
economic powers of the interacting Member States and other economic factors 
affecting the efficiency of possible decisions. The formal sovereign equality of the 
decision-making States must be necessarily collated with the strong variables in 
their economic positions in order to generate workable decisions.
2. The Impact of the IEO’s Acts on International Law
Regardless of the various terms used in constituent documents (decisions, 
resolutions, recommendations, rules, regulations, directives, statutes, etc.), most 
of the IEOs’ acts may be subdivided into two major types: (1) binding decisions; and
(2) recom m endations*^.
2.1. Binding decisions
(a) Legal nature of a binding decision
No IEO is able to operate without taking binding decisions at least on 
procedural, administrative and budgetary issues which make up part of the so-called
161. Some other IEOs’ acts, normally entitled "communique”, "understanding", etc., which state the 
intentions, conclusions or non-legal agreements of the Member States (e.g. the IEA Governing Board 
Communique Concerning Energy Requirements and Security of 1983. - In: 22 ILM 918-929 (1983) are 
left out of consideration in the present study.
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’internal’ law of an organization. These decisions produce secondary international 
rules for their internal needs and do not make any considerable impact on the 
regulation of international economic relations.
More important are decisions in substantive matters, which nowadays may be taken 
in the majority of IEOs. In this connection at least two general problems arise: (a) 
are the IEOs’ binding decisions compatible with the sovereignty of Member States and 
the consensual nature of international law; and (b) are they sources of 
international legal norms or merely acts of application of law.
At first sight, it may seem that decisions binding even the disagreeing minority
of the Member States contradict to traditional consensual international law-making
in treaty and custom form. In fact, all the IEOs’ decisions have, in the end,
consensual character, either directly (taken by unanimity or consensus), or
indirectly (taken by majority vote but on the basis of the Member States’ consent
priorily expressed in the relevant constituent provisions). As J.Weiler states, and
he seems to be right, consent "is fundamental even in supranational organizations.
Supranational organizations differ from the world order in a lot of ways, but not so
much by virtue of the way law is formed. What we have there is also rule of consent,
162even in the EEC which is locus classicus of a supranational organization" It is 
absolutely natural and normal tha t sovereign States delegate some of their decision­
making powers to international institutions formed through their participation. By 
this way they simply use a special m ethod'of producing the rules of conduct by 
virtue of institutional procedures. And such method alone being a result of States’ 
voluntary consent has nothing to do with any ’limitations’ of sovereignty. It 
’restricts’ the sovereignty of Member States in the same manner as any other 
international agreement voluntarily restricts the freedom of actions of States. This 
is not a limitation of sovereignty, but its normal realization to the benefit of the
162. Change and Stability in International Law-Making, p. 122.
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Member States. The other point is that the founders of the organization have to 
elaborate such decision-making procedures (see the previous paragraph), which 
minimize the possibility of negative effects injuring the interests of the Member 
States.
The second question raised in connection with binding decisions has more a
theoretical than practical significance. In fact, if a decision of the organization
is binding and m ust be complied with by Member States, there is not much difference
in either to consider it as a new source of international law, or merely as an act
of application of law. The distinction between sources of law and acts of
application of law derives from the municipal legal approach distinguishing the
legal norms of generalized action (designated for numerous similar situations) and
ad hoc acts of application of law issued by administrative or judicial organs for a
163concrete situation . This approach can hardly be automatically applicable to 
international law, many of whose norms have an individualized and ad hoc character 
(e.g. a bilateral agreement on exchange of prisoners of war). Therefore, if a 
decision of an IEO in substantive issues contains obligatory rules of conduct for 
the Member States, such rules may differ from classical norms of treaties and
customs in many details, but in the end have the same regulatory effect on
. . . 164interstate economic relations
163. For example, K.Skubiszewski divided the binding resolutions of international organizations 
"into those which create law and those which are executive in character and pertain to 
international administration sensu stricto rather than to legislation". The latter acts "do not lay 
down rules of conduct to be applied in an unlimited number of situations covered by the resolution.
They concern exclusively specific addressees (in contrast with the unlimited number of those 
falling under a legislative enactment) and situations occurring at a specific place and time (in 
contrast with the abstractly defined circumstances in the legislative act)" (K.Skubiszewski. Op. 
cit., p. 202).
164. It should be borne in mind, that not all IEOs’ acts entitled "decision" contain only 
binding rules. Some of them are framed as a mixture of binding and recommendatory norms (e.g.
Decision of the OECD Council Concerning the Minimum Pre-Marketing Set of Data in the Assessment of 
Chemicals of 1982. - In: 22 ILM 909-913 (1983).
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International legal rules can be found in binding decisions of many IEOs. For
165 166example,theAndeanGroupCommission’sDecisionsl84of 1983 and220ofl987 are 
composed in a manner typical of international agreements, and furthermore, its 
decision 236 of 1988 provides the codification of the Cartagena Agreement and its 
instrum ents of modification
Another decision reminding of a treaty, but with regard to the procedure of 
entering into force, is the Andean Group Commission Decision on Andean Multinational 
Enterprises N 169 of 1982. Under Art. 35, it "shall enter into force when two Member 
Countries have deposited in the Secretariat of the Jun ta  the instrum ents whereby 
they have put it into effect in their respective territories. For the remaining 
countries, the date of entry into force shall be the date of the deposit of their 
corresponding instrum ents"*^.
An interesting example of a decision th a t is practically identical to a 
traditional international agreement as regards the form and composition is the OECD
Council Decision of 1977 establishing a M ultilateral Consultation and Surveillance
169Mechanism for sea dumping of radioactive waste . Its text contains the preamble
and 10 Articles framed in a m anner typical for an international treaty. The OECD
170countries tha t accepted this Decision are termed "participating parties". Any 
participating party may cease to apply the Decision by giving a 6 months’ notice to
165. See 23 ILM 425-441 (1984).
166. See 27 ILM 974-988 (1988).
167. See 28 ILM 1165-1211 (1989).
168. See 21 ILM 546 (1982).
169. See 17 ILM 445-452 (1978).
170. Australia, Austria, Japan and New Zealand abstained.
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the General Secretary. The annex to the decision suggests the interpretation of its
certain provisions. In 1979 the Secretariat of the Nuclear Energy Agency (the body
within the framework of the  OECD) composed the Note on practical measures on the
171implementation of this Decision
The OECD Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations of 1961 is an
example of a legally binding decision laying down a withdrawal procedure comparable
witha treaty denouncement: "Any Member may withdraw from the Code by transm ittinga
notice in writing to the Secretary-General of the Organization. The withdrawal shall
172become effective twelve months from the date on which such a notice is received".
In order to make the Code available for most of the OECD Members, taking into 
account their individual interests, Article 26 of the Code authorizes a Member to 
lodge reservations relating to certain obligations resulting from the Code. These 
examples explain why the OECD binding decisions are sometimes qualified as "quasi­
treaties"
A special law-making effect is produced by the IEOs’ decisions on the
amendments to their constituent instrum ents which are not required to be approved by
174the Member States . Here we face a unique phenomenon when an organization’s 
decision changes the contents of the founding treaty previously concluded by the 
Member States. Is such a decision a source of international law? The answer should 
be in the affirmative.
171. See 18 ILM 862-866 (1979).
172. See: Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations. P., OECD, 1990.
173. See H.A.H.Audretsch. Supervision within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. - In: Supervisory Mechanisms in International Economic Organizations, p. 526.
174. E.g. Art. 20 of the Charter of the CCASG, Art. 28 of the Agreement Establishing the ATPC (see 
more details in Chapter V 1.3).
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Another noteworthy example is the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of
GATT "Action by the Contracting Parties on the M ultilateral Trade Negotiations" (
17527 November 1979) . This decision determines the relationship between the General
Agreement and the non-tariff agreements concluded during the Tokyo Round in order 
"to preserve, in the operation and functioning of GATT instruments, the unity and 
consistency of the GATT system". The main rule of the decision provides that 
"existing rights and benefits under the GATT of contracting parties to these 
agreements, including those derived from Article 1 are not affected by these 
agreements". In other words, the decision of the GATT plenary organ produced a norm 
which sanctioned a free choice for the GATT contracting parties whether or not to 
participate in the non-tariff agreements concluded within the framework of GATT and 
regarded as an inherent component of the entire GATT system. If this norm had been 
included in a formal international treaty it would have undoubtedly been treated as 
a legal rule. But being formulated in a binding decision of the GATT organ it has 
the same legal effect. Moreover, in this particular case a binding decision was an 
optimum legal form, since the non-tariff agreements were obligatory only for the 
signatories, which were not all contracting parties of the GATT. Hence, it was not 
reasonable neither to include this rule in the texts of these agreements, nor to 
amend the General Agreement. In sum, the above-mentioned decision inherently belongs 
to the so-called "law of GATT". A similar juridical maneuver was applied while 
adopting the "enabling clause" which made an exception to the most-favoured-nation 
clause (Art. 1 of the General Agreement) for preferences in favour of developing 
countries. To avoid a complicated procedure of amending the General Agreement the
175. See O.Long. Op. cit., p. 27-28.
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CONTRACTING PARTIES took a special binding decision*^.
Another example of a decision keeping away from a lengthy and/or procedurally 
complicated process of treaty-making is the OECD Trade Pledge of 1974 - a sort of 
"gentlemen agreement" between the OECD Member countries declaring their
determination to refrain from import restrictions and export stimulating for a
177 178period of one year . Roessler termed such decisions as de facto agreements
Finally, such a specific form of a decision as the IMF stand-by arrangements
deserves mentioning. Under Art. XXX (b) of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, a
stand-by arrangem ent is defined as "a decision of the Fund by which a member is
assured that it will be able to make purchases from the General Resources Account in
accordance with the term s of the decision during a specified period and up to a
specified amount". In practice, a stand-by arrangement is taken by the Executive
Directors of the IMF as a response to a letter of intent in which the monetary
authorities of the member describe the economic and monetary policy which will be
followed during the term  of such arrangem ent and request to make drawings from the
179Fund for this period . A combination of a letter of intent and a stand-by 
arrangement reminds of an international agreement in a form of exchange of
176. It should be admitted, however, that it is not always possible to use a decision form in
order to avoid complicated parliamentary procedures requested for international agreements. In some 
cases, the national delegations insist on putting the matter under consideration before the 
national parliaments. This normally requests a relevant treaty form. See an interesting 
illustration from the OECD practice suggested by Mr.Elkin in: The Effectiveness of International 
Decisions. Ed. by Stephen M.Schwebel. Leyden, 1971, p. 369.
177. See the OECD Declaration on a Code of Conduct for International Economic Relations of 1974. - 
In: 13 I.L.M. 998(1974).
178. See F.Roessler. Law, De Facto Agreements and Declarations of Principle in International 
Economic Relations. - In: GYIL 1978, vol. 21, p. 27-59.
179. See J.Gold. Certain Aspects of the Law and Practice of the International Monetary Fund. - In: 
The Effectiveness of International Decisions, p. 76-83; R.Barents. Supervision within International 
Monetary Fund. - In: Supervisory Mechanisms in International Economic Organizations, p. 388-391.
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documents. However, stricto sensu the Fund does not equate its stand-by arrangements 
to international agreements. The stand-by arrangements are neither published by the 
Fund nor registered at the U.N. Secretariat. Hence, this is a specific form of an 
IEO decision of an individual character (unlike general decisions) which gives birth 
to certain reciprocal rights and obligations of the Fund and the member. The 
avoidance of the constitutional approval procedure by virtue of the stand-by 
arrangem ents technique has been also stressed as an advantage compared to formal 
international agreements*80.
Of course, each rule may have exceptions, but in principle there do not appear
any serious reasons preventing from treating the binding decisions of IEOs in
substantive m atters which formulate the rights and duties for the Member States as a
181source of international law . Furthermore, once created, an IEO that attem pts to 
play a regulatory role and is not merely a deliberative forum, should be trusted by 
the Member States. Its binding decisions should be recognized as a fully-fledged 
source of international law covered by the principle pacta sunt servanda. This 
approach is in line with the wording of the 1986 Seul Declaration (the 62nd 
Conference of the International Law Association) with regard to the above principle: 
"Treaties and binding decisions, taken by international economic organizations have 
to be fulfilled in good faith by the parties concerned".
Analyzing the binding decisions of IEOs one should bear in mind that, along with 
formal binding acts, there is a number of informal decisions which may in many ways 
influence the organization’s activities and have certain legal consequences. The
180. R.Barents. Op. cit., p. 390.
181. See some earlier conclusions relating to a decision of an international organization as a 
source of international law in: A.J.P.Tammes. Decisions of International Organs as a Source of 
International Law. - In: Recueil des Cours, 1958-11, vol. 94, p. 261-364; Maarten Bos. The 
Recognized Manifestations of International Law. A New Theory of "Sources". - In: GYIL 1977, vol.
20, p. 24-25.
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difference between formal and informal decisions in respect of international
financial organizations was stressed by Lester Nurick, who pointed out that these
organizations take a host of de facto decisions on loans, credits, etc., which not
being shaped in any legal form, result in such formal legal acts as a bilateral
182agreement or a contract . Undoubtedly, the informal decisions of this sort by no 
means can be classified as a source of international law in the meaning of the form 
of the legal rules’ existence. Nonetheless, their virtual impact on the subsequent 
legal acts may be quite notable.
(b) Addressees of decisions
Decisions of IEOs have various addressees: (1) the Member States; (2) the
institutions; (3) national persons of the Member States, and (4) other IEOs.
Some constituent instrum ents more or less definitely indicate the addressees of
the IEO’s acts. Under Art. 11 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the ECCAS, the
Conference acts by decisions binding on the Member States and institutions of the
Community except for the Court of Justice, and directives binding on the
183institutions concerned except for the Court of Justice . Under Articles 5 and 6 of 
the Treaty of the ECOWAS, the Authority takes decisions binding on all institutions 
of the Community, while the Council of Ministers makes recommendations to the 
Authority and gives decisions to all subordinate institutions of the Community.
182. The Effectiveness of International Decisions. Ed. by Stephen M.Schwebel. Leyden, 1971, p. 366- 
367.
183. The first part of this formula is also used in Art. 15 of the Treaty in respect to the 
regulations of the Council.
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The Treaty of Rome (Art. 189) enumerates three types of binding acts of the
Council and the Commission, namely, regulations which have general application and
are directly applicable in all Member States; directives binding upon each Member
State to which they are addressed ( but the choice of forms and methods of their
realization is left to the national authorities); decisions which are binding in
their entirety upon those to whom they are addressed. Art. 192 adds tha t "decisions
of the Council or of the Commission which impose a pecuniary obligation on persons
other than States shall be enforceable". Therefore, a striking peculiarity of the
EEC, compared to other IEOs, is tha t its binding acts may be addressed not only to
the Member States, but also directly applicable to their nationals. For example,
Art. 3 of the Council Regulation 2641/84 says: "Any natural or legal person, or any
association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of a Community industry
which considers that it has suffered injury as a result of illicit commercial
184practices may lodge a w ritten complaint" . Art. 4 of the Commission Decision 
83/671 definitely states: "The Decision shall apply to the oil companies to which it 
is addressed"*^.
Some other IEOs also take decisions which address the rules of conduct to the
national persons of the Member States. However, unlike the EEC, these rules are
applied to national persons not directly, but are to be enforced by the competent
186authorities of the Member State concerned (e.g. the Andean Group ).
184. See 23 ILM 1420 (1984).
185. See 28 ILM 465 (1984).
186. For example, Art. 28 of the Andean Group Commission Decision 292 entitled "Unified Code on 
Andean Multinational Enterprises" provides: "In the event of a violation of this Code by an Andean 
Multinational Enterprise in the Member Country of the principal domicile or at the branches, the 
national competent entity of the Member Country where the violation has occurred shall apply in
(Footnote continues on next page)
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A new phenomenon in IEOs’ decision-making as regards addressees has been 
provided by the 1991 Treaty Establishing the AEC. The Assembly of the Community is 
empowered to take decisions that are binding not only upon the Member States and the 
organs of the AEC, but also upon regional economic communities (such as the ECCAS, 
the ECOWAS, the PTA), which do not formally belong to the AEC members ( Art. 10). 
Therefore, not being a supranational IEO, the AEC pretends to become a sort of a 
supra-regional "umbrella" institution affecting other less capacious regional 
communities through the common Member States. It is not clear, however, how viable 
this model will be. From a formal legal standpoint, the AEC Treaty may establish the 
rights and/or obligations for the third international legal persons (which are in 
this case the regional economic communities) only with their consent. The common 
State membership of the AEC and the regional economic communities facilitates 
obtaining such a consent in principle. But the procedural vulnerability of the whole 
"supra-nationality" model lies in the Assembly’s power to take binding decisions by 
a two-thirds majority of the Member States (if a consensus fails to be achieved) 
against a one-third minority, which might potentially consist of the Member States 
of the regional economic communities - the addressees of such decisions. Obviously, 
a proper implementation of such binding acts might be very problematic.
2.2. Recommendations
(Footnote continued from previous page)
accordance with its internal provisions, the corresponding sanctions or measures, including to 
annul the classification as an Andean Multinational Enterprise or as a branch thereof. Any such 
action shall be notified to the Board, which shall inform the other Member Countries" (30 ILM 1301- 
1302(1991).
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It may appear strange, but the recommendations of IEOs used to draw more
attention from commentators than binding decisions. Two reasons for this may be
observed. Firstly, for a long time there has been a widely shared view, that
recommendations are the primaiy product of an organization’s rule-making activities,
while binding decisions mainly concern procedural m atters, and therefore, are of
less importance (an exception was usually reserved for the EEC). Nowadays, this
argument does not work any more at least for IEOs, most of which are authorized to
take binding decisions in substantive matters. Secondly, and this reason still
remains important, unlike decisions taken mainly on more concrete and less
controversial issues concerning a limited number of Member States, many
recommendations, especially those of the universal organizations, relate to a wide
spectrum of m atters of general importance and in many ways influence the state and
187developments of general international law . Consequently, the main debates revolve 
around (1) the so-called ’soft’ law; (2) the legal nature of the UN General Assembly 
resolutions; and (3) the impact of recommendations on creation of customary rules.
(a) Recommendations as a "source" of "soft" economic law
A concept of ’soft’ economic law in its modem version is a kind of reaction, on 
the one hand, to the difficulties in the formulation of universal I EL, and on the 
other, to a considerable growth in the recent years of the number and legal 
significance of the IEOs’ recommendations. One of the authors of the ’soft’ economic 
law concept, I.Seidl-Hohenveldern writes: "At present chances are dim for
187. Meanwhile, Kohona’s remark on some initial drawbacks of the resolutions deserves to be quoted: 
"It is very likely that they are not the result of detailed and scholarly examination and they may 
have been prompted by purely political or emotive factors. There is also no guarantee of the 
timeliness or the practicability of such resolutions" ( P.I.B.Kohona. Op cit., p. 9).
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establishing firm rules susceptible of worldwide acceptance" . That is why he pins
his hopes on the rules of ’soft’ law, most of which are or will be formulated by
189acts of international organizations . I.Seidl-Hohenveldem also writes about 'soft
definitions’ and ’soft procedure’ for the rules concerned, which in his opinion,
190have allowed solutions impossible under ’strict’ law
Some ideas on ’soft’ law were suggested by the contributors to "Change and
Stability in International Law-Making" (ed. by A.Cassese & J.Weiler). The discussion
on its pages shows once more that far from being groundless, the concept of ’soft’
191law is still vague and does not have general acceptance . One of the obstacles for 
a uniform approach to the ’soft’ law instruments is their strong variety in form, 
language, subject matter, participants, addressees, purposes, follow-up and
188
188. I.Seidl-Hohenveldern. International Economic ’Soft’ Law. - In: Recueil des Cours, 1979-11, 
vol. 163, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1980, p. 225.
189. Op. cit., p. 205.
190. Op. cit., p. 209.
191. "Is it ('soft' law - S.V.) a theoretical aberration which is contrary to meaningful legal 
discourse, or is it part of the norm setting process as an intermediate category between lex lata 
and lex ferenda"» - asks J.Weiler. And he is answered in both optimistic and more pessimistic ways:
”...between the world of hard law on the one hand (made up of binding rules specifically 
requiring or forbidding a particular conduct, or authorizing it, thereby obliging the other 
addressees of the same rule to tolerate such authorized behaviour) and the world of non-law on the 
other, there is a transitional zone in which the elements characterizing these two worlds are mixed 
in very variable proportions... But we have to admit that at present this transitional zone is 
becoming steadily wider than it was in the past. The term soft law has become fashionable for 
precisely that reason; the phenomenon has no doubt always existed but it has today taken on such 
gigantic dimensions that it could no longer go unnoticed by even the most distracted observer" 
(L.Condorelli);
”...there are cases where the adoption of soft law may represent a first step towards the 
possible adoption - through further adequate steps - of hard law, or just law without any 
adjective. This does not, however, justify recourse to soft law devices on the part of States in 
order to cover up unwillingness to achieve more substantial law-making results, presenting peoples 
or other States with a poor substitute for what is needed. Nor does it justify attitudes of 
complacency on the part of those scholars who seem at time too anxious to applaud as achievements 
soft law solutions which are only illusory” (G.Arangio-Ruiz) (Change and Stability in International 
Law-Making, p. 63, 80, 82, 83).
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monitoring procedures
In the meantime, what is called "soft" economic law (though its frameworks are 
not definitely outlined) appears to reflect some real phenomena in international 
rule-making. At present, the resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the UNCTAD, the 
recommendations of the OECD, etc. make up to some extent for the lack of universally 
binding norms of IEL badly needed by the international community but unlikely to be
immediately created. Some of these recommendatory acts, though not necessarily all
193of them, as G.Arangio-Ruiz rightly noted , sooner or later take the shape of real
law (e.g. numerous acts on perm anent sovereignty over natural resources); others
194first make pre-legal regulatory effect and then partially penetrate into
international and municipal laws. The best illustration of the latter point is the
way in which the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was transformed from a
195recommendatory idea into a new institute of IEL
192
The first UNCTAD recommendations on the GSP in favour of developing countries
196appeared in the 1960s , and within a short period of time ( a little more than ten
years) they were adhered to by nearly all developed industrial countries, which
192. See C.M. Chinkin. The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law. - 
In: ICLQ, 1989, Part 4, p. 850.
193. Op. cit., p.83.
194. See I.I.Lukashuk. Mechanism of International Legal Regulation. Kiev, 1980, p. 140 (in 
Russian); I.I.Lukashuk. International Organizations and the Functioning of International Law. - In: 
Indian Journal of International Law, 1984, N 1, p. 74.
195. See S.A.Voitovich. The Legal Regulation of the Generalized System of Preferences. - In:
Foreign Trade, 1988, N6.
196. Resolution 21 (II) "Preferential or free entry of exports of manufactures and semi­
manufactures of developing countries to the developed countries" (1968) is of primary importance in 
this connection.
156
issued national preferential tariff schemes . In 1971 the Contracting Parties of 
the GATT made temporary exemption for preferences from A rt.l on the most-favoured­
nation treatm ent, which in 1979 took the shape of the so-called "enabling clause". 
Certainly, the existing preferential schemes are not free from shortcomings. They 
vary in beneficiaries, goods nomenclature, scopes of preferences, regimes for the 
least developed countries, and rules of goods origin; some schemes have 
discriminatory restrictions. Nevertheless, the fact tha t the majority of developed 
industrial countries reacted positively to the UNCTAD recommendations is sufficient 
proof of their regulatory effect which is even more visible than in some binding 
legal norms. These recommendations influenced both municipal laws (national 
preferential schemes) and international treaties (the GATT provisions relating to 
developing countries, preferential rules in the Lome Conventions, some agreements on 
regional economic cooperation, etc.), as well as have become a starting point for 
the creation of new customary norms (e.g. a customary rule under which preferences 
in favour of developing countries m ust not be qualified as an illegal discrimination 
of developed countries).
Another example of "soft" economic law is the so-called "codes of conduct"
198adopted by various IEOs . Strictly speaking, many of such IEOs’ acts contain
199recommended rules of conduct addressed to the Member States and their nationals 
But even should they never be transformed into traditional IEL, the codes of conduct 
may generate a considerable regulatory effect influencing developments in the
197. The preferential schemes were adopted by the USSR (1965), Australia (1966), EEC, Japan, Norway
(1971), Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland
(1972), Canada (1974), Poland, the USA (1976).
198. See e.g. R.Schwartz. Are the OECD and UNCTAD Codes Legally Binding? - International Lawyer, 
1977, vol. 11, p. 529-536.
199. In the meantime, some other codes are framed as legally binding acts (e.g. the Code of 
Liberalization of Capital Movements adopted by the OECD Council in 1961, the Code of Conduct for 
Liner Conferences of 1974, the Andean Foreign Investment Code of 1976).
157
corresponding branches of the Member States’ national laws. As R. J.W aldmann notes,
"perhaps the most important potential benefit of a code is the harmonization of
national laws and regulations”̂ ^ .  For instance, to take the International Code of
Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides adopted by the FAO Conference
(Resolution 10/85) in 1985 , it is voluntary in nature but serves as a guideline for
the Member States, especially if they have not established adequate national legal
instruments. Art. 11 of the Code states: "The objectives of this Code are to set
fourth responsibilities and establish voluntary standards of conduct for all public
and private entities engaged in or affecting the distribution and use of pesticides,
particularly where there is no or inadequate national law to regulate pesticides".
Under Art. 12.3, "all parties addressed by this Code should observe this Code and
should promote the principles and ethics expressed by the Code". It is noteworthy
tha t the German Plant Protection Act of 1987 is considered an example for "direct
201but soft implementation" of the above FAO Code
The Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning Restrictive Business Practices
202Affecting International Trade of 1986 is also framed as a code of conduct. Its 
principal part is preceded by the following words of the preamble: "The Council 
recommends... to the Governments of Member countries tha t insofar as their laws 
permit" they "should" (this term is frequently used in the text) comply with the 
enumerated rules. The Recommendation provides for a special implementation 
procedure. The other examples of voluntary codes of conduct in this field are the
200. R.J.Waldmann. Regulating International Business through Codes of Conduct. Wash., L., 1980, p.
23.
201. Ph.Kunig. The Relevance of Resolutions and Declarations of International Organizations for 
Municipal Law. - In: International Law and Municipal Law. Proceedings of the German-Soviet Colloquy 
on International Law at the Institut fur Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel, 4 to 8 May
1987. Berlin, 1988, p. 65-66.
202. See the text in 25 ILM 1629-1636 (1986).
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OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of 1976, the UN Set of Multilaterally 
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Conduct of Restrictive Business 
Practice of 1980.
If we take the recommendations of the CARICOM Conference, many of them also 
appear to belong to "soft" economic law. Art. 9 of the Treaty Establishing the 
CARI COM distinguishes binding decisions and recommendations of the Conference. The 
latter (though, formally non-binding) are to be observed by the Member States. A 
Member State which failed to observe a recommendation, not later than six months 
thereafter shall submit a report to the Conference, giving reasons for its non- 
compliance.
It can be concluded, that the term "soft" economic law (though linguistically
not perfect) is used for indicating formally non-binding acts of IEOs which possess
at least one of the following features: (1) contain rules which are expected to be
transformed under favorable conditions into the norms of international or municipal
laws; (2) perform pre-legal regulation in the certain fields of relationships
between the Member States, where the adequate legal instruments have not been 
203established yet . From a strict positivist viewpoint, what is called "soft" law 
does not belong to a real international law as a system of consensual legally 
binding norms. At the extreme, the "soft" law may be considered as some kind of
203. To quote Chinkin, "Even the expectation that instruments of soft law will be ignored is an 
important indicator of future behaviour. Those States that reject any particular resolution or code 
do not generally distance themselves from the negotiating process and do not subsequently ignore 
its existence. Instead they make it public that they feel no obligation to comply, allowing other 
States to react as they think appropriate" (C.M. Chinkin. The Challenge of Soft Law: Development 
and Change in International Law. - In: ICLQ, 1989, Part 4, p. 866).
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"pre-law" . An opposite approach dividing international law into "hard" and "soft"
is fraught with a methodological error, namely, the erosion of the border between
legal and non-juridical norms, when, using L.Lazar’s expression, the wheat of law
205can not be separated from the chaff of pseudo-law . I agree with those who think, 
that "soft" law is better than nothing. But it must not be overestimated and the 
attem pts to produce legally binding norms of IEL, where it is necessary, must not be 
discouraged.
204
(b) UN General Assembly Resolutions
Another subject of intensive discussion are the UN General Assembly
206resolutions . Some authoritative conclusions summarizing their legal meaning were 
made in a special Resolution of the Institute of International Law adopted in 
1987207
The first point, practically unchallenged now, is that there are resolutions and 
resolutions, notwithstanding their equally non-binding character under the UN 
Charter provisions. It is clear without special analysis that, for instance, the
204. An interesting theoretical question is how do 'soft' law and lex ferenda correlate? Without 
pretending to give an exhaustive answer» it may be observed that these phenomena only partly 
coincide. When a ’soft’ law rule is expected to be transformed into lex lata and has the real 
chances for this, it can be equated to what is called lex ferenda. However, the latter term may 
apply to the instruments which are not normally termed as 'soft’ law (e.g. a non-ratified 
convention which is supposed to be ratified in a visible future), or to the ideas about the future 
development of law, which do not have any 'soft* law form (e.g. a legal definition of economic 
aggression).
205. L.Lazar. Transnational Economic and Monetary Law. Transactions & Contracts. Introduction. 
N.Y., 1977, p. 207.
206. See e.g. J.Hagashi. The Role of Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly in the 
Formative Process of International Customary Law. - In: The Japanese Annual of International law 
1982. Tokyo. 1982, p. 11-25.
207. See Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 1987. Paris, 1988, p. 274-289.
160
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and a resolution on a narrow
technical matter, being formally equal, can not be equated by their actual
significance. Nonetheless, it does nor appear very convincing when, due to their
subject-matter, the UN General Assembly resolutions are classified into
208recommendations and law-making resolutions . According to the UN Charter, all of
them are recommendations, and even the highest doctrinal appreciations can not 
209change this status . The other thing is that different recommendations may have 
zero, insignificant and more considerable law-declaring or law-developing effects.
The Resolution of the Institute of International Law entitled "Resolutions of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations" (Conclusion 6) puts forward a number of 
elements which help to identify law-declaratory and law-developing resolutions, as 
well as those relevant to the application or interpretation of law:
(a) the intent and expectations of States;
(b) respect for procedural standards and requirements;
(c) the text of the resolution;
(d) the extent of support for the resolution;
(e) the context in which the resolution was elaborated and adopted, including 
relevant political factors;
(f) any implementing procedures provided by the resolution.
Undoubtedly, one of the most disputable resolutions of the UN General Assembly
208. See T.O.Elias. The Rulemaking Process and the Future of International law. - In: American 
Society of International Law. Proceedings of the 75th Anniversary Convocation. April 23-25, 1981. 
Wash., 1983, p. 29-30.
209. The recommendatory character of the General Assembly Resolutions was repeatedly stressed by 
the ICJ (see e.g. the South West Africa (Second Phase) case (1966) (I.C.J. Reports, 1966, 50-51),
the Advisory Opinion on Namibia (1971) (I.C.J. Reports, 1971, 50).
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is the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States of 1974 . The estimates of
211 212 its legal value varied from reserved pessimism to excessive optimism . The
Charter was adopted in the period when the efforts aimed at the establishment of the
New International Economic Order achieved their culmination. However, the Western
countries unwilling to assume far-reaching obligations of a general character in
the economic field practically boycotted this document. It is remarkable, that only
a half a year earlier another General Assembly Resolution, the Declaration on the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, which dealt with approximately
the same scope of issues but was formulated in a more declaratory and less legal
language, was passed by consensus.
Although, the practical impact of the Charter has not met the initial
213expectations, it can not be said that the Charter had zero effect . Certainly, not
all the provisions of the Charter were realistic. Some of them, though just, were
214unlikely to be ever implemented . But still the Charter remains the only document 
which:
(1) formulates in detail the normative contents of the principles of IEL and
210
210. It was adopted on 12 December 1974 by 118 votes to 6, with 10 abstentions.
211. See e.g. M.Akehurst. Custom as a Source of International Law. - In: BYIL 1974-1975, Oxford, 
1977, p. 6; Texaco Oversea Petroleum Company/ California Asiatic Oil Company v. Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic (1977). - 17 I.L.M. (1978) 29-31; J.S.Stanford. International Law and Foreign 
Investment. - In: The International law and Policy of Human Welfare, p. 489-490.
212. See T.O.Elias. Op. cit., p. 29-30.
213. See American Society of International Law. Proceedings of the 75-th Anniversary Convocation, 
p. 122.
214. For example, the provision of Art. 16 declaring that all States practicing colonialism, 
apartheid, racial discrimination, neo-colonialism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation 
and domination "are economically responsible to the countries, territories and peoples affected for 
the restitution and full compensation for the exploitation and deflection of, and damages to, the 
natural and all other resources of those countries, territories and peoples".
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may be used for their interpretation ;
(2) constitutes evidence of some basic customary rules of IEL (e.g. the right to 
nationalize foreign property, the principle of economic non-discrimination, etc.), 
though, this evidence is weakened by the negative votes and abstentions of the 
W estern States;
(3) suggests authoritative recommendations on the development of existing, and 
formulation of new norms of IEL (e.g. the rules concerning regulation and 
supervision of the activities of transnational corporations; transfer of technology, 
tariff preferences to developing countries, non-use of economic coercion);
(4) is the first step in a badly needed codification of IEL which has, however,
a non-binding character and yields to the conventional codifications typical for
216many other branches of public international law
(c) Recommendations and customary international law
Nowadays, the contribution of recommendations to customary international law 
becomes apparent. B. Sloan rightly explains why customary rules need recommendations 
as an auxiliary means for their formulation and interpretation: "Custom by its very 
nature, being derived from diffuse practice, may lack the precision of a text. 
Resolutions will define, formulate, reformulate, clarify, specify and authenticate a
215. A broad recognition of the basic principles of IEL was confirmed by the fact, that Chapter 1 
of the Charter, apart from the point "peaceful coexistence", was adopted with no negative votes. 
The Charter’s role in formulation and interpretation of the principles is well seen in the 
analytical research of the principles and norms of international law relating to the New 
International Economic Order made by the UNITAR (See UN doc. A/39/504/Add. 1).
216. See some more details on the Charter evaluation in: S.K.Chatterjee. The Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States: An Evaluation after 15 years. - In: ICLQ, 1991, Vol. 40, Part 3, p. 
669-684.
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text and corroborate the rule contained therein"
Recommendations not only "decipher" existing customary law, but also serve as an
218element of opinio juris Certainly, the fact of voting in favour of a resolution
taken alone does not make convincing proof of opinio juris. What must be taken into
account is tha t sometimes States vote solely on political grounds, not having an
219intent to produce any legal effect . But together with other evidences of opinio
juris (official statements, judicial judgements, national laws, etc.)
recommendations may be sufficient proof that a customary legal rule exists and is
binding upon the State concerned.
A classical example of how recommendations influence international customary law
is the UN General Assembly Resolution 1803/XVIII/1962 on permanent sovereignty over
natural resources. The fact that it reflects existing customary law concerning
nationalization was admitted by professor R-J.Dupuy, the sole arbitrator in the
220dispute on nationalization between Libya and American oil companies . Some authors
221noted also "a destructive effect" of this Resolution , which denied the formula of 
"prompt, adequate and effective compensation" in favour of ’appropriate
„217
217. B.Sioan. General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty years after). - In: BYIL 1987. L.,
1988, p. 69.
218. In the Nicaragua case (1986) the ICJ stated that opinio juris in respect to the customary 
principle of non-use of force "may, though with all due caution, be deduced from, inter aha, the 
attitude of the Parties and the attitude of States towards certain General Assembly Resolutions..." 
(I.C.J. Reports, 1986, 13).
219. See O.Schachter. International Law in Theory and Practice. General Course in Public 
International Law. - In: Recueil des cours, 1982-V, p. 115.
220. See Texaco Oversea Petroleum Company/ California Asiatic Oil Company v. Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic (1977). - 17 I.L.M. (1978) 21; D.Johnson. The New International Economic 
Order. - In: Yearbook of World Affairs 1984, vol. 38, L., 1984, p. 222-223; S.Zamora. Is There 
Customary International Economic Law? -In: GYIL 1989, B., 1990, p. 23-25.
221. See Change and Stability in International Law-Making, p. 50.
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compensation". However, what is "appropriate compensation" still remains 
d ispu tab le^^.
Recommendations are not only declarations of existing customary law already
crystallized in States’ practice, but may also be a focal point for a further
223development of a customary rule , i.e. both proceed and precede States’ custom-
making practice. An example of the latter variant, the UNCTAD resolutions on
preferences, has been already mentioned. In this case international community, and
the developed countries in particular, appeared to be receptive to the new ideas
suggested by the UNCTAD. Those UNCTAD resolutions were timely and, therefore,
successful. This is an example, though still comparatively rare, when, using the
expression by L.Condorelli, the resolutions "have penetrated from the world of words
224into the world of reality"
At present, there is another problem, much more complicated than the problem of
preferences, which urgently needs its adequate international legal regulation and as
a starting point the relevant recommendations of IEOs. That is the problem of the
legitimacy of use of economic force in international relations.
The economic security of individual States, as well as global international
economic security on the whole, are unimaginable without a clear legal definition of
what legitimate conditions, forms and limits of use of economic coercion are, and
when the use of economic force becomes unlawful, especially in such an extreme and
225dangerous form as economic aggression . It is unrealistic to expect a universal
222. See UN doc. A/39/504/Add. 1, p. 16-17.
223. See J.de Arechaga. International Law in the Past Third of a Century. - In: Recueil des cours, 
1978-1, vol. 159, p. 31.
224. Change and Stability in International Law-Making, p. 42.
225. See S.A. Voitovich. Legitimacy of the Use of Economic Force in International Relations: 
Conditions and Limits. - In: World Competition, 1992, Vol. 15, No 4,p. 27-36.
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treaty to regulate this problem in the visible future, but the recommendations of
such organizations as the UN, UNCTAD and some others are a plausible consideration.
They could produce a legal effect similar to tha t of a well-known General Assembly
Resolution 3314/XXIX/1974 on the definition of armed aggression. The ground for this
has been already prepared by a number of acts condemning economic coercion aimed
226against sovereignty and economic security of other States . To quote Dr. Omer
Yousif Elagab, "...although these Resolutions have not as yet evolved into clearly
defined rules proscribing economic coercion, there are signs that they are gradually
227narrowing-down the permissible character of th a t concept"
♦ * *
It can be concluded, tha t the IEOs’ regulatory acts have become an essential 
factor of norm-making in IEL and of the movement to what is called a law-oriented 
international economic society. Some of them (binding decisions) are the sources of 
international law, others (recommendations) perform law-interpreting, law-declaring 
and law-developing functions. The efficiency of IEOs’ acts perceptibly depends on 
such a choice of decision-making procedures which makes it possible to combine the 
operative regulation with the adequate protection of the interests of the Member
226. See, for example, the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (Resolution 2131 (XX)),
Art. 32 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, the 1981 Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (Resolution 
36/103); the UNCTAD Resolution "Rejection of Coercive Economic Measures" (Resolution 152/VI/1983); 
the 1987 Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from
the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations (Resolution 42/22); the 1989 UN General 
Assembly Resolution "Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion Against 
Developing Countries" (Resolution 44/215).
227. Omer Yousif Elagab. The Legality of Non-Forcible Counter-Measures in International Law, 
Oxford, 1988, p. 212.
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States concerned. One can hardly find an IEO with an ideal decision-making model. 
But their common experience suggests useful data for the draftsmen of new 
constituent documents, as well as for those IEOs whose decision-making mechanisms 
need improvement.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS TO THE SECOND PART
During a relatively short period of their existence, IEOs have accumulated a 
rich arsenal of law-making techniques, some of which can be considered as an 
important contribution to the overall international legal practice.
A striking peculiarity of IEOs.__compared to many other international
organizations, is th a t most of them are authorized to take binding decisions not 
only in procedural but also in substantive m atters. A highly specialized character 
of the issues IEOs deal with and their vital importance for the Member States 
require more strict legal instrum ents than mere recommendations, which were 
traditionally considered as the main product of the organizations’ rule-making. It 
should be stressed th a t a binding decision in substantive m atters formulating the 
rights and obligations of the Member States differs from a treaty and custom as 
traditional sources of international law in many ways, but in the end has the same 
regulatory effect on international economic relations. Such binding decisions must 
be recognized as a full-fledged source of international law covered bv the principle 
pacta sunt servanda.
The integrational IEOs gave birth to such new decision-making phenomena as: (1) 
"supranationalitv". when the organization’s normative acts are directly applied to 
the nationals of the Member States without resort to national legal procedures (the 
EEC, to some extent the Andean Group), and (2) "supra-regionalitv". when an 
"umbrella" organization may issue decisions binding upon the regional economic 
institutions which do not formally belong to the "umbrella" organization’s 
membership (the AEC). These innovations to the international law-making experience 
witness tha t the more homogeneous an IEO is, the more Member States tru st it and, 
therefore, invent the most far-reaching decision-making models. In practice, the 
"supranationality" concept, at least within the European Communities, has already
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proved its feasibility, while the recently suggested pattern of "supra-regionality" 
within the AEC has not yet got enough time to demonstrate how it works.
The emphasis on binding decisions must not shadow the IEOs’ recommendations, 
some of which discharge law-interpreting, law-declaring and law-developing 
functions. The concept of "soft” economic law, albeit linguistically not perfect, is 
a noteworthy contribution to the theory of law of IEOs, denoting formally non­
binding acts of organizations with a notable regulatory and law-developing 
potential. The instrum ents of "soft" economic law, being diverse in many parameters, 
possess at least one of the following features: (1) contain rules which are expected 
to be transformed under favourable conditions into the norms of international or 
national laws; (2) perform pre-legal regulation in the certain fields of 
relationships between the Member States, where the adequate legal instruments have 
not been yet established. However, those who support this concept should avoid a 
methodological error of confusing lex lata as a system of consensual legally binding 
norms and lex desirata as a sort of "pre-law" rules which can be only expected to 
become a full-fledged law.
In sum, the impact of the IEOs’ non-binding recommendations on the process of 
law-making may be many-fold:
(1) serving as the auxiliary means for interpretation of the existing legal acts;
(2) constituting an evidence of customary law;




The existing IEOs have also amassed a valuable experience of the application of 
sophisticated decision-making procedures, which might be helpful for other 
international institutions. The only relevant test for decision-making techniques is 
whether substantive decisions are taken both operatively and with an adequate
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protection of the Member S tates’ interests. In this respect, IEOs have elaborated 
the models of reasonable combination of majority voting, unanimity and consensus, 
taking into account the subject-matter and the importance of the decisions, as well 
as the conditions under which those decisions are to be taken. Along with other 
international organizations, IEOs have applied diverse technical means aimed at 
diminishing the possible negative effects of both majority voting and unanimity, 
namely, a combination of simple and special majority voting, "weighted" voting, 
"relative unanimity", and contracting-out procedures. Remarkably, certain procedural 
mechanisms provided by the IEOs’ founding acts often have a potentially protective 
and stim ulating character (e.g. majority voting, "weighted" voting), i.e. Member 
States prefer to use them rather as a shadow under which the consensual decisions 
can be reached easier. Finally, the experience of existing IEOs shows that formal 
procedures may be viable only if they account the actual correlation of economic 
powers of the interacting Member States and other economic factors affecting the 
efficiency of possible decisions.
As regards the IEOs’ treaty-m aking, both direct and preparatory, it does not 
considerably differ from tha t of other international organizations in view of 
applied drafting and procedural techniques. More variety can be seen in the contents 
of concluded agreements.
By analogy to the relationship between international legal personality and 
international legal sta tus of an IEO considered in the First Part, the Second Part 
deals with an IEO’s treatv-m aking capacity and treatv-m akinp competence. The term 
"treaty-making capacity" denotes in general outline tha t a particular IEO possesses 
a functionally determined legal right to enter into international agreements with 
other subjects, while "treaty-making competence" is a measurable category which 
specifies the types of treaties to be concluded, the distribution of treaty-m aking 
powers among the bodies, and the procedures applied within them.
The treaty-making competence of IEOs, as it is shaped in constituent 
instruments, differs from one organization to another due to the peculiarities of 
their creation, subject-matter and functions, as well as the skills of the drafters 
of those documents. It is presumed that even a broadly shaped treaty-making 
competence of an IEO is limited by its subject-matter and functional peculiarities, 
and cannot be equated to that of a State.
From a pragmatic viewpoint, the optimal, though rarely seen in practice, formula 
might be a precisely defined wide-ranging treaty-making competence, provided that 
the "wide range" lies within the limits of the IEO’s subject-matter and functional 
needs. This variant, first, saves from a resort to the concept of "implied powers", 
and, second, does not leave an undesirable ambiguity as to the treaty-making 
procedure and distribution of powers among the IEO’s bodies.
As many other international organizations, IEOs enter into agreements with 
Member-States, non-members and other international organizations. Some of these 
agreements suggest better opportunities, compared to those of individual States, for 
collective technical and financial assistance (agreements on technical assistance, 
financial agreements), for the establishment of special regimes of multilateral co­
operation (e.g. the EEC agreements on association). Others are concluded for the 
IEOs’ "internal" needs (e.g. the headquarters agreements, the agreements on the 
status of the UN specialized agency) or for more effective realization of their 
functions in the m atters of common competence (e.g Memorandums of understanding). 
Obviously, there is a large difference from one IEO to another both as to the 
intensity of treaty-m aking and the importance of concluded treaties.
A logic trend in the standard-setting process within IEL is the development of 
multilateral treatv-m aking on the institutional base of IEOs, which possess 
appropriate financial, technical and expert facilities. Being involved in drafting 
and adoption of m ultilateral conventions, IEOs discharge an important but auxiliary
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law-making function, since the primary law-makers in this case are the States 
expected to become the contracting parties to the relevant conventions.
Admittedly, the convention-making process within IEOs is spontaneous, rather 
than systematic. IEOs strongly vary in their convention-making capacities and 
practice. Few of them have special statutory provisions relating to convention- 
making, while most IEOs are oriented to the arising practical needs. Ad hoc drafting 
bodies using similar methods and techniques prevail over few permanent convention- 
making organs.
The most successful convention-making within IEOs has been seen in the 
specialized m atters of mostly technical character, where the consent of vast 
majority of Member States can be reached more easily. On the contrary, general 
codification conventions less attainable for a broad agreement are still the m atter 
of lex ferenda. if not lex desirata.
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THIRD PART: THE LAW-IMPLEMENTING FUNCTIONS 
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS
How efficiently a legal system works is best seen in the manner in which its 
normative provisions are transformed into practice. In this sense, one can not be 
completely satisfied with the state of the international legal rules’ 
implementation^ in the economic field.
On the one hand, there are certain factors encouraging the proper realization of 
the norms of IEL. First, this is a high degree of reciprocity in economic co­
operation, when one party’s non-compliance with its obligations deprives it of the 
corresponding benefits promised by another party. Hence, reciprocity and mutual 
benefit are rightly considered the best guarantees for the proper observance of 
international obligations. Among the other positive factors of effective 
implementation are the clear and detailed manner in which many norms of IEL are 
formulated; the quick renovation of the rules in accordance with rapidly changing 
practical needs; and the recourse to special institutional means of law enforcement.
Yet, the state of the IEL rules’ implementation should not be overestimated. 
Breaches of law occur all too often. Dozens of claims and disputes relating to the 
non-compliance with legal obligations are considered each year. These negative 
experiences of the international economic order are primarily caused by certain 
socio-economic factors, firstly, by the conflicts of economic interests of the
1. Without going into the details of the terminological dispute on the use of terms 
"implementation", "realization", "execution", "enforcement", "application", etc., in this paper 
implementation is considered in a broad sense, as the stage of international legal process at which 
the subjects apply the whole complex of institutional, norm-making, supervisory, norm-executing and 
law-enforcing means in order to ensure the proper and timely realization of international legal 
rules. (See more details on the concept of implementation in: A.S.Gaverdovskij. The Implementation 
of International Legal Norms. Kiev, 1980, p. 47-62 (in Russian).
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interacting States, which seem, unfortunately, inevitable in the present-day 
international economic life. (Even in a rather homogeneous integration system, like 
the EEC, the disputes are not a rarity). Secondly, breaches of law may occur when 
economic benefits are sacrificed to political pressure. (This was quite a typical 
practice during the Cold War period). And finally, the shortcomings of legal 
technique in both law-making and law enforcement should also be borne in mind.
Therefore, the problem of implementation in IEL has numerous facets. In this
Part only one of them shall be tackled - what the law-implementing facilities of2IEOs are and in what m anner these are applied . The analysis covers the main law- 
implementing functions discharged by IEOs. These are: (1) interpretation; (2) 
subsequent rule-making; (3) supervision; (4) operative norm-execution; (5) dispute 
resolution; (6) sanctions.
CHAPTER VI. INTERPRETATION 
AND SUBSEQUENT RULE-MAKING
1. Interpretation
Obviously, interpretation, i.e. finding the proper meaning of a norm, is an 
indispensable stage of its implementation. Even the rules, which are well 
formulated, are to be uniformly understood by their addressees, since the drafters 
cannot foresee all the possible de facto situations covered by the norms they 
produce. Moreover, the norms with unclear wordings (either because of the lack of a
2. To quote Lukashuk, "the capacity of international organizations is aimed largely not at 
creating new norms but at the realization of the already existing ones" (I.I. Lukashuk. 
International Organizations and the Functioning of International Law. - In: Indian Journal of 
International Law, 1984, N 1, p. 74).
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clear agreement between the parties, or due to the fault of the drafters), are 
unable to function without official interpretation. In the latter case 
interpretation may generate both norm-making and norm-executing effects.
Which rules may be interpreted by the IEOs? Apparently, the provisions of the 
constituent instruments, the treaties with their participation, as well as their own 
normative acts fall into this category. This is likely to be presumed in all IEOs, 
although only few of their statutory acts contain explicit provisions on 
interpretation.
An elaborate interpretation procedure is laid down by the Articles of Agreement 
of the IMF. Under Art. XXIX, "any question of interpretation of the provisions of 
this Agreement arising between any member and the Fund or between any member of the 
Fund shall be submitted to the Executive Board for its decision". Within three 
months from the date of such a decision, any member may require that the question be 
referred to the Board of Governors, whose decision shall be final. The Board of 
Governors establishes the Committee on Interpretation, whose decision shall be the 
decision of the Board, unless the latter decides otherwise. Pending the result of 
the reference to the Board of Governors, the Fund may, so far as it deems necessary, 
act on the basis of the decision of the Executive Board. Apart from this, Art. XXX 
gives an explanation of some term s used in the Agreement. It is important to note 
th a t the Fund has an exclusive power to interpret its own Articles of Agreement. 
Such interpretations given by the Fund have been recognized in the courts of the
3Member States .
A similar scheme of interpretation follows from the statutory acts of other 
international financial organizations, such as the IBRD, the IFC, the IDA, the EBRD,
3. See P.I.B.Kohona. Op. cit., p. 200.
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the IADB, the AMF . The main difference, in comparison to the Fund, is the absence
5of provisions on a special committee on interpretation .
A notable example of the IBRD and IMF interpretation was seen in the m atter of 
IBRD and IMF v. All America Cables & Radio. Inc.. and Other Cable Companies.
gconsidered by the United States Federal Communications Commission in 1953 . The 
Commission concluded tha t the United States Government was obliged to act in 
conformity with the interpretations issued by the Executive Directors of the Bank 
and Fund in accordance with the provisions of their constituent instruments. Thus, 
the binding and final character of the IBRD and IMF interpretations was confirmed at 
the national judicial level.
In some regional integration organizations the interpretative function is
endowed to the permanent courts ( the Court of Justice of the European
7 8Communities , the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement , the Court of
4. Articles IX, VIII, X, 57, XIII, and Fifty-one of the constituent instruments respectively.
5. For more details on the interpretation in international financial organizations see in: 
E.P.Hexner. Interpretation by Public International Organizations of Their Basic Instruments.- In: 
AJIL, 1959,N 2, p. 341-370; F.A.Mann. The 'Interpretation* of the Constitutions of International 
Financial Organizations. - BYIL 1968-1969. Oxford, 1970, p. 1-19.
6. See ILR 1955, London, 1958, p. 705-712.
7. Under Art. 177 of the Treaty of Rome, "the Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give 
preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and 
interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community; (c) the interpretation of the statutes 
of bodies established by an act of the Council, whose statutes so provide”. On judicial 
interpretation in the EEC law see: Anna Bredimas. Methods of Interpretation and Community Law. 
Amsterdam/New York/Oxford, 1978.
8. Art. 2 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement defines the Court as 
"the jurisdictional body created to assure respect for law in the application and interpretation of 
the juridical order over the Agreement”.
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9 10Justice of the AEC , the Tribunal in the ECOWAS , the Court of Justice of the
11 12 ISECCAS , the Tribunal of the PTA , the Arbitration Commission of the CEPGL ).
The statutory acts of some other IEOs provide that the questions of
14interpretation are within the competence of either supreme (e.g. the ITPA ), or
both supreme and executive organs (e.g. the OPEC Fund for International 
15Development ). A special subsidiary organ dealing with interpretation may be also
16set up (e.g. the FAO Committee on Constitutional and Legal Matters ).
9. Under Art. 18 of the Treaty Establishing the AEC, "the Court of Justice shall ensure the 
adherence to law in interpretation and application of this Treaty and shall decide on disputes 
submitted thereto pursuant to this Treaty11.
10. Art. 11 of the Treaty of the ECOWAS states: "There shall be established a Tribunal of the 
Community which shall ensure the observance of law and justice in the interpretation of the 
provisions of this Treaty".
11. According to Art. 16 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the ECCAS, "the Court of Justice 
shall be responsible for observance of the law in the interpretation and application of this 
Treaty".
12. Art. 10 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the PTA stipulates that the Tribunal "shall 
insure the proper application or interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty".
13. Under Art. 25 of the Convention Establishing the CEPGL, " the Arbitration Commission shall 
ensure compliance with the law in interpreting and applying this Convention".
14. Under Art. 16 of the Agreement Establishing the ITPA, "in the event of any question of 
interpretation of any clause of this Agreement arising, the matter shall be referred to the 
Governing Board of the Association whose decisions shall be final and binding on all parties".
15. Art. 12 of the Agreement Establishing the Fund says: "Any question of interpretation of the 
provisions of this Agreement, or any dispute between the Members of the Fund or between an 
Executing National Agency and the Fund shall be settled by the Governing Board and failing this by 
the Ministerial Council".
16. Under Rule XXXIV of the General Rules of the Organization, this Committee "shall consider 
specific items referred to it by the Council or the Director-General which may arise out of: (a) 
application or interpretation of the Constitution, these Rules and the Financial Regulations or 
amendments thereto; (b) the formulation, adoption, entry into force and interpretation of
(Footnote continues on next page)
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Is an interpretation by a policy-making organ or a specialized judicial body
preferable? The answer depends on the subject-matter and the parties concerned with
such interpretation. A policy-making organ being less formalized, more operative,
and, what is of utmost importance, more receptive to the changing circumstances, may
be more useful for the interpretation of the provisions relating to the current
activities of the IEO. In disputes over interpretation between an IEO and a Member
17State a more independent judicial body is, undoubtedly, more appropriate 
However, the existing IEOs can hardly demonstrate an example of a distribution of 
interpretative powers among the policy-making and the judicial organ in one 
organization.
Another question is: which organ possesses the interpretative power in the event 
the constituent instrum ents keep silence on this? Normally, such situation occurs in 
the IEO, whose founding acts do not provide for a specialized judicial organ within 
its institutional structure. In this case, it is logical to assume that the concept 
of implied powers may be reasonably applied in favour of a supreme (policy-making) 
organ which is in charge for the implementation of the objectives of the IEO and its 
proper operation.
In some cases, the drafters of the IEOs’ documents strive to explain the meaning 
of certain applicable term s in advance, in order to prevent the interpretation
(Footnote continued from previous page)
multilateral conventions and agreements concluded under Article XIV of the Constitution; (c) the 
formulation, adoption, entry into force and interpretation of agreements to which the Organization 
is a party under Articles XIII and XV of the Constitution...". For some examples of the 
interpretative work of the Committee see UN Juridical Yearbook 1985, N.Y., 1992, p. 81-85.
17. See H.G.Schermers. International Institutional Law, 1980, p. 671.
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disputes . Much interpretative work of this kind is carried out in GATT , though
the text of the General Agreement has no special provisions on this matter. Taking
into account the flexibility of many GATT rules, the interpretation of a number of
term s and expressions is given in the Annex 1 to the General Agreement. Serious
attention is paid to interpretation in the Tokyo Round Agreements. Some of them
contain comprehensive interpreting annexes (e.g. the Standards Code, the Customs
Valuation Code), others separate explanatory articles and notes (e.g. the Agreement
on Government Procurement, the Subsidies Code, the Agreement on Import Licensing
Procedures, the Anti-Dumping Code). However, as J.H.Jackson writes, "whether those
codes can influence the GATT interpretation for Contracting Parties, which do not
20accept the codes is not yet clear" . Moreover, the complexity of the GATT law, the
original elasticity of many its rules, as well as dynamically changing economic
scenarios covered by these rules, make the interpretation problem within GATT not an
21easy one .
A noteworthy example from the GATT practice demonstrates that an interpretation 
suggested by the IEO’s organ, which is not formally authorized to do this, may be 
acceptedbytheMemberStates.Durin^h^secondsessionoftheCONTRACTINGP ARTIES,
18. See e.g. the Convention Establishing the EFTA, the OECD Rules of Procedure, the Appendix to 
the Decision of the OECD Council Establishing a Multilateral Consultation and Surveillance 
Mechanism for Sea Dumping of Radioactive Waste of 1977, the OECD Council Decision-Recommendation on 
Exports of Hazardous Wastes from the OECD Area of 1986, the FAO Conference Resolution 4/89 "Agreed 
Interpretation of the International Undertaking", etc.
19. See some examples in: R.E.Hudec. The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy. N.Y., Wash., 
L., 1975, p. 100-143.
20. J.H.Jackson. Restructuring the GATT System, p. 57.
21. See e.g. Brigid Gavin. A ’Super-Rule’ Proposal for Liberalization of Agriculture in GATT - 
Implications for the EEC. - In: The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Legal and 
Economic Problems. Second updated Edition. Ed. by E.-U. Petersmann, M.Hilf. Deventer/Boston, 1991, 
p. 279-280
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the Chairman was requested by the Dutch delegation to give an interpretation
concerning A rt.l of the General Agreement. Owing to the Chairman’s personal
prestige, his interpretation was accepted without discussion. At the third session
the Chairman suggested a more far-reaching interpretation of Art. XXV as implicitly
enabling the CONTRACTING PARTIES to interpret the General Agreement whenever
22the need arises, which was also accepted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES . This 
example witnesses that the interpretative competence of an IEO may be specified on 
the basis of the "implied powers" doctrine if the Member States do not object it.
Therefore, the normative acts of some IEOs provide for both pre-interpretation 
of the applicable term s and subsequent interpretative procedures in the course of 
the rules’ implementation. This is typical mainly for the IEOs focussing upon 
intensive rule-making. In such IEOs it is preferable to establish special judicial 
or quasi-judicial organs dealing with interpretation. In the other organizations 
with a limited scope and intensity of law-making, it may be sufficient to outline 
the interpreting competence of the supreme or executive organs consulted by the 
legal experts.
2. Subsequent Rule-Making
In a broad sense, all the IEOs’ norm-making activities have certain implementing 
effects promoting the achievement of the purposes fixed in the statutory acts. But 
here the scope of the inquiry is limited to the subsequent (secondary) rule-making, 
i.e. the creation of special rules facilitating the proper implementation of the 
previously adopted acts. I.I.Lukashuk used the term  "implementational international
22. See I.H.Courage-van Lier. Supervision within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. - In: 
Supervisory Mechanisms in International Economic Organizations, p. 75.
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legal norms" for this purpose. J.P.Dobbert called this phenomenon in a more
general way: "follow-up", which means that "some procedural and possibly
institutional arrangements are often indispensable to assertain the effects of
decisions and to amplify or modify them as the needs arises: this often leads to new 
24decisions" . In other words, subsequent rule-making is an attribute of the ongoing
process of law-implementation which may be compared with a living organism self-
adapting to the changing environment.
Subsequent rule-making may be necessary for several reasons: (1) to concretize
and specify the general norms in order to ensure their adequate application; (2) to
adapt the previously created norms to the newly emerging circumstances either
developing or amending them; (3) to revise obsolete rules.
When the IEOs’ normative acts are formulated as the guidelines or general
principles for co-operation, they can not be executed otherwise, than through the
25elaboration of concrete methods and forms of interaction . A typical example was 
the Joint EEC-CMEA Declaration of1988 which presumed and prompted the conclusion 
of some more specified agreements between the EEC and individual Member States of 
the CMEA. A number of IEOs’ normative acts explicitly provide the ensuing norm- 
making for their implementation. Thus, the OECD Council in one of its acts 
"recommends that, to implement this Decision, member countries should...seek to 
conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements with non-member countries to which 
frequent exports of hazardous wastes are taken place or are foreseen to take
23. I.I.Lukashuk. International Organizations and the Functioning of the International Law. - In: 
Indian Journal of International Law, 1984, N 1, p. 76.
24. Jean Pierre Dobbert. Op. cit., p. 276.
25. See V.I.Suvorova. Concretization as the Means of Ensuring the Efficient Realization of 
International Legal Norms. - In: The Problems of Universality and Efficiency of International Law.
- Sverdlovsk, 1981 (in Russian).
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9fiplace" . Art. 9 of the Agreement between the FAO and the UNIDO of 1989 states:
"The Directors-General of FAO and UNIDO may enter into such arrangements for the
implementation of this Agreement as may be found desirable in the light of the
27operating experience of the two Organizations"
From the standpoint of the legal technique of implementation, the most
interesting acts are those determining the special implementation mechanisms for
previously created norms. Such are those agreements of Tokyo-Round, which were
concluded with the purpose of interpretation, specification and implementation of
certain provisions of the General Agreement. How the strengthening of the norm-
executing effect is achieved may be found in the example of the Anti-Dumping Code.
Art. VI of the General Agreement provides a definition of dumping, by which products
of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its
28normal value . In order to offset and/or prevent dumping, a contracting party may 
levy on any dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the 
margin of dumping in respect of such products (i.e. the price difference).
As follows from the preamble of the Anti-Dumping Code, one of its purposes is 
"to interpret the provisions of Article VI of the General Agreement... and to 
elaborate rules for their application in order to provide greater uniformity and 
certainty in their implementation". In connection with this, the Code gives a 
detailed explanation of the term s "like product", "comparable price", "domestic
26. 25 ILM 1011 (1986).
27. See Report of the Conference of FAO. Twenty-fifth Session. Rome, 1-29 November 1989. Appendix
H.
28. "For the purpose of this Article, a product is to be considered as being introduced into the 
commerce of any importing country at less than its normal value, if the price of the product 
exported from one country to another (a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course 
of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country, or, (b) in 
the absence of such domestic price, is less than either (i) the highest comparable price for the 
like product for export to any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or (ii) the cost of 
production of the product in the country of origin plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and 
profit".
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industry" used in Art. VI; and defines determination of injury, the order of 
investigation of any alleged dumping, price undertakings, imposition and duration of 
anti-dumping duties, provisional measures, etc.
It is normal for the IEOs’ legal practice to take subsequent decisions improving 
the basic texts of the constituent instruments. For example, within the first ten 
years of the ECOWAS existence the whole set of such decisions, rendering the 
previously created documents more operational and detailed, were worked out and 
adopted
In the meantime, the idea of improving the basic texts of the constituent
instrum ents by virtue of subsequent rule-making must not undermine their key
provisions which had been a precondition for the Member States’ adherence to the
constituent agreement. A conflict of this sort was seen in the practice of
International Coffee Council in the Quota case of 1965. The Advisory Panel convened
by the International Coffee Council under the provisions of the 1962 International
Coffee Agreement was requested to give a legal opinion whether the adoption of a
selective system of quota adjustment by means of a Resolution of the Council was
compatible with the International Coffee Agreement of 1962, which laid down a pro
30rata  system of quotas . The Panel agreed that the answer must be in the negative, 
presenting the following motivation: "The pro rata system for the establishment and 
adjustm ent of quotas is the heart of the Agreement. There can be no question that 
for many exporting countries, the protections and guarantees tha t this system 
provides for shares of the market, formed a major consideration for adherence to the 
Agreement. ... To permit the exception thus to eat up the rule would be unfaithful
29. See Ten Years of ECOWAS 1975-1985. Lagos, 1985, p. 16-21. (109).
30. A pro rata system of quotas meant that basic export quotas were Fixed at the same percentage 
for all exporters. On the other hand, a selective system would have allowed the Council to vary the 
individual quotas due to the changed market conditions.
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to the security of expectations tha t must underlie a viable Agreement and a regime
31 32of treaty law" . In result, the problem was settled in a compromise way
A widely spread form of the implementing rule-making is the adoption of a 
normative act amending or revising a previous obsolete decision of the organization. 
For example, the Commission of the Andean Group is explicitly empowered to "evaluate 
every three years the integration process and, whenever it may be necessary, modify 
the terms contemplated in the distinct mechanisms of this Agreement as well as 
revise or update the norms with respect to which it has competent jurisdiction" 
(Art. 7 of the Cartagena Agreement). In 1987 the Commission took the Decision N 220 
on the Common Foreign Investment and Technology Licensing Code revising its foreign 
investment code which was introduced by the Decision N 24 (1971). The Decision 220 
accepted the de facto situation tha t the Member Countries were not observing the 
provisions of the common policy established by Decision 24, because it was not 
deemed to be in their respective national in terests '^ .
Subsequent revisory rule-making may have the most far-reaching consequences if 
the Member States conclude that the IEO does not cope with its statutory tasks. In 
tha t case a decision on the radical revision of its statute, right up to its 
reorganization, may be taken. The latter happened with the WACU which was 
established in 1966. In 1970 the heads of the Member States, having recognized its 
unsatisfactory functioning, adopted a protocol substituting the WACU for a new 
organization - the West African Economic Community (the CEAO). Here, the Member 
S tates’ decision had more than  norm-executing purpose, though it was caused by the
31. 62 I.L.R. 422-427.
32. See P.I.B.Kohona. Op. cit., p. 120-121.
33. See ILM, 1988, vol. 27, p. 974-988; J.L.Esquirol. Foreign Investment: Revision of the Andean 
Foreign Investment Code. - In: Harvard International Law Journal, 1988, vol. 29, p. 169-177; 
E.E.Murphy. The Andean Decisions on Foreign Investments: An International Matrix of National Law. 
In:International Lawyer, 1990, vol.24, N 3, p. 643-654.
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failure in the implementation of the constituent instruments. This decision revised 
the overall institutional basis of the organization which was proven to be 
ineffective.
On the other hand, in the case of an IEO dissolution the normative acts of the 
IEO-successor can keep alive some acts of the IEO-predecessor. A noteworthy 
illustration is the replacement of the OEEC by the OECD in 1960. Pursuant to Article 
15 of the OECD Convention, decisions, recommendations and resolutions of the OEEC 
shall require approval of the OECD Council to be effective. The Member States of the 
OECD then adopted the Memorandum of Understanding on the Application of Article 15 
of the OECD Convention, which specified a "rule of selection" for the OEEC acts 
which were to remain in force.
It is apparent, that under otherwise equal circumstances, the better the IEOs’
normative acts are framed, the lesser the need in the subsidiary rule-making for
their proper implementation. Within this context, an essential precondition for
implementation is the maximum possible avoidance of the conflicts between the Member
States’ international obligations within an IEO and their national legal acts.
Taking into account the divergence in the Member States’ municipal law approaches to
the relationship between international and municipal laws, the constituent documents
of some IEOs explicitly determine a priority of the legal acts passed within the IEO
34over the national laws of the Member States . On the contrary, a predominance of 
national law over an IEO’s decision-making may be a serious factor undermining the 
la tter’s efficiency. This follows from the unsuccessful lesson of the EAC where the
34. See for instance Art. 27 of the Unified Economic Agreement between the Countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council: "In case of conflict with local laws and regulations of Member States 
execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail”.
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national legislation had priority over the regional one
No less important, with a view of proper execution of the IEO’s normative acts,
is the conformity between "the law of an IEO" and international agreements of the
Member States with the third parties. The constituent instruments of some IEOs
36definitely request for such conformity
* * *
The above analysis leads to the conclusion tha t both interpretation and 
subsequent rule-making are such intermediary stages of international legal process, 
in which law-making and law-implementation interlace. Interpretation is 
indispensable for implementing any rule of law, while subsequent rule-making is 
applied only in cases of specification, adaptation or revision of the priorly 
created rules.
Interpretation and subsequent rule-making within IEOs often go side by side. It 
means tha t in many cases (although not always) interpretation is provided by virtue 
of subsequent rule-making. However, subsequent rule-making does not necessarily deal 
with solely interpretation issues.
35. See J.Ravenhill. Regional Integration and Development in Africa: Lessons from the East African 
Community. - In. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 1979, N 3, p. 229. The 1970 Judgement of the 
Court of Appeal for East Africa on conflict of Kenya Constitution and East African Community Act 
stated: "... it is clear that the Constitution of Kenya is paramount and any law, whether it be of 
Kenya, of the Community or of any other country which has been applied in Kenya, which is in 
conflict with the Constitution is void to the extent of the conflict” (see 9 ILM 565-566 (1970)).
36. For example, Art. 93 of the Treaty Establishing the AEC reads: "In the event of 
incompatibility of agreements concluded, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty among Member 
States and Third States, sub-regional or regional organizations or any other international 
organization, with the provisions of this treaty, the Member State or Member States concerned shall 
take the appropriate steps to eliminate such incompatibility".
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Neither interpretation nor subsequent rule-making, taken alone, is sufficient 
for complete law-implementation. Both serve as preparatory steps for the direct 
execution of legal rules.
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CHAPTER VII. SUPERVISORY AND 
NORM-EXECUTING FUNCTIONS OF IEOs
l .  S m rerv jis iQp
The more sophisticated the legal mechanisms within IEOs are, the more is the
37need in adequate supervision over how they operate. The main aim of 
38supervision is to evaluate and control in what m anner the addressees of the legal 
rules comply with their obligations. In many cases, when no deviation from a norm is 
fixed, routine supervision is practically invisible for the outside observation. 
Only in the event, the fact of improper behaviour is established in the course of 
supervision, this gives an impetus for subsequent corrective measures, which may 
vary from a request to follow a legal prescription more strictly to the use of 
sanctions.
As H.A.H. Audretsch points out, "supervision has two aspects: review and 
39correction" . The former "is directed to behaviour, an act, or an omission, a fact
or a factual situation...", while the latter "is relevant only when an unlawful act
40has been recorded" . However, what is called "correction" sometimes goes beyond 
the scope of proper supervision in the narrow meaning (in this paper, for instance, 
dispute-settlement and sanctions, which may follow supervision, are treated as 
relatively independent phases of implementation). Although, the mere results of the
37. See more details on the supervision in IEOs in: Supervisory Mechanisms in International 
Economic Organizations. P.van Dijk: General Editor. Deventer, 1984; Restructuring the International 
Economic Order: The Role of Law and Lawyers, p. 135-182.
38. See on supervision in international law: A.Cassese. Il Controllo Internazionale. Milano, 1971.
39. H.A.H.Audretsch. Supervision in European Community Law. Amsterdam, 1986, p. 7.
40. H.A.H. Audretsch. Op. cit., p. 7-8.
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review are often used for the "mobilization of shame" purposes, i.e. a resort to
public opinion, which may have a corrective effect. Along with review and
42correction, some writers distinguish the creative function of supervision which 
approximately coincides with what is considered in the present study as 
interpretation and subsequent rule-making.
1.1. International Financial Organizations
IEOs dealing with monetary, credit and financial issues badly need elaborate 
system of supervision in order to ensure effective operation of monetary mechanisms 
and proper use of financial means. The IBRD and IMF deserve consideration in this 
respect.
The IBRD supervision system consists of two stages: prior examination and
subsequent control. At the first stage, the examination covers the general economic
situation and balance of payments of the requesting country, its attitude towards
debt(s), and the project which is proposed for financing. A competent loan
committee, including an expert selected by a requesting Member State and one or more
members of the technical staff of the Bank, is appointed for this purpose. The
committee submits a written report recommending the project after a careful study of
43the merits of the proposal . At the second stage, the Bank supervises over the use
41. See the discussion on "mobilization of shame" in: The Effectiveness of International 
Decisions. Leyden, 1971, p. 353-517.
42. See G.J.H.van Hoof & K de Vey Mestadagh. Mechanisms of International Supervision. - In: 
Supervisory Mechanisms in International Economic Organizations, p. 11-14.
43. See Art. Ill, sec. 4 and Art. V, sec. 7 of the Articles of Agreement of the IBRD.
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of the loans granted and the progress of the financed project . The Articles of
Agreement of the IBRD stipulate tha t "the Bank shall make arrangements to ensure
tha t the proceeds of any loan are used only for the purposes for which the loan was
granted, with due attention to considerations of economy and efficiency and without
regard to political or other non-economic influences or considerations".
The IBRD system of supervision has proved to be quite effective due not only to
its elaborate technique, but also to sensible sanctions, such as the suspension or
cancellation of a loan, which are at the Bank’s disposal. To quote van Hoof, "the
World Bank offers something its recipient Member States badly want or even need,...
and they can therefore be expected to be prepared to conform with the requirements
45of the World Bank’s supervisory system to a considerable extent"
Supervisory techniques applied by the IMF somewhat differ from those of the
IBRD, owing to a two-fold nature of the Fund which does not finance particular
projects, but regulates the operation of the international monetary system and
46renders financial assistance for the general balance-of-payments purposes . Hence, 
the Fund exercises firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of Members and 
adopts specific principles for the guidance of all Members with respect to those 
policies (Art. IV. sec. 3 of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF). The Fund also 
supervises the use of its general resources by the Members. Whenever the Fund 
considers tha t such use is contrary to its purposes, it shall present to the Member 
a report setting forth the views of the Fund and prescribing a suitable time for 
reply. Afterwards, the Fund may limit the use of its general resources by the
44. See N.M. Poulantzas. International Financing and Supervision: The Example of the World Bank. - 
In: Revue de Droit International, Geneve, 1982, N 4, p. 283-287; G.J.H. van Hoof. Supervision 
within the World Bank. - In: Supervisory Mechanisms in International Economic Organizations, p. 
397-485.
45. G.J.H. van Hoof. Op. cit., p. 452.
46. See The Effectiveness of International Decisions, p. 467.
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Member. If no reply to the report (or unsatisfactory one) is received within the 
prescribed time, the Fund may continue to limit the Member’s use of the general 
resources, or may, after giving reasonable notice to a Member, declare it ineligible 
to use such resources of the Fund (Art. V sec. 5). The Fund may also require the 
Members to furnish it with such information which it deems necessary for its 
activities. Art. VIII, sec. 5 of the Articles of Agreement specifies the list of the 
m atters such information may relate to. However, the Members are not obliged to 
furnish information in such detail that the affairs of individuals or corporations 
are disclosed.
1.2. Regional Integrational Organizations
The regional integrational organizations belong to the most active IEOs as
regards both the scope and intensity of operation. Their effective work strongly
depends on comprehensive supervisory mechanisms. The lead of the EEC in view of
47experience and efficiency of supervision is unchallenged now , although other
integrational IEOs are gradually accumulating their own supervisory practice.
Supervisory procedure in the EEC and African economic communities (constructed
under strong influence of the EEC) consists of non-iudicial (administrative) phase,
including a preliminary investigation, a conciliation, and taking a reasoned
48decision or opinion; and judicial phase, including the written and oral parts 
Non-iudicial supervision is within the competence of prevailingly either
47. Supervision in the EEC has been thoroughly examined in: H.A.H.Audretsch. Supervision in 
European Community Law. Amsterdam, 1986.
48. See H.A.H.Audretsch. Op. cit., p. 21-22.
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executive body (e.g. the Commission in the EEC ), or policy-making and executive
50organs (e.g. the AEC, the ECCAS ), or executive and administrative bodies (e.g. 
51the ECOWAS ). Certain supervisory powers may be endowed to the parliamentary (e.g.
52the European Parliament ) and subsidiary bodies (e.g. the specialized technical
49. The main supervisory functions of the Commission are the following:
(a) it examines the Member States’ action on the fulfillment of their obligations; arranges 
consultations; makes necessary recommendations; and prepares reports;
(b) it informs the Council on the progress in carrying out the Community’s purposes;
(c) if it finds that there has been an infringement of the Community law, the Commission may 
decide that the State concerned shall abolish or alter its measures; if the State concerned does 
not comply with this decision within the prescribed time, the Commission may refer the matter to 
the Court of Justice;
(d) it consults the Member States whose national law regulations are incompatible with the 
Community Law.
According to the Treaty on European Union, the important supervisory powers will be assigned to 
the Council. For example, on the basis of reports submitted by the Commission it will monitor 
economic developments in each of the Member States and in the Community as well as the consistency 
of economic policies with the broad guidelines formulated by the Council (Article G (103).
50. The Assembly of the AEC and the Conference of the ECCAS have similar supervisory powers: ( 1 ) 
to oversee the operation of the communities’ institutions and the follow-up of the implementation
of the communities’ objectives; (2) to refer to the respective court of the Community any matter 
concerning the non-compliance with the Community law. On the other hand, the Councils of Ministers 
of these IEOs keep under regular review particular matters, e.g. the operation of any quantitative 
or similar restrictions or prohibitions imposed by a Member State encountering the balance-of- 
payments difficulties (see Articles 8 and 35 of the Treaty Establishing the AEC, Articles 9 and 34 
of the Treaty for the Establishment of the ECCAS). Vast supervisory powers belong to the Economic 
and Social Commission of the AEC, which supervises and follows-up the activities of Secretariat, 
committees and subsidiary bodies; examines the reports and recommendations of the committees; 
supervises the preparation of international negotiations (see Article 16 of the Treaty Establishing 
the AEC).
51. The Council of Ministers of the ECOWAS keeps under review the functioning and development of 
the Community, inter alia the reductions or eliminations of the customs duties (see Article 13 of
the Treaty of the ECOWAS), the method of application of safeguard measures by the Member States 
(Art. 26), the question of deflection of trade (Art. 32) etc., while the Executive Secretary keeps 
under continuous examination the operating of the Community and reports on the results to the 
Council of Ministers and the Authority (Art. 8).
52. The role of the European Parliament in the supervision procedure has been comprehensively 
analyzed by H.A.H. Audtretsch, who pointed out that up to the early 1980s the supervisory function 
of the European Parliament was confined to asking oral and written questions of the Commission and
(Footnote continues on next page)
committees of the AEC ensuring the supervision, follow-up and evaluation of the
53implementation of decisions taken by the AEC organs , the Committee of West
54African Central Banks overseeing the system of payments within the ECOWAS , the
55Court of Auditors examining the EEC financial activities ).
The advantages of the administrative supervision were commented by
H.A.H.Audretsch on the example of the EEC: "the administrative phase is useful 
because a good many infringements by States are not committed ’willfully’. In many 
cases they are to be attributed to insufficient understanding of the treaty 
obligation, a misinterpretation, an ’error of communication’ on a national and/or a 
Community level. Thus, by means of preliminary negotiations most ’errors’ can be 
eliminated without the necessity of recourse to the Court, which is often considered 
em barrassing"^.
(Footnote continued from previous page)
the Council. A principal turn was taken by the SIEGLERSCHMIDT Resolution (1983), which suggested 
the Commission annual reporting to the European Parliament on the state of affairs with respect to 
treaty infringements (see H.A.H.Audretsch. Op. cit., p. 247-272). In the case the Treaty on the 
European Union enters into force, the supervisory powers of the European Parliament would be 
considerably expanded. In particular, at the request of a quarter of its members, the European 
Parliament will be authorized to set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged 
contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of the Community law, except where the 
alleged facts are being examined before a court and while the case is still subject to legal 
proceedings. The temporary Committee of Inquiry shall cease to exist on the submission of its 
report (Art. 138 c of the Treaty on the European Union).
53. See Art. 26 of the Treaty Establishing the AEC.
54. See Art. 38 of the Treaty of the ECOWAS.
55. See Art. 206a of the Treaty of Rome.
56. H.A.H. Audretsch. Op. cit., p.23.
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Judicial supervision is a prerogative of the permanent courts of economic
communities, which are responsible for observance of law in the interpretation and
application of the constituent treaties. The courts: (a) review the legality of the
communities’ binding acts, which, if the action is well-founded, may be declared
void; (b) decide on the appeals lodged on the grounds of lack of competence, abuse
of powers or infringement by the Member States or institutions. Normally, most of
the regular supervisory work in economic communities is carried out by non-judicial
means. Judicial supervision applies in specific situations, when there are
complaints or doubts about the legality of certain actions on the part of the Member
States and/or institutions. Moreover, unlike some non-judicial supervisory bodies,
courts lack the power to initiate the procedure themselves. The dependence on
57appeals and petitions is another limiting factor for judicial supervision . On the 
whole, judicial supervision is likely to be avoided if non-judicial means allow to 
dispel existing doubts and suspicions. In the words of one of the most authoritative 
legal writings on supervision, "judicial supervision is a more developed form of 
international surveillance, reflecting a high degree of integration where it 
functions in practice. Yet, it cannot be denied that non-judicial supervision is
better suited to the requirements, or rather shortcomings, of international society
. . „58as it is at present
The Agreement on the EEA of 1992 provides a new pattern of joint supervision by 
the EEC Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority, which "shall cooperate, 
exchange information and consult each other on surveillance policy issues and 
individual cases". Each of the bodies shall examine all complaints falling within 
its competence and shall pass to other body any complaints which fall within the
57. See G.J.H. van Hoof & K.de Vey Mestadagh. Mechanisms of International Supervision. - In: 
Supervisory Mechanisms in International Economic Organizations, p. 35.
58. Ibid.
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competence of that body. In the case of disagreement between these two bodies with
regard to the action to be taken in relation to a complaint or with regard to the
result of the examination, either of the bodies may refer the m atter to the EEA 
59Joint Committee
Supervisory systems within the Latin-American integrational IEOs somewhat differ 
from those of the EEC and African communities. Only the Cartagena Agreement provides 
for both non-judicial and judicial supervision similar to that of the above
mentioned communities. The main supervisory powers are entrusted to the Commission
60 61 (the highest body of the Andean Group) and the Board (the technical body) . The
Andean Parliament evaluates the progress of the subregional integration process
through the annual reports of the bodies of the Andean Group and through other
62information requested from them . In turn, the Court of Justice of the Cartagena 
Agreement has responsibility to assure respect of law in the application and 
interpretation of the juridical order of the Agreement. Therefore, owing to the 
decisive modifications in the Andean Pact introduced by the Quito Protocol of 1987, 
the supervisory mechanism of this subregional IEO goes more in line with the EEC
59. Art. 109 of the Agreement on the EEA; Protocol 23 Concerning the Cooperation between the 
Surveillance Authorities (Article 58).
60. The Commission, in particular, is empowered to monitor the harmonious fulfillment of the 
obligations deriving from the Cartagena Agreement and to evaluate every three years the integration 
process and, whenever it may be necessary, to modify the terms contemplated in the distinct 
mechanisms of this Agreement (Art. 7).
61. The Board: (1) monitors the application of the Cartagena Agreement and the fulfillment of the 
Decisions of the Commission and its own Resolutions; (2) annually evaluates the results of the 
application of the Cartagena Agreement and the achievement of its objectives, giving particular 
attention to the fulfillment of the principle of the equitable distribution of the benefits of 
integration, and proposing to the Commission corrective measures of a positive nature (Art. 15). 
These general supervisory functions of the Board are specified in other Articles of the Cartagena 
Agreement (e.g. Articles 67, 73, 75, 79, 79A, 80, 85, 101).
62. See Art. 13 of the 1979 Treaty Establishing the Andean Parliament.
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pattern, being based on a quite reasonable separation of supervisory powers among 
the principal bodies.
Other Latin-American integrational IEOs practice only non-judicial supervision.
A rational distribution of supervisory powers among the principal bodies can be 
observed in the LALA. According to the 1980 Montevideo Treaty, the Council (the 
supreme body of the LALA) examines the results of the tasks carried out by the 
Association, reviews and updates basic rules governing convergence and cooperation 
agreements with other developing countries in the respective areas of economic 
integration (Art. 30). The Conference (the sessional body) examines the operation of 
the integration process in all its aspects; periodically reviews the implementation 
of differential treatm ents and evaluates the results of the preferential systems in 
favour of less-developed countries (Art. 33). In turn, the Committee of 
Representatives (the permanent body) evaluates the operation of the integration 
process, analyses measures to atta in  more advanced mechanisms of integration and 
declares the compatibility of partial-scope agreements with other developing 
countries (Art. 35). Finally, the Secretariat carries out the studies entrusted to 
it by the superior bodies (Art. 38).
In the CARICOM the overall amount of supervisory work is carried out by one of 
the principal organs - the Common Market Council, which:
(1) keeps under constant review the execution of the constituent instruments;
(2) receives and considers references alleging breaches of any obligations 
arising under the constituent instrum ents, and
(3) considers what further action should be taken by the Member States and the
63Common M arket
63. See Art. 7 of the Annex to the Treaty Establishing the CARICOM. These general supervisory 
powers of the Council are specified in other Articles of the Treaty (e.g. Articles 13.6, 14.11,
18.5, 28.2, 29.3, 30.3, 32.5, 33.3, 35.4, 37, 42.2, 49.5, 62).
Unlike the constituent instruments of the above mentioned IEOs, the 1991 Treaty
Establishing the MERCOSUR does not pay much attention to supervision, which is
confined to a generally-framed power of the Common Market Group (the executive
organ) "to monitor compliance with the Treaty" (Art. 13). Of course, such laconic
treaty formula, however less perfect from the legal technique viewpoint it might be,
does not necessarily mean tha t the supervisory mechanism in fact works badly. Too
short time of the MERCOSUR existence and the lack of necessary data do not make it
64so far possible to reach any conclusion on this m atter
1.3. Other IEOs
The entire spectrum of supervisory organs operates within the framework of 
65GATT . The general supervisory functions are discharged by the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES and the Council which are assisted by technical bodies. Along with this, 
separate agreements are supervised by special bodies: the Textiles Surveillance Body 
and the Committees (Councils) overseeing the agreements of the Tokyo Round. These 
organs examine how the contracting parties observe their obligations and render 
services on conciliation and dispute settlement. The Council of GATT may also 
establish ad hoc bodies with supervisory functions. For example, in 1987 it formed
64. See more details on MERCOSUR in: Ch.Chatterjee. The Treaty of Asuncion: An Ananlysis. - In: 26 
J.W.T. 1 (1991), p. 63-71; E.V. de Davidson. The Treaty of Asuncion and a Common Market for the 
Southern Cone. - In: Virginia J. of International Law, 1991, Vol. 32, Nol, p. 265-283; Emilio J.
Cardenas. The Treaty of Asuncion: A Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) Begins To Take Shape. - 
In: World Competition. Law and Economics Review, Vol. 15, No 4, p. 65-77.
65. See the detailed analysis of the GATT supervision in: I.H.Courage-van Lier. Supervision within 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. -In: Supervisory Mechanisms in International Economic 
Organizations, p. 47-223; Richard Blackhurst. Strengthening GATT Surveillance of Trade-Related 
Policies. In: The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Legal and Economic Problems. 
Second Updated Edition. Ed. by E.-U.Petersmann, M.Hilf. Deventer/Boston, 1991, p. 123-155.
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the working group to examine the Third Lome Convention in the light of the relevant
provisions of the General Agreement. In its report the working party stated that the
purposes and content of the Convention were in line with those embodied in the
66General Agreement, including its Part IV
The 1986 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round provided for the
m ultilateral surveillance so as to ensure the proper implementation of the
67standstill and rollback commitments . The Trade Negotiations Committee was 
empowered to decide on the appropriate surveillance mechanisms, including periodic 
reviews and evaluations. The participant’s notifications of the alleged omissions 
should be addressed to the GATT Secretariat which may also provide further relevant 
information. On the whole, to quote Courage-van Lier, "under GATT a sophisticated 
system of supervision is established which certainly could be improved, but which at 
the same time might be the best attainable given the current relations between 
States"68.
A great deal of regular supervisory work is executed by international commodity 
organizations. An example of the well-distributed supervisory powers among the 
organs is the International Cocoa Organization. On the basis of a detailed annual 
report presented by the Executive Director, the Council (the highest authority) 
reviews the general situation regarding cocoa production and consumption,
66. See BISD. Thirty-fifth Supplement. 1987-1988, Geneva, 1989, p. 321-330.
67. The standstill commitments prescribed each participant within the term of Uruguay Round not to 
take any trade restrictive or distorting measure both inconsistent with the provisions of the law
of GATT and those in the legitimate exercise of the participant’s GATT rights, that would go beyond 
that which is necessary to remedy specific situations, as provided for in the law of GATT; and not 
to take any trade measures in such a manner as to improve its negotiating positions.
The rollback rule stipulated that all trade restrictive or distorting measures inconsistent with 
the law of GATT shall be phased out or brought into conformity with the above provisions not later 
than by the date of the formal completion of the negotiations.
68. I.H.Courage-van Lier. Op. cit., p. 204.
evaluating, particularly, the development of global supply and demand. The Council
69may make recommendations to the members based on this evaluation . The Council
70also keeps under permanent control the buffer stock operations , periodically
71reviews the commercial transaction of the members with non-members . In turn, the
Executive Director maintains a record of the members’ exports and imports of cocoa
72on the basis of their monthly reports . Each exporting and importing member is
required to submit an authorized Council control document before permitting the
73export or import of any cocoa from/into its customs territory . Along with this, 
the International Cocoa Organization is obliged to collect and keep up-to-date the 
available information on the world’s current and potential production and 
consumption capacity^.
Supervision in the EFTA is within the competence of the supreme organ. The 
Council oversees the application of the constituent Convention and considers whether 
further action should be taken by the Member States in order to promote the 
attainm ent of the objectives of the Association (Art. 32). The Member States notify 
to the Council on their implementing measures, having examined which, the Council 
takes appropriate decisions and recommendations. The Council also may authorize any 
Member State to suspend in certain cases its obligations under the Convention (Art. 
13, 31).
69. Articles 49, 51 of the 1986 International Cocoa Agreement.
70. Ibid., Articles 34-44.
71. Ibid., Art. 55.
72. Ibid., Art. 46.
73. Ibid., Art. 47.
74. Ibid., Art. 48.
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Some IEOs practice special procedures for control over the compatibility and
application of the decisions taken by their organs. For instance, the F AO
Constitution explicitly provides tha t the supreme organ (the Conference) may review
any decision taken by the executive organ (the Council) and other bodies (Art. IV).
The review over the application of the acts of the supreme and executive organs may
be kept by the administrative body (e.g. Art. 15 of the Charter of the CCASG).
Obviously, even the most elaborate supervisory mechanisms are unable to ensure a
one hundred per cent efficiency of supervision within complicated individual legal
systems created by IEOs. The weaknesses of the "intergovernmental" supervisory
75procedure, on the example of the EEC, have been revealed by Weiler
2. Operative Norm-Execution
For the purpose of the present study the term  "operative norm-execution" denotes 
a wide spectrum of preparatory, organizational and executive measures taken by the 
IEOs’ organs in order to ensure the proper and timely fulfillment of the IEOs’ legal 
provisions. This is the central phase of law-implementation. In a broad sense, to 
describe how an IEO operates in order to execute its constituent and subsequent 
(secondary) rules would mean to expose its every-day work. Obviously, some typical
75. "(1) The procedure is political in nature: the Commission (appropriately) may have nonlegal 
reasons not to initiate a prosecution;
(2) a centralized agency with limited human resources is unable adequately to identify, process, 
and monitor all possible Member State violations and infringements;
(3) Article 169 may be inappropriate to apply to small violations; even if small violations are 
properly identified, dedicating Commission resources to infringements that do not raise an 
important principle or create a major economic impact is wasteful; and finally, and most 
importantly;
(4) no real enforcement exists: proceedings conclude with a "declaratory" judgement of the 
European Court without enforcement sanctions" (J.H.H.Weiler. The Transformation of Europe. - In: 
The Yale Law Journal, 1991, Vol. 100, p. 2420).
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examples might give only a general idea of how IEOs approach this problem, which 
inevitably arises before each of them.
2.1. Regional Inteerational Organizations
For the same reason as in the case of supervision, the most comprehensive norm- 
executing mechanisms have been elaborated within the regional integrational 
organizations. The examples of the EEC and the AEC deserve consideration.
In the EEC the main burden of the operative executive work is bestowed upon the 
Commission which, among others, ensures "that the provisions of this Treaty and the 
measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied" (Art. 155). For 
this purpose the Commission performs a number of functions which may be summarized 
as follows:
- it issues directives establishing the procedure and timetable in accordance 
with which the Member States carry out their obligations; takes organizational 
measures;
- it submits proposals to the Council for working out and implementing the 
common policy of the Community;
- it may authorize any Member State encountering special difficulties to 
postpone the fulfillment of certain obligations, to take in certain cases protective 
measures;
- it takes implementing initiatives;
- it implements the EEC budget under the European Parliament and Council 
supervision.
The Council performs norm-executing functions mainly by virtue of the decisions 
taken in the Commission’s proposals, when the Commission’s own competence is 
insufficient. However, under Art. 145 of the Treaty of Rome, the Council may also
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reserve the right, in specific cases, to directly exercise implementing powers 
itself.
A clear enough separation of norm-executing powers among the supreme, executive 
and administrative organs can be observed in the constituent Treaty of the AEC. The 
AEC Assembly (supreme organ) is responsible for implementing the objectives of the 
Community. To this end it determines the general policy of the Community; 
coordinates the economic, scientific, technical, cultural and social policies of 
Member States; takes any action under the constituent Treaty to attain the 
objectives of the Community; takes decisions and gives directives concerning the 
regional economic communities; approves the Community’s programme of activity and 
budget, etc. (Art. 8).
Futhermore, The Council of Ministers is responsible for functioning and 
development of the Community. It makes recommendations to the Assembly on any action 
aimed a t attaining the objectives of the Community; guides the activity of 
subordinate organs; submits to the Assembly proposals concerning the programmes of 
activity, the budget of the Community, the Member States’ annual contributions, etc. 
(Art. 11).
In turn, the Economic and Social Commission prepares the programmes, policies 
and strategies for cooperation and makes appropriate recommendations, through the 
Council, to the Assembly; coordinates the activities of the Secretariat, of the 
Committees and of the subsidiary bodies, etc. (Art. 16).
Finally, the General Secretary ensures the implementation of the decisions of 
the Assembly and the application of the regulations of the Council, prepares the 
proposals concerning the programme of activity and the budget of the Community; 
submits reports on the Community’s activities; carries out studies with a view to 
attaining the objectives of the Community and makes relevant proposals, etc. (Art.
2.2. International commodity organizations
In certain cases the whole IEOs are formed with the main purpose to promote the
functioning of complicated multilateral economic agreements. Such are international
76commodity organizations . A standard formula applied in a number of international 
commodity agreements reads: "The Council (the supreme organ - S.V.) shall exercise 
all such powers and perform or arrange for the performance of all such functions as 
are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Agreement". Thus, the Councils of 
the International Cocoa Organization and International Natural Rubber Organizations, 
which operate under similar rules, discharge inter alia such norm-executive 
functions as redistribution of the votes in the Council, review and revision of 
prices, undertaking supplementary measures necessary for the price stabilization, 
relieving a member of obligations on account of exceptional or emergency 
circumstances, approval of administrative budget and assessment of the members’ 
contributions, etc. In turn, the operative executive work is carried out by the 
Executive Committees, while the Buffer Stock Managers are responsible for the buffer 
stock operations, including purchase and sale of the relevant commodity.
However, in practice not all international commodity organizations have proved 
their feasibility. In 1985 the International Tin Council was unable to meet its 
financial commitments, owing several hundred million pounds to its creditors. The 
attem pts of the Member States to get out of the crisis failed and some main 
creditors initiated legal action before the High Court in London and some other 
courts. Although the High Court refused to liquidate the Council, regarding this as
76. See P.I.B.Kohona. Some Legal Problems Relating to the Implementation of International 
Commodity Agreements. - In: Indian Journal of International Law, 1981, N 4, p. 546-562.
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incompatible with its immunities and privileges , the operations with the buffer
78stock were suspended . This negative experience of the International Tin Council 
moved some other international commodity organizations to narrow their financial and 
contractual com petence^.
2.3. Other IBQs
Fragm entary provisions relating to norm-execution can be found in the normative 
acts of many other IEOs. Some of them suggest a very general formula: the supreme 
organ generates the organization’s policy and determines appropriate ways and means 
of its realization, while the executive organ directs and supervises the current 
operation of the organization and ensures the implementation of the decisions of the
77. It is worth to quote one of the Court’s conclusions on this matter: "The failure of an 
international organization to meet its obligations is without precedent. The possibility was 
obviously not foreseen when the treaties which established or continued the I.T.C. were concluded. 
The responsible course now would be for the member states, by diplomatic means, to negotiate 
suitable arrangements to meet the shortfall. Failing this, there is much to be said for the view 
that an unprecedented situation calls for an unprecedented solution. But under our constitution it 
is for Parliament to decide whether the United Kingdom, as the host State, should intervene and, 
contrary to the terms of the treaties and without the consent of the other member states, claim the 
right to subject the affairs of an insolvent international organization to its own domestic 
jurisdiction and wind it up. All I decide is that by the general words of existing legislation 
Parliament has not already demonstrated any such intention" ( In re International Tin Council 
(1987).- 77 I.L.R. 40-41).
78. See more details in: M.Herdegen. The Insolvency of International Organizations and the Legal 
Position of Creditors: Some Observations in the Light of the International Tin Council Crisis. -
In: NILR, 1988, N 2, p. 133-144; I.Seidl-Hohenveldern. Piercing the Corporate Veil of International 
Organizations: The International Tin Council Case in the English Court of Appeals. - In: GYIL 1989, 
Berlin, 1990, p. 43-54.
79. Thus, under Art. 7.2 of the 1986 International Cocoa Agreement, "The Council shall not have 
power, and shall not be taken to have been authorized by the members, to incur any obligation 
outside the scope of this Agreement: in particular it shall not have the capacity to borrow money, 
without however limiting the application of Article 33 (concerning relationships with the Common 
Fund for Commodities - S.V.), nor shall it enter into any trading contract for cocoa except as 
provided for specifically in this Agreement". A similar provision can be seen in Art. 7 of the 1987 
International Natural Rubber Agreement.
supreme organ . Others vest the most important norm-executing powers to the IEO’s
81principal body (e.g. the ITPA ) or provide the establishment of subsidiary
82 83bodies with limited norm-executing functions (e.g. the FAO , the OECD , the 
84ASEAN ).
However elaborate norm-executing techniques may be stipulated by the constituent
instrum ents of an IEO, taken alone, these cannot guarantee a high rate of compliance
with the organization’s decisions. Much depends on the direct executives in the
Member States. For instance, some normative acts of the ECOWAS had not been simply
presented for ratification in the Member countries. This came about not because
these documents had been found unacceptable by the legislative bodies of the Member
States, but due to either the lack of political will on the part of some political
leaders or to the position of the officials not being enough responsible for timely
85presentation of the relevant documents for ratification
80. See e.g. Articles 15, 20 of the Statute of the OPEC.
81. Under Art. 7 of the Agreement Establishing the ITPA, "(1) The Governing Board shall exercise 
such powers and perform or arrange for the performance of such functions as are necessary to carry 
out the objectives of the Association". (2) The Governing Board may establish such subsidiary 
organs and adopt such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the objectives of the 
Association".
82. Under Art. VI of the FAO Constitution, the Conference or Council may establish commissions "to 
advise on the formulation and implementation of policy and to coordinate the implementation of 
policy".
83. The OECD Committee on Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions considers all questions 
concerning interpretation and implementation of the provisions of the OECD Code of Liberalization 
of Current Invisible Operations (Articles 18, 19, and 20 of the Code).
84. For example, the ASEAN Food Security Reserve, the Committee on Industry Minerals and Energy, 
the ASEAN Committee on Trade and Tourism (see ASEAN Documents Series 1987-1988, Geneva, 1989, p. 
321-330).
85. See: Ten Years of ECOWAS 1975-1985. Lagos, 1985, p. 93.
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Therefore, the supervisory and norm-executing functions pierce through the 
entire IEOs activities. This is quite natural, since the main IEOs designation - to 
coordinate the Member States economic policies - presupposes the existence of a 
certain system of institutional tecniques, procedures and mechanisms for the proper 
implementation of their normative acts. How elaborate such a system is depends upon 
the scope and intensity of the IEO’s activities. The most developed supervisory and 
norm-executing mechanisms can be found in the integrational, financial and commodity 
organizations.
Summarizing the practice and experience of the existing IEOs, it is possible to 
formulate their most typical supervisory and norm-executing functions the following 
way:
- requesting and examining the information from the Member States on the 
fulfillment of their obligations within the framework of the organization;
- supervision over the progress in the attainm ent of the organization’s 
purposes;
- administrative and judicial supervision over legality of the acts adopted by 
the institutions and the Member States;
- arranging negotiations and consultations among the Member States as regards to 
the application of the organization’s normative acts;
- making decisions and recommendations for the Member States on the procedure, 
timetable and other issues concerning the due implementation of their relevant 
normative provisions;
- authorizing the Member States to take safeguard measures, suspend in certain 
cases the execution of their obligations;




- taking measures provided by the constituent instruments in case of a Member 
State’s non-compliance with its obligations;
- implementing the budget of the organization and overseeing its financial 
activities.
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CHAPTER VIII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The normal course of law-implementation does not necessarily include the
discharge of dispute-resolving function by IEOs. In many cases, the IEOs’
interpreting, norm-making, executive and supervisory efforts prove to be sufficient
for the proper application of their normative acts. The dispute-resolving powers
sta rt to be applied in the anomalous, though not rare, situations connected with
disagreements and breaches of law. However, as long as international law exists, the
process of its implementation inevitably covers such a corrective phase as dispute
86settlem ent .
W hat kinds of disputes can retard the regular pace of implementation? Kohona
gives the following answer: "Disputes may arise between the member states of an
organization and the organization, among members themselves and among the various
organs. They could relate to the implementation of the agreement, the interpretation
of its provisions or of subsequent norms set by the organization, the internal
87working of the organization and a host of other matters"
1. Negotiations and Consultations
Normally, the IEOs’ Member States attem pt to avoid administrative or judicial 
means of dispute settlement, preferring at least during the initial stage of the
86. The idea that the dispute-resolving process may be considered a certain stage of law 
implementation is shared by some authors (see e.g. M.Sorensen. Autonomous Legal Orders: Some 
Considerations Relating to a System Analysis of International Organizations in the World Legal 
Order. - In: ICLQ, 1983, Part 3, p. 566; J.H.Jackson. Restructuring the GATT System, p. 56).
87. See P.I.B.Kohona. The Regulation of International Economic Relations Through Law, p. 150.
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dispute evolution the more amicable procedures of negotiations and consultations
As Kohona wrote, "multilateral economic agreements rely extensively on
consultations, negotiations and investigations for the purpose of resolving 
89disputes" . A similar view was held by Ostrihansky: "Most likely, the dominant
role of consultations would be retained, not because the subject-matter of a case is
not suitable for adjudication, but because the consultations are the natural initial
attem pt to settle any controversy, and they are the cheapest, the least adversary
90and the most confidential means of settling a dispute" . It should be also borne 
in mind tha t some States, like Japan, by tradition dislike any formal dispute 
settlement procedures and, correspondingly, give preference to negotiations without 
publicity^.
The constituent instruments of some IEOs place a special emphasis on
92 93 94 95consultations and negotiations (e.g. the OECD , GATT , AMF , MIGA ) in both
88. The terms "negotiations" and "consultations” are very close in the meaning. However, a slight 
difference has been pointed out by Kohona: "...consultations, being an ongoing process could occur 
even before a dispute arises. They could be used to anticipate problems and even to avert potential 
disputes. While on the other hand negotiations, in this context, could occur only after the parties 
have recognized the existence of a dispute" (P.I.B.Kohona. Op. cit., p. 158).
89. P.I.B.Kohona. Op. cit., p. 166.
90. R.Ostrihansky. Settlement of Interstate Trade Disputes - The Role of Law and Legal Procedures.
- In: NYIL 1991, vol. XXII, The Hague, 1992, p. 175.
91. See Meinhard Hilf. Op. cit., p. 297.
92. For example, pursuant to Art. 3 of the OECD Convention, "the Members agree that they will: (a) 
keep each other informed and furnish the Organization with the information necessary for the 
accomplishment of its tasks; (b) consult together on a continuing basis, carry out studies and 
participate in agreed projects; and (c) co-operate closely and where appropriate take coordinated 
action".
(Footnote continues on next page)
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dispute-preventing and dispute-resolution.
It may be presumed, that negotiations and consultations are the most natural, 
accessible and, therefore, widely utilized means of dispute settlement in any 
international relationships, including those within IEOs. Unlike more formalized 
administrative, arbitral, or judicial procedures, negotiations and consultations are 
often hidden from an outside observer, who is able to get only fragmentary 
information on them. Because of confidentiality, it is hardly possible to evaluate 
their real efficiency in each particular case. Nonetheless, due to the consensual 
nature of international legal obligations, negotiations and consultations are 
supposed to be the most logical and helpful means for preventing and resolving 
international economic disagreements.
2. Good Offices. Mediation. Conciliation
(Footnote continued from previous page)
93. Article XXII of GATT entitled "Consultations" says:
"1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate 
opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by another contracting 
party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement.
2. The Contracting Parties may, at the request of a contracting party, consult with any 
contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it has not been possible to find a 
satisfactory solution through consultation under paragraph 1M.
Remarkably, about half of the disputes which were formally brought under the procedures within 
GATT were settled by negotiation (see Meinhard Hilf. Op. cit., p. 302.
94. Among the means employed by the AMF for the accomplishment of its goals, there is: "...holding 
periodic consultations with member States on their economic conditions and the policies they pursue 
in support of the realization of the goals of the Fund and the States concerned" (Article Five (h)
of the AMF Agreement).
95. Along with the above quoted general provisions, one can also meet more specific procedural 
requirements to negotiations and consultations. Thus, the MIGA Convention definitely stipulates:" 
Negotiations shall be deemed to have been exhausted if the parties fail to reach a settlement 
within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the date of the request to enter into 
negotiation" (Art. 2 of the Annex II to the Convention).
Past experience has shown that quite often an economic dispute can hardly be
settled bilaterally, without a recourse to a third body. Meanwhile, the disputants
strive to avoid or at least delay adjudicative intervention, often giving preference
96to good offices, mediation or conciliation . As commonly used quite informal 
dispute-resolving means, good offices, mediation and conciliation do not, normally, 
need any special procedure to be laid down in the IEOs’ constituent instruments. It 
is presumed that the disputant Member States of an IEO may undertake them 
voluntarily upon their mutual agreement.
However, sometimes special procedural requirements are fixed in the IEOs’
97 98normative acts . Most attention is paid to conciliation , which is somewhat more
96. Merrills suggested the following correlation among good offices, mediation and conciliation:
'The third party may simply encourage the disputing states to resume negotiations or do nothing 
more than provide them with an additional channel of communication. In these situations he is said 
to be contributing his ’good offices’. On the other hand, his job may be to investigate the dispute 
and to present the parties with the set of formal proposals for its solution... this form of 
intervention is called ’conciliation*. Between good offices and conciliation lies the form of third 
party activity known as ’mediation’.
Like good offices, mediation is essentially an adjunct of negotiations, but with the mediator 
as an active participant, authorized, and indeed expected, to advance his own proposals and to 
interpret, as well as to transmit, each party’s proposals to the other. What distinguishes this 
kind of assistance from conciliation is that a mediator generally makes his proposals informally 
and on the basis of information supplied by the parties, rather then his own investigations, 
although in practice such distinctions tend to be blurred* (J.G.Merrills. International Dispute 
Settlement. Cambridge, 1991, p. 27).
97. Thus, pursuant to the 1989 Decision of the Contracting Parties "Improvements to the GATT 
Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures”, good offices, conciliation and mediation may be requested 
at any time by any party to a dispute. They may begin at any time and terminated at any time. If 
the parties to the dispute agree, procedures for good offices, conciliation or mediation may 
continue while the panel or working party process proceeds. It is specially provided that the 
Director-General may offer his good offices, conciliation or mediation, acting in an ex officio 
capacity.
98. It is worth to mention here the UN Draft rules for the conciliation of disputes between States
of 1990 which were recommended to the Member States for examination as a part of the UN Decade of 
International Law program ( see 30 ILM 229-244 (1991)).
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99 100formalized compared to good offices and mediation (e.g. the MIGA , the OECD , 
the International Cocoa O rganization^^).
Many lawyers persuasively expose the advantages of conciliation, usually 
stressing the two major points:
(1) Conciliation does not aim at imposing binding solutions upon the disputants, 
thus leaving for them a freedom of maneuver;
(2) Keeping the dispute under the parties’ control, conciliation suggests them a
99. According to Article 3 of Annex II to the MIGA Convention, if the dispute is not resolved 
through negotiation, prior to arbitration, the parties by mutual consent may resort to conciliation 
procedure. The agreement for recourse to conciliation shall specify the matter in dispute, the 
claims of the parties and, if available, the name of the conciliator. In the absence of agreement 
on the conciliator, the parties may jointly request either the Secretary General of the ISCID or 
the President of the ICJ to appoint a conciliator. The disputants provide conciliator with all 
necessary information and documentation and shall give their most serious consideration to his 
recommendations. Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, the conciliator shall within a period 
not exceeding 180 days from the date of his appointment, submit to the parties a report recording 
the results of his efforts and setting out the controversial issues and his proposals for their 
settlement. Each party shall, within 60 days from the date of the receipt of the report, express in 
writing its views on the report to the other party. Only if the conciliation process fails, the 
disputants are entitled to recourse to arbitration.
100. For example, pursuant to the Revised Recommendation of the Council concerning cooperation 
between Member Countries on restrictive business practices affecting international trade of 1986, 
the Member Countries agree to use the good services of the Committee of Experts on the Restrictive 
Business Practices for the purpose of conciliation. In such case they inform the Chairman of the 
Committee, who determines in agreement with the Member countries concerned the procedure for 
conciliation. The Secretariat compiles the list of persons willing to act as conciliators. Any 
conclusions drawn as a result of the conciliation do not have a binding force and are kept 
confidential unless the member countries concerned agree otherwise (see 25 ILM 1634-1635 (1986).
101. A step-by-step dispute-resolving procedure with the use of conciliation is also stipulated 
by the 1986 International Cocoa Agreement. It includes: (1) consultations on the matters of 
interpretation or application of the Agreement; (2) in the course of such consultations, on the 
request of either party and with the consent of the other, the Executive Director shall establish 
an appropriate conciliation procedure; (3) if no solution is made, the matter may, at the request 
of either party, be referred to the Council (Art. 61).
thoroughly motivated realistic platform for settlem ent102.
On the whole, the procedures of good offices, mediation and conciliation are a
natural and logical addition to negotiations and consultations. The present writer
is likely to support those lawyers who advise IEOs not to underestimate these
reliable means of dispute-resolving. To quote P.van Dijk, "negotiations and
consultations often turn  out to be more successful if they are combined with good
offices, mediation and conciliation. This still leaves the ultimate solution in the
hands of the disputants but may bring into their discussions certain abstractions,
impartial third-party views, solutions not yet taken into consideration, and
103persuasive force of authority and reasonableness"
3. Dispute-Resolving Organs in IEOs
The analysis of the IEOs* constituent instruments reveals the following main 
types of organs involved in dispute settlement: (1) supreme and executive organs;
102. See Tiyanjana Maluwa. The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Among African States, 1963-1983: 
Some Conceptual Issues and Practical Trends. - In: ICLQ, 1989, vol. 38, Part 2, p. 310-311,
Linda C. Reif adds to this: "Conciliation is less costly than the adjudicative methods, as it is a 
relatively informal and expeditious process. ...like arbitration, party autonomy is emphasized and 
the disputants usually have considerable freedom to design the conciliation process, including the 
choice of location and conciliators with expertise in the relevant subject-matter. If a disputant 
is of a type that warrants a wide-ranging or creative solution, then conciliation, with its ability 
to design such proposals, would be more appropriate than litigation with the restrictions involved 
in rendering judgements. Further, the information and statements generated by conciliation remain 
confidential unless the parties agree otherwise." (Linda C. Reif. Conciliation as a Mechanism for 
the Resolution of International Economic and Business Disputes. - In: Fordham International Law 
Journal 1990-1991, No 3, p. 634-635).
103. P.Van Dijk. A Comparative Analysis in the Perspective of Changing Structures of the 
International Economic Order. - In: Supervisory Mechanisms in International Economic Organizations, 
p. 781.
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(2) special quasi-arbitral organs; (3) arbitral tribunals; (4) permanent courts
The frequency of disputes arising in IEOs varies considerably from one
organization to another. The rates are higher within the actively operating
organizations with a large volume of powers. This factor influences the drafters of
the statutory acts when they make their choice as to the type of dispute-resolving
organ to be used, or their combination.
It is quite difficult to follow any clear dependence between the subject and the
intensity of activities, on the one hand, and the character of the dispute-resolving
organ , on the other, in the existing IEOs. The only easily observed trend is that
most integrational organizations resort to the perm anent courts, a t least in their
constituent instrum ents, if not so actively in practice. To some extent this is
determined by the influence of the EEC, whose experience undoubtedly has a strong
impact on the other regional IEOs. But more important are: (1) a comparatively high
105degree of the Member S tates’ tru st to the regional integrational institutions and 
their judicial capacity to take effective decisions, and (2) a large intensity of 
activities within integrational IEOs, that, despite a high level of their 
homogeneity, may cause a large number of disputes
104
104. International administrative tribunals dealing with disputes between an organization and its 
officials, as well as the ICSID, involved in resolving investment disputes between States and the 
nationals of other States, are intentionally left beyond the scope of this study, since these kinds 
of dispute settlement do not directly relate to the implementation of the international legal rules 
of interstate nature.
105. The problem of the Member States' trust to their institutional creation has been seen in the 
early period of the CIS evolution. Apparently, the CIS States had too much experience of an 
excessive "supranationalism" within the former USSR to be willing to reanimate it again. Hence some 
of them (Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine) viewed the Commonwealth as a minimally institutionalized 
coordinating association with a limited number of powers of its own. On the contrary, the attempts
to create a strong Commonwealth were considered as endangering the sovereignty of the newly emerged 
independent States.
106. See some considerations on this point in: Judicial Settlement of International Disputes. An 
International Symposium. N.Y., Heidelberg, Berlin, 1974, pp. 381, 397, 404-405.
At the same time, the absence of explicit provisions relating to the dispute 
settlement mechanisms can be found in the constituent documents of both some 
actively operating IEOs (e.g. the OPEC), and the organizations of mainly 
deliberative character (e.g. the UNCTAD).
In rare cases, it is provided that legal action against the IEO may be brought 
in the outside judicial body, such as a competent national court of the State where 
the headquarters of the IEO are located (e.g. Article Fifty-three of the AMF 
Agreement).
3.1.Dispute Settlement in Supreme and Executive Organs
Unlike States, many IEOs do not follow the principle of separation of powers in
its classical version and in certain cases their supreme or executive organs may be
107endowed with quasi-judicial powers . In this connection the following typical 
schemes may be observed.
(1) The supreme organ takes the final binding decision on the dispute without
recourse to any other bodies. Such a brief formula without going into procedural
details is provided, for example, in some financial organizations and the
108organizations of producers and exporters
(2) The supreme or executive organ resolves disputes with the assistance of a
specially established body consisting of legal and other experts (e.g. examining
109committee in the EFTA , advisory panels in some international commodity
107. P.I.B.Kohona. Op. cit., p. 149.
108. See e.g. Art. 18 of the Agreement Establishing the OWPEAC, Art. VIII of the Agreement 
Establishing the IBA, and Art. 21 of the Agreement Establishing the ATPC, Art. 29 of the 
International Timber Agreement of 1983.
109. See Articles 31 and 33 of the EFTA Convention.
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organizations^^, ad hoc tribunal in the CARICOM ^ \  panels of experts and groups of
112specialists in the MERCOSUR , Commission for Settlement of Disputes in the 
113CCASG , panels in GATT). In this case, the final arbitrator is also a supreme or
executive organ, while the special body establishes the facts relating to the
disputable m atter and makes recommendations to the decision-making organ.
(3) The final dispute-resolving decisions are taken for some disputes by the
supreme or executive organ, for the others by the ad hoc tribunals (e.g. the MIGA,
114the OPEC Fund for International Development)
3.2. Special Quasi-Arbitral Organs
As it has been above noted, in some IEOs special quasi-arbitral organs may be 
set up with a view of assisting a supreme or executive organ in resolving disputes. 
Such working technique possesses certain incontestable advantages: (1) a thorough 
and qualified expertise of the disputable matter; (2) disposing supreme or executive 
organ of time-taking preparatory work; (3) a flexible procedure th a t opens a door 
for compromises between the parties in dispute before the final decision is taken.
110. An example from the practice of such panel within International Coffee Agreement see in: 62
I.L.R. 422-428.
111. See Articles 11, 12 of the Annex to the Treaty Establishing the CARICOM.
112. According to Annex III to the Treaty Establishing the MERCOSUR, if no dispute solution can be 
found by means of direct negotiations, the dispute is referred "to the Common Market Group which, 
after evaluating the situation, shall within a period of 60 days make the relevant recommendations 
to the Parties for settling the dispute. To that end, the Common Market Group may establish or 
convene panels of experts or groups of specialists in order to obtain the necessary technical 
advice".
113. See Art. 10 of the Charter of the CCASG.
114. See Articles 56, 57 of the Annex II of the MIGA Convention, Articles 12, 13 of the Agreement 
Establishing the OPEC Fund for International Development.
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Pursuant to Art. 31 of the EFTA Convention, if a disputable m atter is referred
to the Council, it shall promptly, by majority vote, make arrangements for examining
the m atter. Such arrangements may include a reference to an examining committee.
which, in accordance with Art. 33 of the Convention, is composed by the Council of
persons selected for their competence and integrity and appointed in personal
capacity. The report of examining committee is taken into consideration by the
Council when it makes recommendations to any Member State concerned. This procedure,
however, has been rarely applied to the practical cases. Only six m atters have come
115before the Council, the last in 1967 . Normally, the EFTA Member States prefer a
116political compromise to a legal settlement
Some international commodity organizations strongly rely on advisory panels in
resolving disputes concerning interpretation and application of the relevant
commodity agreements. Normally, the panel consists of two persons nominated by the
exporting countries, two persons nominated by the importing countries, and a
chairman selected unanimously by the above mentioned four persons or, if they fail
to agree, by the Chairman of the Council. The motivated opinion of the panel is
submitted to the Council, which after considering all relevant information, shall
117decide the dispute
Under Art. 10 of the Charter of the CCASG, the Commission for Settlement of 
Disputes is attached to the Supreme Council. If a dispute arises over interpretation 
or implementation of the Charter and it is not resolved within the Ministerial 
Council or the Supreme Council, the latter may refer such dispute to the Commission,
115. See: The European Free Trade Area. Geneva, 1987, p. 37-40.
116. See A.Szokoloczy-Syllaba. EFTA: The Settlement of Disputes. - In: ICLQ, 1971, Part 4, p. 519- 
534.
117.See: Art. 58 of the 1983 International Coffee Agreement; Art. 62 of the 1986 International 
Cocoa Agreement; Art. 39 of the 1987 International Sugar Agreement; Art. 55 of the 1987 
International Natural Rubber Agreement.
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which is formed for every case separately based on the nature of the dispute. The
Commission submits its recommendation or opinion to the Supreme Council for the
appropriate action. Unfortunately, there is no available information on the
practical work of the Commission.
The Treaty Establishing the CARICOM makes reference to an ad hoc tribunal
constituted by the Council for examining disputable issues. Despite the use of the
118term "tribunal" to denote this subsidiary body , it does not possess full
arbitral powers (for example, it cannot take binding decisions upon the parties to
the dispute). The competence of an ad hoc tribunal is confined to making
recommendations and opinions for the Council. However, the procedure, applied for
the establishment and composition of an ad hoc tribunal resembles that of arbitral 
119bodies . It is important to note, tha t the CARICOM Member States took an 
obligation to refrain from any method of dispute settlement other than provided by 
Articles 11 and 12 of the Annex to the founding Treaty.
120A unique dispute-resolving machinery has been invented within GATT . If a
118. Articles 11 and 12 of the Annex to the CARICOM Treaty.
119. Every Member State is invited to nominate two qualified jurists to the list of arbitrators.
The term of an arbitrator is five years and may be renewed. Each party to the dispute appoints one 
arbitrator to an ad hoc tribunal. Then the two arbitrators chosen by the parties appoint a third 
arbitrator who shall be the chairman. If they fail to do this within 15 days following the date of 
their own appointment, the Secretary-General of the CARICOM fills the vacancy. Where more than two 
Member States are parties to a dispute and these fail to appoint two arbitrators from the list, the 
Secretary-General appoints a sole arbitrator. An ad hoc tribunal makes up its own procedure and 
may, with the consent of the parties to the dispute, invite any party to submit its views orally or 
in writing.
120. There is a voluminous legal literature on the GATT dispute settlement. See e.g. I.Van Bael.The 
GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure. - In: JWTL, 1988, N 4, p. 67-77; R.P.Parker. Dispute Settlement 
in the GATT and the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. - In: JWT, 1989, N 3, p. 83-93; J.M.Waincymer. 
GATT Dispute Settlement: An Agenda for Evaluation and Reform. - In: North Carolina Journal of 
International law and Commercial Regulation, 1989, N 1; E.-U.Petersmann. Mid-Term Review A greem ents
(Footnote continues on next page)
dispute is not resolved through consultations (under Art. XXII of the General 
Agreement), a disputable m atter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTI ES which 
"shall promptly investigate any m atter so referred to them and shall make 
appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be 
concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate" (Art. XXIII of the 
General Agreement). Nothing is said in the basic text about panels or working 
parties which started to be formed in the course of the GATT evolution, first, as a 
customary practice, later codified in the "Understanding Regarding Notification, 
Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance" adopted in 1979, and modified in 
the 1989 Decision "Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and 
Procedures".
At present, the work of a GATT panel covers the following stages:
Composition of a panel
A panel is established upon the written request of a contracting party 
indicating whether consultations were held, and providing a brief summary of the 
factual and legal basis of the complaint. It is composed of the well-qualified 
governmental and/or non-governmental individuals by the agreement of the concerned 
parties, or if such agreement fails to be reached within twenty days from the 
establishment of the panel, at the request of either party, by the Director-General 
who appoints the panelists in consultation with the Chairman of the Council and 
after consulting both parties. Normally, a panel consists of 3-5 members acting in
(Footnote continued from previous page)
of the Uruguay Round and the 1989 Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures. - In: 
GYIL 1989, vol.32, Berlin, 1990, p. 280-322; J.H.Bello, A.F.Holmer. Settling Disputes in the GATT: 
The Past, Present, and Future. - In: International Lawyer, 1990, vol. 24, N 2, p. 519-533;
E.P.Eichmann. Procedural Aspects of GATT Dispute Settlement: Moving Towards Legalism. - In: 
International Tax & Business Lawyer, 1990, vol. 8, N 1, p. 38-77.
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their personal capacity and representing the countries which are not directly 
interested in the dispute outcome. When more then one contracting party requests for 
the establishment of a panel related to the same matter, a single panel may be 
established to examine these complaints.
Working procedure
Normally, a panel arranges 2 or 3 meetings with the participation of the parties 
to the dispute, which present their views both in the written form and orally at the 
meetings. The members of the panel may request the parties concerned to submit any 
relevant information, as well as consult competent bodies or experts on legal, 
procedural and technical matters. Any third contracting party having a substantial 
interest in the m atter before a panel has an opportunity to be heard by the panel.
Panel reports
The work of a panel results in a written report submitted for adoption to the
121Council which acts by consensus . Panel reports are discussed and drafted 
confidentially, provided that personal views of the members are not disclosed. If 
the parties arrive to a compromise within the period of the m atter consideration, 
the report is confined to a brief description of the disputable m atter and the 
reached solution. If a compromise fails to be achieved, the panel suggests its
121. In accordance with the normal GATT practice, the Council is empowered to act for the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES with regard to the adoption of panel reports. It should be kept in mind that 
under the existing GATT rules each party may request a majority voting on the adoption of a panel 
report (Art. XXV:4). Hence, the proposals of the "consensus minus one" and "consensus minus two" 
rules could not be considered as cardinal innovations to the current procedure. To quote 
Petersmann, "the regular adoption of GATT dispute settlement reports by all GATT Contracting 
Parties increases not only the legal significance of panel findings as ’subsequent treaty practice’ 
which has to be taken into account in the future interpretation of GATT rules, but also their 
’political weight’ because participation of the ’losing party* in the consensus decision is likely 
to enhance its political willingness to actually implement the panel findings" (E.-U.Petersmann.
The Uruguay Round Negotiations 1986-1991, p. 554-555).
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conclusions and recommendations on the m atter . As a general rule, the period
within which the panel drafts its report should not exceed six months from the time
of the panel composition. The overall period from the request for a panel until the
Council decision is taken shall not exceed, unlike agreed by the parties, fifteen
123months. The adopted panel report becomes a part of the GATT practice which is
taken into account in the further interpretation and application of the GATT rules.
A vast dispute-resolving experience within GATT proves that the recourse to
subsidiary quasi-arbitral organs may be quite efficient, if these retain the
confidence of the Member States and the latter treat them rather as a co-adjudicator
in finding compromises among the disputing parties, than an arbitrator imposing
binding decisions. Perhaps, for this reason, most of the panel reports were adopted
by the CONTRACTING PARTIES and followed by the countries concerned. According to
Jackson, among 117 disputes on which there was available information, only in 8-10
124cases the panels’ reports have not been fulfilled
However, in the recent years the dispute-resolving situation within GATT has 
been somewhat worsened. In the regular report on this subject in the Council meeting 
(November 1991), the Director-General of GATT, Mr. Arthur Dunkel pointed out a 
remarkable rise of the number of dispute-settlement cases during a year (95% of all 
the disputes were with participation of the USA, EEC and Japan). He observed that
122. To quote Pierre Pescatore, "Unlike judgements, panel reports are persuasive, not decisive 
documents. Their objective is to convey the opinion of the Council, not to decide directly the 
issue, and this influences deeply the style and the choice of arguments. Panels do their best to 
avoid controversial issues and try to present their arguments as being the expression of the 
obvious" (Pierre Pescatore. The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism - Its Present Situation and its 
Prospects. - 27J.W.T. 1 (1993), p. 13).
123. See J.H.Jackson. Op. cit., p. 68.
124. J.H.Jackson. Restructuring the GATT System, p. 67. For more detailed factual data on the GATT 
dispute settlement system see: E.-U.Petersmann. Strengthening the GATT Dispute Settlement System: 
On the Use of Arbitration in GATT. - In: The New Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Legal 
and Economic Problems, p. 323-343.
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the GATT faced an "increasing problem of conditional and incomplete implementation 
of panel reports"
3.3. Arbitral Tribunals
In some IEOs arbitration procedure is provided for the disputes which fail to be 
resolved by virtue of pre-adjudicative means. The comparative study of statutory 
provisions highlights the following characteristics of the IEOs’ arbitral tribunals.
Composition and procedure
Unlike permanent courts, arbitral tribunals are, as a rule, set up for each 
particular case in accordance with a traditional arbitral procedure. In the 
meantime, purely ad hoc arbitral tribunals, typical for a number of IEOs (e.g. the 
IMF, the MIGA, the WARD A, the OPEC Fund for International Development), differ from 
the permanent arbitral organs, within which the tribunals for particular cases may 
be set up (e.g. the Benelux College of Arbitrators, the IEA Dispute Settlement 
Center).
In most cases, tribunals are composed of three arbitrators, although, any other 
odd number of arbitrators or even a sole arbitrator are possible (e.g. the IEA). 
Normally, each party to the dispute appoints one arbitrator, while the third 
arbitrator (often endowed with the chairman’s powers) is chosen by their mutual 
agreement. In the case such agreement fails to be reached, the third arbitrator may 
be nominated, at the request of the parties, by a highly authoritative official, 
like the President of the ICJ or the Secretary General of the ICSID. In the AMF the 
third arbitrator, in such event, is selected among Arab jurists by the Secretary-
125. GATT Activities 1991, Geneva, 1992, p. 49.
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General of the League of Arab States . In some tribunals arbitrators may be
appointed from the special panel, unless the parties agree to an outside person
(e.g. the IEA Dispute Settlement Center), or from a list established by a supreme
127organ (e.g. the Benelux College of Arbitrators)
As a general rule, the IEOs’ constituent instruments do not specify the place of 
128arbitration and applicable law. Few exceptions can be observed.
Thus, under the Charter of the IEA Dispute Settlement Center, the principal 
place of arbitration is Paris. The parties may, however, agree to any other place, 
which should be approved by the Tribunal after consultation with the Director of the 
Center (Art. VII,i). The rules of applicable law are, in principle, those agreed to 
between the parties. In the absence of such agreement, these rules of law are 
determined by the Tribunal. In that case, if the transaction giving rise to the 
dispute involves a supplier of oil based in an IEA country, the Tribunal shall apply 
the law of tha t IEA country where the supplier of oil maintains its principal 
executive offices, but not including the conflict of law rules (Art. VII,c). The 
College of Arbitrators of the Benelux, with the consent of the parties to the 
dispute, may pronounce judgement ex aequo et bono. i.e. on the basis of general 
principles of law, in case of the lack of the relevant particular rules of law.
Most tribunals are authorized to determine their own working procedures. 
However, in some cases the constituent instrum ents stipulate that special procedures
126. Article Fifty-two of the AMF Agreement.
127. To quote Schwarzenberger, "the only difference between arbitration and judicial settlement 
lies in the method of selecting the members of these judicial organs. While, in arbitration 
proceedings, this is done by agreement between the parties, judicial settlement presupposes the 
existence of of a standing tribunal with its own bench of judges and its own rules of procedure 
which parties to a dispute must accept" (George Schwarzenberger. A Manual of International Law. 
Sixth edition, p. 195).
128. Kohona commented in this regard, that "it might be due to the assumption that the place would 
be the seat of the relevant organization" (P.I.B.Kohona. Op. cit., p. 175).
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for arbitration will be adopted by a principal body of the IEO 
Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals is most often limited to a relatively
narrow circle of disputes arising within IEOs. Such limitations relate either to the
130disputes unresolved by the supreme or executive organ (e.g. the WARD A , the
131Benelux Economic Union ), or to the disputes on specified m atters between
132 133 134different categories of the parties (e.g. the ITPA , the MIGA , the IEA ), or
to the combination of both above mentioned criteria (the OPEC Fund for International
Development
In some IEOs a resort to arbitration is provided in a mandatory manner (e.g. the
129
129. For example, under Article I,g of the Charter of the IEA Dispute Settlement Center, the 
Governing Board of the IEA will adopt such Procedures for Arbitration as soon as practicable. In 
accordance with Art. 53 of the Treaty Establishing the Benelux Economic Union, in 1960 the 
Statutory Rules of the College of Arbitrators were adopted by the Committee of Ministers.
130. Under Art.XVI of the WARDA Constitution, if the Governing Council cannot reach a conclusion on 
the question in dispute concerning interpretation or application of the Constitution, or if the 
conclusion of the Governing Council is not accepted by the parties concerned, either party to the 
dispute may request that the matter be submitted to arbitration.
131. Art. 44 of the Treaty Establishing the Benelux Economic Union stipulates that "A dispute which 
cannot be settled in the Committee of Ministers shall be submitted to the College of Arbitrators 
either at the joint request of the parties to the dispute or at the request of either of these”.
*132. According to Art. 17 of the Agreement Establishing the ITPA, arbitration is applied merely to 
the disputes between the Association and a Member.
133. Under Art. 57 of the MIGA Convention, arbitration procedure shall be applied to the disputes 
between the Agency and a Member, or a country that has ceased to be a Member.
134. The jurisdiction of tribunals set up within the IEA Dispute Settlement Center concerns the 
disputes between sellers and buyers of oil and between parties to an exchange of oil (Art. II of 
the Charter of the IEA Dispute Settlement Center).
135. Pursuant to Art. 13 of the Agreement Establishing the OPEC Fund for International Development, 
in case no settlement is reached by the Ministerial Council, a dispute between the Fund and the 
State that ceased to be a Member, or between the Fund and any Member upon the termination of the 
operations of the Fund shall be submitted to arbitration.
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IMF, EBRD) , while other IEOs refer it to a discretion of the disputant parties.
In the latter case, a disputable m atter may be submitted to arbitration either by a
137mutual consent of the disputants (e.g. the IEA ), or by a unilateral request of
1 ooany of them (e.g. the WARDA ).
Awards and advisory opinions
The tribunals’ decisions, mostly taken by majority vote, are, as a rule, final
and binding upon the parties concerned. However, in rare cases the award may be
requested for the revision or annulment. For example, Art. IX of the Charter of the
IEA Dispute Settlement Center states that, if after the award was rendered, a party
discovers a fact, ignorance of which was not due to negligence, and of such nature
as decisively to affect the award, this party can apply to the Director of the
139Center for the revision of the award
Some arbitral tribunals, apart from binding awards, are competent to give 
advisory opinions regarding the questions of law on the request of other organ of
136. In such cases the constituent instruments use the word "shall" for the matters to be submitted 
to arbitration. For example, under Art. 58 of the Agreement Establishing the EBRD, "if a 
disagreement should arise between the Bank and a member which has ceased to be a member, or between 
the Bank and any member after adoption of a decision to terminate the operations of the Bank, such 
disagreement shall be submitted to arbitration..."
137. Pursuant to Art. II,b of the Charter of the IEA Dispute Settlement Center, in order for the 
Tribunal to have jurisdiction, the parties must have given their consent in writing, indicating 
that they exclude any other means of dispute settlement, and that the award shall be final and 
binding as between them.
138. Art. XVI of the WARDA Constitution.
139. Within 30 days after the award was rendered any party may request the annulment of the award 
by applying in writing to the Director of the Center, on the following grounds: (1) that the
tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; (2) that there was corruption on the part of a member 
of the tribunal; (3) that there was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or
(4) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it was based. On receipt of the 
application, the Director appoints from the Panel an ad hoc Committee of three persons, independent 
from the tribunal, for investigation. If the award is annulled, the dispute shall be submitted, at 
the request of a party, to a new tribunal.
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the IEO . It makes them in this respect similar to the permanent courts of 
integrational IEOs.
3.4. Permanent Courts
An important contribution to the dispute-resolving practice within international
organizations is the idea of "judicial supranationality" constitutionally provided
in some IEOs, mostly in regional economic communities (the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, the Court of
Justice of the AEC, the Tribunal in the ECOWAS, the Court of Justice of the ECCAS,
the Tribunal of the PTA, the Arbitration Commission of the CEPGL). Pursuant to
Article 108.2 of the Agreement on the EEA, the EFTA countries shall establish the
EFTA Court in accordance with a separate agreement between them. A specialized
141Economic Court is expected to be set up within the CIS
Normally, States resort to litigation a t the final stage of the dispute 
evolution, after all other less painful means have been exhausted. This is quite 
understandable, since having recoursed to a court, the parties to a dispute lose an
140. For example, under Art. 52 of the Treaty Establishing the Benelux Economic Union, "The 
Committee of Ministers may request the College of Arbitrators to supply advisory opinions regarding 
questions of law in respect of the provisions of the present Treaty and of conventions related to
the aims of this Treaty".
141. Art. 32 of the CIS Charter stipulates that the Economic Court can interpret the agreements and 
other Commonwealth acts on economic issues, and resolve the disputes arising while executing 
economic obligations, as well as other disputes referred to the Court’s competence by the 
agreements among the Member States. However, these brief provisions do not bring to the fore the 
status and competence of the Economic Court, which are expected to be defined more precisely in the 
Agreement on the Status of the Economic Court and the Regulation on it, which are to be passed by 
the Council of Heads of State. In particular, it is not clear from the CIS Charter if resort to the 
Economic Court in the event of an economic dispute is mandatory or depends on the discretion of the 
disputant parties. In the latter case, which is more likely, it will have to be specified whether a 
litigation in the Court can be initiated by a unilateral request of any of disputants or only by
their mutual consent. Finally, who are considered potential disputants - only the Member States or 
also their nationals directly involved in economic interactions?
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opportunity of the direct influence on the dispute-resolving, entrusting it to an 
independent tribunal. Being in general very reticent about this way of dispute 
settlement, the Member States of the IEOs having permanent courts refer to them
quite rarely. Apart from the ECJ, whose extensive judicial practice has been an
142 143object of thorough examination , and to much less extent the CJCA , the other
IEOs’ courts have not yet got any noteworthy experience in dispute-resolution, thus
remaining rather a potential, than a practical tool. A certain dependence apparently
exists between the level and intensity of integration, on the one hand, and the
volume of work of the judicial organs within the economic communities, on the other.
Unfortunately, the present writer has failed to find either any traces of a
practical judicial work or even any detailed statutory provisions of the permanent
144courts of African economic communities , apart from the brief references in
142. See, for example, G.Slynn. The Court of Justice of the European Communities. - In: ICLQ, 1984, 
Part 2, p. 409-429; K.P.E.Lasok. The European Court of Justice. Practice and Procedure. L., 1984; 
Hailtre Rasmussen. On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice. Dordrecht, 1986; C.Gray. 
Judicial Remedies in International Law. Oxford, 1987, p. 120-149.
Remarkably, only two interstate disputes, from the total number of more than five thousand cases, 
were brought before the ECJ during the first three decades of its existence. Hence, to quote Hilf,
"the mere existence of this Court has helped Member States in nearly all cases under dispute among 
themselves to find solutions to their conflicts through negotiation and consent" (see Meinhard 
Hilf. Op. cit., p. 289).
143. A noteworthy phenomenon has been observed within the Andean Group, where the Member States’ 
non-compliance with their commitments was a general situation in the early 1980s, caused by grave 
economic difficulties of the Member States. If they had begun litigation against each other in the 
Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement it could have accelerated the disintegration in this 
subregion (see 23 ILM 424-425 (1984)).
144. Some comments on the judicial structure of the former EAC see in: M.A.Ajomo. Regional Economic 
Organizations. The African Experience. - In: ICLQ, 1976, vol. 25, Part 1, p. 79-82. See aiso Klaas
van Walraven. Some Aspects of Regional Economic Integration in Africa. - In: Hague Yearbook of 
International Law 1991. Vol. 4 Hague, 1992, p. 106-126.
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constituent instruments. For this reason, the ECJ and the CJCA are the only 
two of the above mentioned permanent courts, whose statutory provisions are 
available for consideration.
The trend to follow the EEC integrational pattern, that has been definitely 
observed within the Andean Group evolution of the last years, apparently covers the 
judicial system of the Cartagena Agreement, built under strong influence of the ECJ. 
This can be easily proved by a brief comparative analysis of the ECJ and CJCA.
Composition and Procedure
Both courts have much in common in relation to composition and procedure.
147The ECJ consists of thirteen Judges and six Advocates-General appointed by 
the common accord of the Governments of the Member States for a term of six years. 
The CJCA is composed of five justices designated for a term of six years by the 
unanimous vote of the plenipotentiaries accredited for this purpose. The position of 
the Attorney-General may be also created by the Commission of the Cartagena 
Agreement upon the unanimous proposal of the Court.
Both courts normally sit in plenary session. However, the ECJ may form chambers, 
consisting of three or five judges, either to undertake certain preparatory 
inquiries or to adjudicate on particular categories of cases. Similarly, for the 
m atters to which a plenary session is not required, the CJCA may meet with a quorum 
of three justices.
145. See Part 5, section 4 of the Treaty of Rome; Statute of the Court of Justice.
146. See The Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement of 1979 (18 ILM 1203- 
1210 (1979) and the 1983 Decision 184 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement "Statute of the 
Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement" (23 ILM 422-441 (1984).
147. Pursuant to Art. 166 of the Treaty of Rome, "It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General, 
acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned submissions of 
cases brought before the Court of Justice, in order to assist the Court in the performance of the
task assigned to it in Article 164".
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The procedure before the courts consists of the written and oral parts. 
Deliberations in both courts are secret, while the hearings are public, unless a 
court for serious motives decides otherwise.
Jurisdiction
Both courts are constituted to ensure the respect of law in the interpretation 
and application of the constituent treaties of the EEC and Andean Group, and are 
endowed for this purpose with a wide jurisdiction. It basically covers:
(1) The acts of noncompliance by the Member States with their obligations under
the constituent treaties. Such matters may be brought to both courts on the
initiative of either an executive body or a Member State concerned. In the latter
case, before a Member State brings an action against another Member State for an
alleged infringement of an obligation under a constituent treaty, it must present a
m atter before a relevant executive body. This way, the Member States are given an
opportunity to avoid a judicial procedure if an adequate solution is reached at the
administrative phase of the dispute settlement. Moreover, according to Article 27 of
the Treaty Creating the CJCA, "natural and juridical persons shall have the right to
bring causes of action in the competent national courts, in accordance with the
provisions of domestic law, when the member countries do not comply with that
148provided in Article 5 of this Treaty and the rights of such persons are affected 
by such noncompliance".
(2) The review of legality of binding acts of the relevant IEOs’ policy-making 
and executive organs. Such action may be brought to the court by a Member State,
148. This Article stipulates: " The member countries are committed to adopt the measures necessary 
to assure the fulfillment of the norms which comprise the juridical structure of the Cartagena 
Agreement.
Likewise, they are committed not to adopt or apply any measure which may be contrary to such 
norms, or which may prejudice their application".
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policy-making or executive organ, or a natural or juridical person . Furthermore,
it is specified that the member countries of the Cartagena Agreement may only bring
an action of nullification against the decisions approved without their affirmative
150vote . If the action is well founded, the courts nullify the acts concerned. 
According to Art. 175 of the Treaty of Rome, the Member States and other 
institutions of the Community, as well as any natural or legal person, may bring an 
action before the ECJ if the Council or the Commission, in infringement of this 
Treaty, fail to act.
(3) Interpretation of the constituent instrum ents and acts of the institutions 
of the relevant IEOs by virtue of preliminary rulings (ECJ) or prior advisory 
opinions (CJCA). Apart from this, the ECJ has jurisdiction in some other m atters 
specified in Articles 172, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181 and 182 of the Treaty of Rome.
Judgements
Both the judgements of the ECJ and the rulings of the CJCA are binding upon the 
parties concerned and enforceable in the Member States. In the case of discovery of 
a fact, which could have decisively influenced the outcome of the proceedings, 
provided that it was unknown to the applying party when the judgement (ruling) was 
given, such judgement (ruling) may be applied for revision (review) in each court.
The statutory documents of the CJCA provide for a special procedure of sanctions 
for nonfulfillment of a judgement. If the judgement is of noncompliance and the 
corresponding member country does not adopt the necessary measures for compliance 
with it within three months following notification, the CJCA having received the 
opinion of the executive body, shall apply sanctions to the above member country. In 
particular, the Court determines the limits within which the complainant country, or
149. In the latter case, a natural or juridical person may institute proceedings against those 
decisions that are of direct and individual concern to them (ECJ) or which are applicable to them 
and cause them harm (CJCA).
150. Art. 18 of the Treaty Creating the CJCA.
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any other member country, may restrict or suspend, totally or partially, the
advantages deriving from the Cartagena Agreement which benefit the noncomplying
member country. Said limits must be in relation to the gravity of the noncompliance.
A similar procedure of imposing financial penalties by the ECJ on a Member State
failing to take necessary measures to comply with the judgement of the Court has
151been accepted by the Treaty on the European Union
Permanent judicial bodies are not an exclusive attribute of the integrational
IEOs. They can be also found in the IEOs of special competence. The Judicial Board
of the OAPEC, for example, consists of the judges appointed by the Council "from the
persons whose impartiality is not in doubt and who fulfill the necessary conditions
for holding the highest judicial positions in their countries, or are jurists of
152international repute" . The Board is competent to consider some types of disputes
153on the request of either a party to the dispute or the Council , while other
categories of disputes may be referred to the Board only subject to the approval of
154the disputant parties . The judgements of the Board are final and binding upon the
151. See the revised Article 171 of the EEC Treaty.
152. Art. Twenty Two of the Agreement of the OAPEC.
153. These are:
(a) disputes relating to interpretation and application of the constituent Agreement and the 
implementation of the obligation arising from it;
(b) disputes which arise between two or more members of the Organization in the field of 
petroleum operations;
(c) disputes which the Council decides that the Board is competent to consider (Article Twenty 
Three, paragraph 1 of the Agreement of the OAPEC).
154. These are:
(a) disputes arising between any member and a petroleum company operating in the territory of 
the said member;
(b) disputes arising between any member and a petroleum company belonging to any other 
member;
(c) disputes arising between two or more members of the Organization, other than what is 
provided in paragraph 1 of Article Twenty Three of the Agreement of the OAPEC (Article Twenty 
Three, paragraph 2 of the Agreement of the OAPEC).
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parties concerned and shall be enforceable per se in the territories of the
155
* * *
The above analysis of dispute settlement within IEOs leads to the following 
conclusions:
(1) The dominant trend in dispute-resolving process is a gradual move in the 
course of a dispute evolution from more flexible pre-adjudicative means of 
settlement (negotiations, consultations, good offices, mediation, conciliation, 
quasi-arbitral bodies) to more strict and formalized arbitral and judicial 
procedures.
(2) There is every reason to suppose tha t a considerable part of the disputes 
arising within IEOs is prevented or resolved by virtue of direct negotiations and 
consultations among the disputants (although, a precise information on this can be 
hardly available to an outside observer). With regard to the disputes that fail to 
be resolved by pre-administrative and pre-adjudicative means, the general trend 
within most IEOs is to refer such disputes to the supreme and executive organs of 
IEOs, which are often assisted by subsidiary, specialized examining bodies. Most 
IEOs consider such choice of dispute-resolving bodies as the most suitable and 
efficient for the disputant parties and the IEO, within which the dispute arises.
(3) Arbitral and judicial means of dispute settlement, although provided for in
#the constituent instrum ents of some IEOs, remain rather a potential, than a 
practical tool, to which the disputant parties resort in rare cases.
155. Articles Twenty Three, Twenty Four of the Agreement of the OAPEC. See some examples from the 
practice of the Board in: Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. Secretary General’s 
Fifteenth Annual Report AH 1408/AD 1988, Kuwait, 1989, p. 138-139.
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CHAPTER EX. SANCTIONS
One can hardly disagree with E.Fukatsu calling for the move of the law-
enforcement process "from coercion to persuasion, from military to diplomatic,
economic and psychological sanctions and, as far as possible, from maximal to
156minimum forms of pressure" . However, the realities of international life still
157often dictate the use of sanctions as an ultimum remedium when the peaceful means
of settlement are exhausted or infeasible.
In order to avoid an abuse of force in international relations, sanctions, as
the extreme measures of coercion, are admissible only under certain conditions: (1)
as a reaction to a breach of a legal obligation; (2) if a delinquent subject refuses
to stop its illegal actions and compensate for its negative consequences, and
amicable means of settlement do not help; (3) strictly within the margins of the
sanctional competence of the subject taking such measures; (4) proportionally to the
negative consequences of such a breach of law ^^ .
For what reason the use of sanctions can be considered a specific phase of law-
159implementation ? Obviously, not all sanctions, even being in line with the above 
four criteria, necessarily ensure the proper or even partial realization of a broken 
rule. A breach of law itself is an anomalous situation, which means that for this
156. E.Fukatsu. Coercion and the Theory of Sanctions in International Law. - In: The Structure and 
Process of International Law. Ed. by R.McDonald and D.Johnston. Hague, 1983, p. 1203-1204.
157. See V.A.Vasilenko. International Legal Sanctions. Kiev, 1982; V.A.Vadapalas. The Realization 
of International Legal Sanctions. - In: Soviet Yearbook of International Law 1988. Moscow, 1989, 
p.71-86 (both in Russian); Ebere Osieke. Sanctions in International Law: The Contributions of the 
International Organizations. - In: NILR, 1984, N 2, p. 183-198.
158. See more details in V.A.Vasilenko. Op. cit.
159. There is a broad agreement among the lawyers that sanctions belong to the law-enforcing means 
in public international law (see e.g. E.Klein. Sanctions by International Organizations and 
Economic Communities. - In: Archiv des Völkerrechts, 1992, 30 Band, 1 Heft, p. 101-102).
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particular case there is nothing to say about a proper and timely law
implementation. But sanctions help to prevent some breaches of law from occurring
and, what happens more seldom, to stop the continuation of the unlawful actions.
Unlike counter-measures taken by individual States, the IEOs’ sanctions are of
the centralized collective character, thus being more weighty from political and
moral points of view, and, in some cases, causing more serious economic consequences
on the target State. Apart from this, when a sanction is imposed by a collective
decision, it is expected to be more thoroughly motivated and used when the breach of
law is unchallengeable, while individual States sometimes abuse the term "sanctions"
for the coercive measures on political reasons. Though, it should be admitted that
economically powerful States often rely more on unilateral reprisals than
160multilateral sanctions
Certain non-legal restraints for the use of sanctions by IEOs should prevent
their being idealized: (1) sanctions against a powerful Member State may be
considered either infeasible or even harmful for the organization, and for this
161reason, may not be imposed ; (2) political considerations of the organization’s
majority may shield a delinquent State from a penalty; (3) sanctions may impel a
target Member State to withdraw from the organization or make other destructive
steps de facto worsening the negative consequences of the breach of law for the
relationships amongst the parties concerned (to use Audretsch’s expression, "the
162remedy will be worse than the disease" ).
160. See M.Doxey. International Sanctions in Recent State Practice: Trends and Problems. - In: 
Contemporary Problems of International Law: Essays in honour of Georg Schwarzenberger on his 
eightieth birthday. Bin Cheng and E.D.Brown (Eds.). L., 1988, p. 53-69.
161. The examples of such a cautious approach see in P.I.B.Kohona. The Regulation of International 
Economic Relations Through Law, p.253-254.
162. H.A.H.Audretsch. Supervision in European Community Law, p. 140.
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If the need for sanctions arises, the most delicate legal problem is the
sanctional competence of an IEO. The drafters of some IEOs’ constituent instruments
seem to underestimate this point, and that can lead under certain circumstances to a
vicious circle. For example, the Statute of the OPEC contains no special provisions
on the use of sanctions to a Member State not complying with its obligations. In the
case of such non-compliance, the Organization should either resort to the concept of
implied powers or make appropriate amendments to the constituent documents. The
concept of implied powers is hardly available for the determination of an IEO’s
sanctional competence in this case, since from a strict legal viewpoint, the rights
of a Member State may be curtailed only in the manner expressly laid down in the
163Statute . On the other hand, the method of amendments would be practically 
infeasible for the OPEC where unanimous agreement of all Members is required for 
such m atters
Another case is the sanctional competence of the CIS laid down by Article 10 of 
the CIS Charter as follows: "The breaches by a Member State of the present Charter, 
the systematic non-compliance with a State’s obligations following from the 
agreements reached within the Commonwealth or decisions of the Commonwealth organs 
shall be considered by the Council of Heads of State.
In relation to such a State the measures allowed by international law can be 
applied”.
Such wide-ranging formula of the Council’s sanctional competence can cause 
serious troubles in interpretation and application most of all due to the consensual
163. This argument was given in the advice of the U.N. Legal Counsel to the General Assembly , when 
in 1968 it faced the question whether its right to create subsidiary organs with limited membership 
enabled it to exclude South Africa from the UNCTAD - an organ with general membership (see
F.Morgenstern. Legality in International Organizations. - In: BYIL 1976-1977. Oxford, 1978, p. 242- 
243).
164. See more details on the OPEC in: L.Stoehr. OPEC as a Legal Entity. - In: Fordham International 
Law Forum, 1979-1980, vol. 3, N 1, p. 91-105.
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nature of the Council’s decisions which can be vetoed by the target States. Hence, 
in order to be able to apply collective Commonwealth’s sanctions, the Member States 
could be expected to make an appropriate amendment to the rule of consensus in the 
Council of Heads of State (it might be a "consensus minus one" rule).
Some more considerations on the sanctional competence of an IEO with regard to 
non-members are suggested in the final sub-section of this Chapter.
* * *
The analysis of the IEOs’ constituent instrum ents and practice reveals a quite 
substantial arsenal of sanctions ranging from the functional restrictions relating 
to membership, which are typical for international organizations in general, to more 
specific economic remedies.
1. Suspension of Rights and Privileges of Membership
1.1. Suspension of Voting Rights
This form of sanction is provided by the statutory acts of some IEOs (e.g. the 
FAO, UNIDO, AEC, ATPC, AIOEC, OWPEAC) for a Member State failing to pay its 
contributions to the organization’s budget. The voting rights of a Member State may*
be suspended either in a supreme organ or in the organization as a whole, either 
when the amounts of arrears and term s within which such sanction is imposed are
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fixed or where there is no such indication . One of the recent relevant precedents 
was the suspension of the voting rights of Democratic Kampuchea for the non-payment 
of its arrears to the FAO budget in 1989.
Some international commodity agreements provide for not only a general formula, 
but a more detailed procedure in respect of voting rights suspension. For example, 
if a member of the International Sugar Organization has not paid its full 
contribution to the administrative budget at the end of four months following the 
date on which its contribution is due to be paid, the Executive Director shall 
request the member to make payment as quickly as possible. If, at the expiration of 
two months after such request, the member has still not paid its contribution, its 
voting rights in the Council and in the Executive Committee shall be suspended until 
the full payment is made^66.
1.2. Suspension of Other Functional Rights and Privileges of Membership
Along with suspension of voting rights, IEOs may have at their disposal other 
restrictive measures affecting the membership status of a delinquent State. What is 
common for such measures - their purely administrative character, i.e. they 
coercively suspend the addressee’s functional capacities of membership and, as a 
rule, can be applied by any institution to its "undisciplined" members. Some typical 
examples are worth brief consideration.
165. Two Articles may be compared in this connection:
”A Member Nation which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the 
Organization shall have no vote in the Conference if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds 
the amount of the contributions due from it for the two preceding calendar years" (Art. III.4 of 
the FAO Constitution);
"If any Member country fails to pay its full contribution to the budget as assessed, within sixty 
days of the date of which the contribution is due, the voting rights of that Member shall be 
suspended until the contribution has been paid" (Art. 16.2 of the Agreement Establishing the ATPC).
166. Art. 25 of the 1987 International Sugar Agreement.
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Upon the recommendation of the AEC Council, the Assembly may apply sanctions,
including the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, to any Member
State which persistently fails to honour its general undertakings under the
constituent Treaty or fails to abide by the decisions or regulations of the 
167Community . It is also specified that a Member State having arrears in the payment
of its contribution to the Community budget, apart from being suspended in its
voting rights, shall cease to enjoy other benefits of membership, including the
right to address meetings, the right to present candidates for vacant posts within
the Community, and shall not be eligible for office in the deliberative organs of
theCommunity. TheAssembly may, where necessary, imposeothersanctionsonaMember
168State for non-payment of contributions
Some IEOs are authorized to suspend the right of representation of their Members
in the IEO organs. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe is empowered
to "suspend the right of representation on the Committee and on the Consultative
Assembly of a Member which has failed to fulfill its financial obligation during
such period as the obligation remained unfulfilled" (Art. 9 of the Statute).
A method of automatic suspension of rights and privileges is provided by the
charters of some U.N. specialized agencies. For example, Art. 5 of the UNIDO
Constitution stipulates th a t "any Member of the Organization that is suspended from
the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership of the United Nations shall
automatically be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of
<i
membership of the Organization".
A specific form of sanctions determined by the peculiarities of the activities 
may be imposed by the Council of the International Coffee Organization on the
167. See Art. 5.3 of the Treaty Establishing the AEC.
168. See Art. 84 of the Treaty Establishing the AEC.
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exporting Member exceeding its quarterly export quota. In such case the Council 
deducts from a subsequent quota of that Member a quantity equal to 110 percent of 
the excess. If such exceeding occurs for a third time, the voting rights of the 
Member shall be suspended until such time as the Council decides whether to exclude 
the said Member from the Organization (Art. 42 of 1983 International Coffee 
Agreement).
1.3. Suspension of Obligations vis-a-vis a Member State
Unlike suspension of individual rights and privileges of membership, this 
measure does not immediately affect the Member State non-complying with its 
obligations, but rather authorizes other Member(s) to suspend their obligations in 
relation to this Member State, i.e. to make reciprocal prohibitions, restrictions or 
withdrawal of concessions. Another point is whether the Member(s) concerned follow 
such authorization or not. Here not merely administrative, but mostly economic 
considerations obtain primary importance. The experience of the GATT with regard to 
"nullification and impairment" is noteworthy.
If the CONTRACTING PARTIES of GATT "consider tha t the circumstances are serious
enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to
suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such
concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be
appropriate in the circumstances" (Art. XXIII.2 of the General Agreement). This
right, however, has been invoked only once: in 1952 the Netherlands were authorized
to impose a quota on the U.S. wheat in response to the U.S. quotas on dairy
169products . However, the Netherlands have never enforced tha t measure. This case is
169. See GATT Analytical Index, Notes on the drafting, interpretation and application of the 
Articles of the General Agreement. - GATT/LEG/2, 1989, p. XXIII-77.
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considered by some commentators as showing the practical inconveniences of such a
sanction. R.Ostrihansky states in connection with this: "The economic hardship of
restrictions mostly affected not the American exporters, who could easily sell the
wheat flour on other markets, but Dutch farmers, who had to buy more expensive
flour. As it turned out it was in the interest of the complaining party not to
170resort to retaliation"
The EFTA Council may impose a similar sanction authorizing any Member State to 
suspend the application of certain obligations under the constituent Convention vis- 
a-vis the Member State which is using government aid in trade (Art. 13 of the EFTA 
Convention), or is unable to comply with the recommendation of a Council on the 
fulfillment of its obligations (Art. 31). In practice, however, the Council has 
never recoursed to this ultimate remedy.
Therefore, the suspension of obligations vis-a-vis a Member State non-complying 
with its obligations is not purely a sanction of an IEO, but rather a combined 
sanction which is supposed to be applied by the organization and the Member State(s) 
concerned together. The organization issues the authorization which may be either 
followed or not by the relevant Member State(s) acting with the account of economic 
consequences of such measures. Logically, this mechanism is aimed at ensuring the 
reciprocity standard within complicated m ultilateral economic regimes. However, 
formal reciprocity in economic relationships is often collated with the real unequal 
economic opportunities of the counter-acting parties. Here lies a serious practical 
limitation for retaliation.
1.4. Financial Restrictions
170. R.Ostrihansky. Op. cit., p. 177.
Normally, the existing IEOs are not constitutionally empowered to resort to
financial penalties in relation to the Member States non-complying with their
obligations. This might be explained by the fact that the m atters of financial
compensation are a presumed prerogative of arbitral and/or judicial organs and,
hence, should not be specified in the constituent instrum ents as an IEO’s sanction.
In 1965 Brazil and Uruguay made a proposal to introduce financial compensation
within the GATT in cases where removal of the restrictions, or alternative trade
171concessions were not possible , but it was rejected by the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
A rare case when the idea of financial penalty has been constitutionally 
accepted is the Treaty on European Union in the revised Art. 171 of the EEC Treaty. 
It is provided that if a Member State fails to take necessary measures to comply 
with the judgement of the Court of Justice within the time-limit laid down by the 
Commission, the latter may bring the case before the Court of Justice. In doing so 
the Commission shall specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be 
paid by the Member State concerned which it considers appropriate in the 
circumstances. A final decision is to be taken by the Court, which, if finds tha t 
the Member State concerned has not complied with its judgement, may impose a lump 
sum or penalty payment on it.
More often the restrictive measures of IEOs having financial effect are provided 
not in the form of financial compensation or penalties, but by means of limiting the 
access to the financial resources of the IEO for a target Member State. Thus, a 
typical sanction in the arsenal of international financial organizations is to 
declare a Member, using the organization’s resources in a manner contrary to its
171. See R.E. Hudec. The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy. N.Y., Wash., L., 1975, p. 
222.
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purposes, ineligible to use its resources . Finally, a veiy effective remedy of an 
international financial organization is its right to suspend or cancel a loan fully 
or partly if a borrower does not comply with its obligations.
1.5. Suspension of Membership
In its maximal form the suspension of rights and privileges coincides with what 
is termed in some constituent instrum ents as "suspension of membership". This
sanction may be imposed either if a Member persists in a policy that is contrary to
173 174the fundamental aim of the IEO , or fails to fulfill any of its obligations , or
175for the non-compliance with its financial obligations to the IEO . In the latter
case, it may be formulated as suspension from taking part in the activities of the 
176IEO or ceasing "to enjoy privileges of membership until arrears and contributions
„177for the current year have been paid" , that appears to be the same as suspension
172. For example, the IMF may declare a Member ineligible to use the Fund’s general resources if 
the Member uses them in a manner contrary to the purposes of the Fund or fails to fulfill any of 
its obligations under the Agreement (Articles V.sec.5; Vl.sec.l; XXVI.sec.2 of the Articles of the 
Agreement of the IMF). The Fund may also suspend the right to use its special drawing rights if a 
participant fails to fulfill any obligation with respect to special drawing rights (Art.
XXIII.sec.2). See more details in: J.Gold. The ’’Sanctions” of the International Monetary Fund.-In: 
AJIL, 1972, N 5, p. 737-762; J.Gold. Membership and Nonmembership in the International Monetary 
Fund. Washington, 1974, p. 334-337.
173. See e.g. Art. 34 of the Statutes of the WTO.
174. See Art. VI.sec.2 of the Articles of Agreement of the IBRD; Art. V.sec.2 of the Articles of 
the Agreement of the IFC; Art. VII.sec.2 of the Articles of Agreement of the IDA; Art. 52 of the 
MIGA Convention; Art. 13.03 of the Agreement Establishing the OPEC Fund for International 
Development, Art. 38 of the Agreement Establishing the EBRD; Article Thirty-Seven of the AMF 
Agreement.
175. See Art. 80 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the ECCAS.
176. E.g. Art. 54 of the Treaty of the ECOWAS.
177. Art. 6 of the Constitution of the ANRPC.
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of membership. Some IEOs apply a special precise procedure for suspension of 
membership
W hat is meant by suspension of membership can be constitutionally specified. For
example, the organizations of the World Bank Group use the following formula: "The
member so suspended shall automatically cease to be a member one year from the date
of its suspension unless the decision is taken by the same majority to restore the
membership to good standing. While under suspension, a member shall not be entitled
to exercise any rights under this Agreement, except the right of withdrawal, but
shall remain subject to all obligations". Here one can see a definite distinction
between suspension of membership and expulsion. The former means that the Member
preserves only one right of withdrawal being subject to all obligations, while in
the latter case the State is coercively deprived of the rights and obligations
179relating to the IEO membership, apart from the unfulfilled financial obligations 
It should be noted that the existing IEOs’ practice can hardly give an example of 
actual suspension of membership.
What is known to the IEOs’ practice is the suspension of rights following from 
the observer status. This occurred, for example, in 1963 when the FAO Conference 
took a decision not to admit the Republic of South Africa, that had an observer 
status, "to participate in any capacity of in FAO conferences, meetings, training
178. For example, Section 15 of the By-Laws of the EBRD stipulates: "Before any member is suspended 
from merr^bership of the Bank, the matter shall be considered by the Board of Directors, inter alia 
after a proposal by the President. The President shall inform the member sufficiently in advance of 
the complaint against it, and shall give the member reasonable time to explain its case orally and
in writing. The Board of Directors shall recommend to the Board of Governors whatever action it 
considers appropriate. The member shall be notified of the recommendation and of the date on which 
the matter is to be considered by the Board of Governors, and it shall be given reasonable time in 
which to present its case orally and in writing before the Board of Governors. Any member may waive 
this right".
179. For more details concerning the differences between suspension of membership and expulsion 
see: J.Makarczyk. Legal Basis for Suspension and Expulsion of a State from International 
Organization. - In: GYIL 1982, vol. 25, Berlin, 1983, p.476-489.
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centers or other activities in the African region, until the Conference decides 
otherwise"
2. Expulsion
This is the most severe sanction tha t may be taken by an IEO against its Member
in the case of a serious breach of its obligations. The experience of the last
decades shows that IEOs resort to this exceptional measure in extremely rare 
181cases , since as H.G.Schermers noted, "it may harm the organization as much as it
182harms the expelled member" . Moreover, only few IEOs’ charters contain the 
explicit provisions on expulsion from membership. There is an understanding among 
lawyers that expulsion is not legally allowed if there is no clear constitutional 
provision to that effect, and the concept of implied powers can be hardly applicable 
• 183 in this case
A rigid procedure of exclusion is provided by Art. 24 of the Agreement 
Establishing the ITPA: "If the Governing Board finds tha t any Member is in breach of 
its obligations under any Article of this Agreement and decides further that such 
breach significantly impairs the operation of this Agreement, it may by a two-thirds 
vote of all those voting other then the Member concerned accounting for at least
180. See FAO Conference. Res. 38/63.
181. In 1954 Czechoslovakia was subjected to compulsory withdrawal from the IMF for the non- 
compliance with its obligations to submit information about the official holdings of gold and 
foreign exchange, total exports and imports of merchandise, balance of payments and other matters. 
See more details in: J.Gold. Membership and Nonmembership in the International Monetary Fund, p. 
360-372.
182. H.G.Schermers. International Institutional Law, vol. 1, p.55.
183. See: J.Makarczyk. Op.cit.,p. 488-489; H.G.Schermers. The International Organizations, p. 84-
85.
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two-thirds of the total volume of exports of all Members other than the Member 
concerned, resolve that such Member shall cease to be a Member of the Association 
and the Executive Director shall notify the depositary accordingly. The exclusion 
shall become effective 30 days after receipt by the depositary of the notification". 
A similar provision can be found in Art. 66 of the 1983 International Coffee 
Agreement, Art. 40 of the 1983 International Timber Agreement, Art. 58 of the 1986 
International Agreement on Olive Oil and Table Olives.
The expulsion from the AMF membership may take place only as a next step 
following the suspension of membership if the latter measure appears to be 
ineffective. Under Article Thirty-nine of the AMF Agreement, "a Member shall be 
definitely divested of membership by decision of the Board of Governors, should it 
continue to fail to fulfill its obligations to the Fund for a period of two years 
from the date of temporary suspension of its membership".
A slightly different scheme follows from Art. XXVI.sec.2(b) of the Articles of 
Agreement of the IMF called "Compulsory withdrawal": "If, after the expiration of a 
reasonable period the member persists in its failure to fulfill any of its 
obligations under this Agreement, that Member may be required to withdraw from 
membership in the Fund by a decision of the Board of Governors carried by a majority 
of the Governors having eighty five percent of the total voting power". Before such 
a decision is taken, the m atter shall be considered by the Executive Directors who 
shall inform the Member in reasonable time of the complaint against it and recommend 
to the Board of Governors the appropriate action. The Member concerned shall be
given a reasonable time to present its case to the Board both orally and in
.A. 184writing
Another procedure of compulsory withdrawal applies in the Council of Europe. A 
Member State, which has seriously violated the principles of collaboration fixed in
184. See Section 22 of the IMF By-Laws.
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Art. 3 of the Statute, may be suspended from its rights of representation and
requested by the Committee of Ministers to withdraw. If this request is not complied
with, the Committee may decide that such State has ceased to be a Member of the
Council (Art. 8 of the Statute). J.Makarczyk calls such suspension "a polite
185invitation to withdraw, which, if not complied with, could result in expulsion"
In 1969 Greece, after a military coup in this country, was accused of the violation
of Art. 3 and withdrew from the Council before a decision on compulsory withdrawal
186was taken ( after the restoration of democracy in Greece, it renewed its 
membership to this organization).
A slight difference between expulsion and compulsory withdrawal relates to a 
double-stage procedure of withdrawal in the latter case (first, the request to 
withdraw, followed, if it is not complied with, by the compulsory withdrawal), but 
does not affect the identical consequences of these measures.
Compulsory withdrawal provided by the constituent instrum ents should be differed 
from a de facto forced withdrawal, when a Member State ceases to be a member after a 
breach of the organization’s obligations, but on the grounds other than compulsory 
withdrawal. Three examples will clarify this point.
In 1962 the CMEA ceased to issue invitations to Albania motivated by Albania’s 
non-payment of its contributions. Formally, Albania neither withdrew, nor was 
expelled from the CMEA.
In 1968 the U.N. General Assembly could not obtain a required two-thirds 
majority in order to exclude South Africa from the UNCTAD. However, South Africa did 
not accept the invitations to take part in the UNCTAD meetings, and on this ground 
after 1977 it was no longer considered a Member of this organization.
185. J.Makarczyk. Op. cit., p. 486.
186. See Council of Europe. Committee of Ministers Resolution (69) 51. Adopted on 12 December 1969. 
-In: 9 ILM 414-416 (1970).
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In 1976 Chili was compelled to withdraw from the Andean Group because of the 
economic clash with the other Members, which occurred after the Chili’s refusal to 
implement the Andean Foreign Investment Code of 1971.
Expulsion from one IEO may automatically cause the cessation of the membership 
in another. As it has been already mentioned, the Articles of Agreement of the IBRD 
provide for an automatic cessation of the membership in the Bank for any Member 
which ceases to be a Member of the IMF (Art.VI.sec.3). The analogous provisions as
regards the cessation of the membership in the IBRD can be found in the constituent
187instrum ents of the IFC and IDA
3. Restricting or Disrupting Economic Ties With a Delinquent State
188This type of sanction has various forms and normally may be imposed by an
organization of general competence (e.g. U.N.) on a State committing an
international crime. By its negative consequences collective disruption of economic
ties, especially in the form of an economic blockade, may be even more harmful for a
target State than an expulsion from the organization’s membership.
There is an extensive U.N. practice on restricting and disrupting economic ties
189with South Africa, South Rhodesia, Portugal, and Israel . The recent examples are 
the U.N. economic blockade of Iraq in response to its act of aggression against 
Kuwait in August 1990, and the UN economic embargo of the Republics of Serbia and 
Montenegro in 1992 as a sanction against their intervention into the internal 
affairs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. One can argue about the end result of
187. See Art. V.sec.3 of the Articles of Agreement of the IFC; Art. VII.sec.3 of the Articles of 
Agreement of the IDA.
188. See more details in V.A.Vasilenko. Op. cit., p. 107-120.
189. See Ibid.
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those measures, which depends greatly upon the concrete situation, including the 
economic position of the target State and the correlation of forces among the Member 
States actively supporting and opposing such measures. The experience of the recent 
U.N. economic sanctions indicates tha t they may have a sufficient potential for 
effectiveness.
More problematic is the legality of restrictive economic measures taken by a
regional economic organization against a non-member. This question arose, in
190particular, during the Falklands crisis of 1982 , when the EEC suspended imports
of the Argentine products by the Council Regulations 877/82, 1176/82, and 1254/82.
These coercive measures were apparently taken for political reasons in order to
support the United Kingdom, although, references were made to Articles 113 and 224
191of the Treaty of Rome . Doubts about the legality of the EEC import restrictions
in th a t case were strengthened by Ireland and Italy refusing to follow them, as well
as by the position of Denmark which declared tha t its trade restrictions would be
based on the national legislation.
In its turn, Argentina complained to the GATT Council on the violation of the
GATT rules by the Community and qualified its measures as inconsistent with the law
192and practice of GATT . Argentina also argued tha t the EEC Members, not directly 
involved in the conflict, had no business taking these measures.
190. See P.J.Kuyper. Community Sanctions Against Argentina: Lawfulness under Community and 
International law. - In: Essays in European Law and Integration. Ed. by D.O’Keeffe and 
H.G.Schermers. Kluwer-Deventer, 1982, p. 141-166; J.Mayall. The Sanctions Problem in International 
Economic Relations: reflections in the light of recent experience. - In: International Affairs,
1984, N 4, p. 636-637.
191. See more details in: P.J.Kuyper. Op. cit.
192. See GATT Activities in 1982. Geneva, 1983, p. 72-73. The EEC said that the restrictions on 
import from Argentina were imposed by the Community and its Member States on the basis of their 
inherent rights, of which Art. XXI of the General Agreement (Security Exceptions to the General 
Agreement) was a reflection. In June 1982 the EEC decided to suspend the economic restrictions 
against Argentina.
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Without going into explicit detail in this particular dispute, which was
thoroughly examined in the referred Kuyper’s article, two general questions might be
posed: (1) do the regional economic organizations or the organizations of special
competence possess a right to impose economic sanctions on the non-member which
committed a serious international crime, in view of Articles 41 and 42 of the UN
Charter?; (2) if such a right is, in principle, compatible with the UN Charter, can
it be executed on the grounds of implied competence of an organization?
The first question should be answered in the affirmative, since neither the UN
Charter, nor general international law contain any provisions prohibiting other then
the UN, subjects of international law to impose sanctions on those, who violate
norms of ius coyens and commit international crimes dangerous for the entire
international community. To use Kuyper’s words, "even in theory, the Security
Council does not have a monopoly over economic sanctions as it does in theory over
193the use of force" . This conclusion was authoritatively confirmed by the ECSC
decision 92/285 prohibiting trade between the Community and the Republics of Serbia
194and Montenegro , which was in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 757
(1992) establishing economic embargo of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro in 
response to their intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina.
The answer to the second question might be a suggestion, rather than a statement. 
The concept of implied powers could be cautiously used in this case, since no 
drafters of the IEOs’ constituent instrum ents can foresee all possible situations 
with regard to international crimes. There is no rule of general international law 
prohibiting the Member States of an IEO to reach additional agreements, either
193. P.J.Kuyper. International Legal Aspects of Economic Sanctions, p. 155.
194. OJ 1992. L 151/20-21.
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formal or informal, filling lacunas in the IEO’s constituent instruments. An 
extended interpretation by the Member States of the statutory rules on the IEO’s 
sanctional powers is in the end a sort of such agreement. However, if sanctions are 
imposed by virtue of implied powers, no disagreeing Member State should be forced to 
follow them. Such approach appears to be logical in view of a consensual, in the 
end, nature of any international legal rule, especially, if the rule lays down 
additional obligations on the Member State in relation to which it did not have any 
opportunity to express its attitude before. In other words, if the interpretation of 
the constituent instrum ents suggested by an IEO organ extends beyond the expressed 
sanctional powers, the dissentient minority of Member States should be duly 
protected from the undesirable consequences of such interpretation.
* * *
Since IEL relies much more on reciprocity and mutual consent, rather than 
coercion, sanctions of IEOs play a relatively limited role in law enforcement. Both 
IEOs and the Member States strive to resort to coercive measures in rare cases, 
after less painful remedies have been attempted. Although many IEOs’ statutes 
determine their sanctional powers, practice reveals only a few examples of the 
application of sanctions. This may be considered as a reflection of a more general 
trend towards the use of prevailingly non-coercive means of dispute settlement in
*
the law-oriented international economic society.
Moreover, from the viewpoint of law-implementation, sanctions rarely lead to a 
proper realization of a violated legal rule. A delinquent State often resists 
obeying the rule it has once broken. In such cases, sanctions tend to have more 
punitive, than law-enforcing effect, fixing a certain negative reciprocity between 
an IEO and a delinquent State.
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All the above scenarios cannot challenge the fact that sanctions still are and, 
apparently, will remain an essential attribute of any law, including IEL, since law 
is inconceivable without coercion. Compared with individual States, which are more 
determined by self-interests, IEOs as collective institutions possess better 
opportunities for the use of sanctions in a more well-balanced and legally motivated 
way. The experience of recent decades provides grounds to suggest that a potential 
use of sanctions, especially if they have a thorough constitutional foundation, may 
be a serious factor preventing the Member States from non-observance of their 
obligations. To put it another way, the threat of sanctions prevents breaches of law 
from occurring, more than the use of sanctions remedies such breaches, once they 
have already taken place.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS TO THE THIRD PART
For the purpose of this study, the law- implementation is considered in a broad 
sense, as the stage of international legal process at which the subjects apply the 
whole complex of institutional, norm-making, supervisory, norm-executing and law- 
enforcing means in order to ensure the proper and timely realization of 
international legal rules. In the Third P art the analysis is focused on the basic 
law-implementing functions of IEOs: (1) interpretation; (2) subsequent (secondary) 
rule-making; (3) supervision; (4) operative norm-execution; (5) dispute resolution; 
(6) the use of sanctions.
From a legal technique viewpoint, the law-implementing facilities of existing 
IEOs are quite impressive (although, these do not strikingly differ from other 
international organizations). In the technical sense, the common law-implementing 
potential of IEOs can be hardly supplemented by something principally new. On the 
other hand, individual IEOs strongly vary as regards both the applied law- 
implementing means and their efficiency. Evidently, for all the meaningfulness of 
the law-implementing techniques which are a t the IEO’s disposal, taken alone, these 
cannot guarantee a high rate of compliance with the legal provisions. Much depends 
on the changing socio-economic and political environment, relationships among the 
Member States and, finally, on the skills and responsibility of the direct 
executives of the relevant normative acts both in the IEO and the Member States.
As in the case of law-making, certain elements of the IEOs’ law-implementing 
practice contribute to the overall experience of international organizations. This 
is true, in particular, for the interpretation by the IBRD and IMF of their 
constituent instrum ents which was recognized as legally binding and final at the 
national judicial level, as well as for the elaborate mechanisms of supervision 
applied in international financial, integrational and commodity organizations. Even 
the unsuccessful experience of the International Tin Council, which failed to meet
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its financial obligations in 1985, posed an important general legal question on the 
liability of the Member States for the non-fulfilled obligations of the 
international organization.
Perhaps, the strongest impact has been made by IEOs on the dispute settlement 
techniques. Along with improving the traditional means of negotiations and 
consultations, conciliation and arbitration, IEOs have amassed a vast experience of 
the use of quasi-arbitral expert bodies and innovated a specific pattern of 
permanent courts within the regional economic communities, which somewhat differs 
from the earlier models of permanent tribunals known to international law.
As many other international organizations, IEOs reserve the potential of 
sanctions as an ultimate remedy applied mostly against Member States or, more 
rarely, non-members, which impede the normal course of law-implementation by the 
breaches of legal prescriptions. The existing IEOs do not strongly differ from other 
international organizations in respect of the sanctional arsenal and the manner in 
which it is applied. (However, the IEOs’ sanctions go beyond purely administrative 
restrictions relating to the status of membership. They may also take a shape of 
more specific economic remedies). A general trend is that a resort to sanctions is 
quite a rare case for the IEOs’ practice. The threat of sanctions prevents breaches 
of law from occurring more, than the use of sanctions remedies such breaches, once 
they have already taken place.
The two perspective directions in the evolution of the IEOs’ law-implementing 
facilities might be observed:
(1) The examination and use by individual organizations of the law-implementing 
experience of comparable IEOs, especially those playing a leading role with regard 
to the diversity of applied instrum ents and volume of amassed practice. The lessons 
taken from the unsuccessful experience of some IEOs can be also helpful.
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(2) The consolidation of the law-implementing efforts of the IEOs operating in the 
common or partly coinciding spheres. Thus, the pioneer experience of the joint EEC- 
EFTA law-implementation might be an incentive for the other regional and functional 
"blocks" of IEOs.
The efficiency of law-implementing efforts within an IEO strongly depends on the 
compatibility and coordination  between:
(a) the legal system of an IEO and the national legal systems of the Member States;
(b) the law of an IEO and the Member States’ agreements with other States (members 
and non-members) and international organizations;
(c) the legal systems of individual IEOs with a comparable or partly coinciding 
competence and common members.
In the case of collisions within any of the above combinations, complicated 
legal problems can arise. For example, what is preferable: to specify a priority of 
the IEO’s constituent provisions (subsequent rules?) over the national laws of the 
Member States or to keep silence on this (as most statutory acts do)? This is a 
double-edged question. On the one hand, an IEO as a relatively autonomous legal and 
functional entity would operate more predictably, not being under the shadow of 
inconsistent domestic legal acts, which could paralyze its work. On the other hand, 
individual Member States would not easily agree to allow the IEO to intervene into 
their national legal orders with the dissenting regulations avoiding parliam entary 
control. Hence, the supranational organizations take the first option, while the 
constituent instrum ents of traditional intergovernmental IEOs, as a rule, keep 
silence on the issue of correlation between the IEO’s legal system and those of the 
Member States, thus, probably, giving more chances for a coordination between them 
(which is the best), but leaving open the question of potential conflicts.
As to possible conflicts between the law of an IEO and the Member States’ 
agreements with the other States and organizations, it is definitely preferable, 
from a standpoint of the IEO, to provide constitutionally a requirement for the
consistency of the Member States’ obligations under other international agreements, 
both priorly and subsequently concluded, with their obligations under the 
constituent rules of the IEO. Having such constitutional statement, the IEO: (1) 
readdresses the major troubles on maintaining the compatibility of the above 
obligations to the Member States; (2) claims to obtain a priority of its 
constitutional rules over the other rules of international law binding upon the 
Member States in the case of a conflict between them (provided that a special 
position of peremptory rules (ius cogens) and the lawful rights of the third 
subjects are not affected). However, such a constitutional provision alone does not 
help to resolve a potential conflict between the legal rules of two individual IEOs 
with coinciding competence and common members (if the statutory acts of both 
organizations contain the requirements of consistency). In this case, the general 
principles lex specialis and lex posteriori might be of more use.
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FOURTH PART: CONCLUSIONS
The basic conclusions of the present study can be summarized as follows:
1. Evolving System of International Economic Organizations
Nowadays, international economic relations appear to be the most 
institutionalized sphere of international life, where dozens of various IEOs 
actively operate. The process of institutionalization, whatever sporadic it may 
seem, is a consequence of the objective changes and developments in the 
international economic environment and has an internal logic of building an adequate 
institutional framework for a well-organized world economic order. This ongoing 
process results in both a striking growth of individual IEOs and a gradual 
strengthening of inter-IEOs links, the formation of relatively compact functional 
and regional groups of IEOs.
A diverse structure of inter-IEOs relationships by virtue of various cooperation 
techniques gives grounds to trea t the existing IEOs as an evolving system, whose 
major structural units are: the U.N. family of economic institutions, the OECD, the 
GATT, the organizations of producers and exporters, international commodity 
organizations, and some regional groups of IEOs.
In the meantime, more weight should be given to the improvement of coordinating 
contacts among various IEOs and their groups, which are still fragmentary and not 
enough tight. It is evident th a t a properly structured overall institutional system 
entails a more effective work of individual IEOs by means of exchange of experience, 
avoiding unnecessary duplication, compensating shortcomings in territorial scope and 
limits of membership of individual IEOs, joint efforts in solving the issues of 
common interest, etc.
A more systematic vision of existing IEOs through the prism of legally essential 
criteria can be envisaged by virtue of the classification suggested in this study. 
It demonstrates a dialectical combination of the IEOs’ common, particular and 
individual features, and helps to establish their points of contact.
2. Emerging Law of International Economic Organizations
A structural analysis applied to the IEOs’ constitutional texts and the 
subsequent legal rules gives grounds to suggest the concept of law of IEOs as a 
large, rather heterogeneous body of law dealing with IEOs and comprising:
(1) numerous legal systems of individual IEOs;
(2) rules of inter-IEOs agreements;
(3) few general customary rules applicable to all IEOs.
Obviously, the individual legal systems of IEOs are likely to remain of primary 
importance compared to general and inter-IEOs rules, which are created in the end 
for a more effective operation of individual IEOs. Hence, unlike many traditional 
bodies of public international law, the law of IEOs, due to its very nature, does 
not need any large-scale codification. Any codification attempts within this legal 
discipline might be taken only in some narrow limits (by analogy with the 1986 
Vienna Convention).
The law of IEOs occupies a specific inter-branch structural position being 
simultaneously a part of international institutional law and IEL (as a segment of 
the two intersecting circles). It cannot be isolated from the more traditional 
subdivisions of IEL, such as international trade law, international financial law, 
international investment law, international transport law, etc., since IEOs operate 
in all spheres of international economic life. In other words, the above 
subdivisions do not have strict margins and inevitably interpenetrate due to the 
close links between the substantive and institutional issues they deal with, thus
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reflecting the complicated structure of the existing international economic 
relations.
The concept of the law of IEOs is not merely a result of theoretical 
systematization. It responds to the functional need to distinguish within IEL a 
voluminous body of legal rules setting up the institutional framework for the world 
economic order. These rules, however diverse they may be from one IEO to another, 
have much in common as regards their mode of creation, addressees, contents and law- 
implementing peculiarities. This justifies to treat them as a relatively autonomous 
body of law.
Moreover, such phenomena as: (1) the commonality of individual legal systems of 
comparable IEOs (e.g. international commodity organizations, regional economic 
communities, the organizations of producers and exporters), which is taken into 
account in the process of law-making and law-implementation, and (2) the problem of 
compatibility and potential conflicts between the legal systems of individual IEOs 
with coinciding competence and common members (e.g. between regional and subregional 
economic communities) give more weight to the complex approach towards the law of 
IEOs.
3. IEOs in the International Law-Making and Law-Implementation:
Main Contributions
*
International legal regulation in any field, including economic relationships, 
appears as the two interpenetrating facets: (1) the system of three principal 
components: the subjects, object and mechanism of legal regulation ( a static or 
institutional aspect); (2) the process comprising the two basic phases: law-making 
and law-implementation, which functionally link the subjects, object and mechanism 
of legal regulation into an operating system (a dynamic or functional aspect). The 
primary objective of this study, mirrored in its title, was to reveal in a
comparative and generalizing way the role of IEOs in the international legal 
process, i.e. how do IEOs as the subjects of international law participate in law­
making and law-implementing, and, hence, how do they influence the changes and 
developments in the mechanism and object of international legal regulation in the 
economic field.
The major parameters of the IEOs’ involvement into the legal process have their 
roots in the international economic environment, which is a wide spectrum of trade, 
monetary, investment, communication, etc. relations based on the international 
division of labour among various countries, regions and economic agents. The legal 
techniques, procedures, methods, as well as institutional models applied within IEOs 
are strongly determined by such characteristics of international economic relations 
as: (1) sensibility to the vital interests of the interacting subjects; (2)
complexity and interpenetration of commercial, financial, transport and other 
economic issues; (3) high intensity and dynamics of economic developments; (4) 
increasing trend for integration on the regional and global levels; (5) conflicting 
economic self-interests of interacting States and economic agents which can hardly 
be completely harmonized; (6) quantitative parameters indispensable for economic 
exchange, etc.
On the other hand, there is no sharp line separating international economic 
relations from other varieties of international ties. In this sense, IEOs as a 
functional group has much in common with the organizations focusing on political, 
military, cultural, ecological and other specific matters. This commonality rests, 
among others, on the same interacting subjects behind these organizations - States - 
which invent similar "rules of the game" for their institutional creations operating 
in various fields.
Therefore, the analyzed law-making and law-implementing facilities of IEOs 
combine certain common experience of intergovernmental organizations as a whole, and 
some innovations determined by the specifics of the IEOs’ subject-matter.
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3.1.1 ntem ational Law-Making
Economic relationships are one of the most dynamic spheres of interstate 
cooperation, where rapidly changing practical needs require operative and adequate 
reactions from interacting subjects. This factor is paramount for the character of 
law-making in IEL, whose increasing intensity makes States to have recourse to 
institutional norm-making mechanisms. Therefore, a certain part of law-making 
activities in this branch is transferred to IEOs, which possess the necessary 
expert, technical and financial facilities.
IEOs are involved in three main forms of international norm-making: (1) 
conclusion of treaties with other subjects of international law; (2) multilateral 
convention-making among the Member States under the auspices of IEOs; (3) adoption 
of normative acts with law-interpreting, law-declaring and law-developing effects.
There are certain grounds to suppose tha t direct IEOs’ rule-making by virtue of 
binding decisions is obtaining primary importance for the law-making process in IEL. 
Of course, traditional treaty and custom have not exhausted their capacities and at 
present cany  out the bulk of regulatory work in IEL. But by virtue of the IEOs’ 
acts States obtain the opportunity of quick, competent and in many cases 
comparatively less costly m ultilateral ruling of their economic relationships. In 
certain cases, a binding decision may be more convenient for the Member States than 
a formal treaty. .
Once it is created, an IEO is supposed to become something more than merely a 
deliberative forum. It should be a working collective organ of the Member States, 
which they tru st and whose binding decisions they trea t like an international 
treaty. Binding decisions of IEOs in substantive m atters formulating the rights and 
obligations of the Member States m ust be recognized as a source of international law 
of full value covered by the principle pacta sunt servanda. The fact th a t most IEOs 
are authorized to take binding decisions in substantive m atters proves tha t the
highly specialized nature of the problems these organizations deal with requires 
stricter legal instruments than mere recommendations. This is a striking peculiarity 
of IEOs compared with many other international organizations relying prevailingly on 
non-binding recommendations.
However, it is understandable, that the binding force of IEOs’ decisions taken 
alone is not a full guarantee of their efficiency. The latter perceptibly depends on 
such a choice of decision-making procedures, which makes it possible to combine 
operative regulation with the adequate protection of the individual Member States’ 
interests. Along with other intergovernmental organizations, IEOs have amassed a 
noteworthy collective experience of the use of elaborate procedural models which 
enable the Member States to minimize the outlay of decision-making. Certain 
procedural mechanisms provided by the IEOs’ founding acts (e.g. majority voting, 
"weighted" voting) may have a potentially protective and stimulating character, i.e. 
they are rather used as a shadow under which the consensual decisions can be reached 
easier. Another important point is that formal procedures may be viable only if they 
account the actual correlation of economic powers of the interacting Member States 
and other economic factors affecting the efficiency of possible decisions (this 
consideration, in particular, gave birth to a specifically IEOs’ procedural model of 
"weighted" voting).
The emphasis on binding decisions does not mean any underestimation of the IEOs’ 
recommendations for international law. At present, some of them make up a part of 
the so-called "soft" economic law, and in this capacity: (1) serve as the auxiliary 
means for interpretation of the existing legal acts; (2) constitute an evidence of 
customary law;
(3) stim ulate the emergence and evolution of legal rules in customary, treaty and 
decision forms; (4) promote a preparatory codification; (5) perform a pre-legal 
regulation in the fields where adequate legal rules are still absent.
As economic cooperation becomes more complicated and acquires new forms, IEOs 
are supposed to be actively involved in international treaty-making, both directly 
and as a preparatory base for m ultilateral convention-making among the Member 
States. In many cases IEOs possess better facilities than individual States for 
collective technical and financial assistance, for establishing special economic 
regimes of m ultilateral cooperation. The regular and voluminous treaty-making 
practice of financial, integrational, and some other IEOs convincingly bears out 
this view. However, the existing IEOs strongly vary in scope and intensity of 
treaty-making. Due to their functional peculiarities, many IEOs participate in 
treaty-m£iking quite sporadically. This is not a reproach at their address, but 
ra ther a m atter of the IEOs’ natural variety.
It is logical, th a t the IEOs’ facilities are broadly used for drafting and 
negotiating m ultilateral conventions among the Member States. In this capacity IEOs 
discharge the function of preparatory law-making, which is quite typical for many 
other international institutions. One can hardly find any remarkable innovations in 
the convention-making techniques on the part of IEOs. As to the end results, the 
most successful convention-making has been seen in the m atters of prevailingly 
technical character, where both the subject was ripe for an agreement and the 
treaty-m akers strived for it. On the contrary, in the m atters of considerable 
divergence in the Member States’ positions (e.g. the codification of IEL) no 
appreciable results have been so far achieved.
a
3.2. International Law-Implementation
For all the meaningfulness of law-making efforts, taken alone, these can not 
guarantee th a t the newly created rules will be embodied in the real life. In order 
to ensure a proper and timely realization of their normative acts IEOs exercise a 
number of law-implementing functions: (1) interpretation; (2) subsequent (secondary)
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rule-making; (3) supervision; (4) operative norm-execution; (5) dispute-resolving;
(6) use of sanctions. The first four procedures are applied in the normal course of 
implementation, while the last two are used in the anomalous situations when a 
regular norm-executing is hindered by disputes or breaches of law.
Interpretation and subsequent rule-making1 are such intermediary stages of 
international legal process, in which law-making and law-implementation interlace.
The constituent instruments of only few IEOs, mainly those oriented to intensive 
rule-making, pay serious attention to interpretation. These may provide for both 
preliminary and subsequent interpretation, as well as the establishment of special 
judicial and quasi-judicial organs dealing with interpretation of the organization’s 
normative acts.
IEOs often have recourse to such implementing procedure as subsequent 
(secondary) rule-making, i.e. creating special rules in order to facilitate the 
proper implementation of the previously adopted acts. This may be necessary for 
several reasons: (1) to concretize and specify the general norms for their adequate 
application; (2) to adapt the previously created norms to the newly emerging 
circumstances either developing them or amending; (3) to revise obsolete rules.
Interpretation and subsequent rule-making within IEOs often go side by side. It 
means that in many cases (although not always) interpretation is provided by virtue 
of subsequent rule-making. However, subsequent rule-making does not necessarily deal 
solely with interpretation issues.
The existing IEOs show variable forms and methods of supervision and operative 
norm-execution. which are the key phases of implementation typical for all IEOs, but 
mostly elaborate in the integrational, financial and commodity organizations. 
Supervision and norm-execution cover a wide spectrum of preparatory, evaluating, 
control, organizational, administrative and executive measures taken by the IEOs’ 
organs in order to ensure the proper and timely fulfillment of the IEOs’ legal 
provisions. The EEC is an example of the organization where the most well-balanced
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distribution of supervisory and norm-executing powers among the organs has been 
reached. The recent practice has seen a pioneer attem pt to set up a joint 
supervisory mechanism by two organizations (the EEC and EFTA) which might be a 
notable incentive for other functional and regional groups of IEOs.
Another phase of implementation in IEOs - dispute settlement - passes either 
through the more flexible dispute-resolving means such as consultations, 
negotiations, good offices, mediation and conciliation, or through the more 
formalized administrative, arbitral and judicial procedures in the competent organs. 
The experience shows that more elastic pre-adjudicative means are preferable, at 
least at the initial stage of the dispute evolution. There is every reason to 
suppose tha t a considerable part of the arising disputes is prevented or resolved by 
virtue of direct negotiations and consultations among the disputants.
Many constituent documents of IEOs provide for more or less elaborate 
institutional schemes of dispute-resolving with resort to policy-making, special 
quasi-arbitral, arbitral and judicial organs, including perm anent tribunals. In most 
of such organizations the preference is given to administrative procedures. 
Arbitration and litigation, although provided for in the constituent instrum ents of 
some IEOs, remain a potential, ra ther than a practical tool, to which the delinquent 
parties have resort quite rarely.
Only a few actively operating IEOs have amassed a vast experience of dispute 
settlem ent (the EEC and GATT are unrivaled in this regard). Other IEOs have either 
fragmentary, or hardly accessible for the outside observer dispute-resolving 
practice.
A certain role in law-enforcement is played by the IEOs’ sanctions, i.e. 
coercive counter-measures imposed on a delinquent State, when non-coercive means of 
settlem ent do not help. In other words, implementation of mainly voluntarily- 
consensual character may be supplemented, if necessary, by legitimate coercive 
procedures. As extreme measures of lawful coercion, sanctions are admissible only
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under certain conditions: (1) as a reaction to a breach of a legal obligation; (2) 
if a delinquent subject refuses to stop its illegal actions and compensate for its 
negative consequences, and amicable means of settlement do not help; (3) strictly 
within the margins of the IEOs’ sanctional competence; (4) proportionally to the 
negative consequences of such a breach of law.
Compared to individual States which are more determined by their self-interests, 
IEOs as collective institutions, possess better opportunities for the use of
sanctions in a more well-balanced and legally motivated way. Notwithstanding the
Ifact that sanctions are used by IEOs in rare cases and not always prove to be 
effective, the threat of their use remains a serious factor preventing certain 
breaches of law from occurring.
The efficiency of law-implementing efforts within an IEO strongly depends on the 
compatibility and coordination between:
(a) the legal system of an IEO and the national legal systems of the Member States;
(b) the law of an IEO and the Member States’ agreements with other States (members 
and non-members) and international organizations;
(c) the legal systems of individual IEOs with a comparable or partly coinciding 
competence and common members.
3.3 The Concept of "Implied Powers"
In their every-day work some IEOs run into what is called the problem of
195"implied powers" . In this respect, the basic legal question is: what are the
195. To quote Skubiszewski, "In international organizations the doctrine of implied powers means 
that the organization is deemed to have certain powers which are additional to those expressly 
stipulated in the constituent instrument. These additional powers are necessary or essential for 
the fulfillment of the tasks or purposes of the organization, or for the performance of its
(Footnote continues on next page)
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conditions and limits for extended interpretation of the IEOs’ constituent 
instrum ents as regards their treaty-making, decision-making, interpretative, and 
sanctional powers, which goes beyond the formally expressed competence, but is 
necessary for a proper functioning of the organization.
On the one hand, it is undoubtedly preferable when the organization’s powers are 
explicitly formulated in the constituent instrum ents in order to avoid unnecessary 
complications in interpreting. On the other hand, a cautious and reasonable approach 
to the organization’s implied powers may be justified in the situations when the 
relevant provisions of the constituent instrum ents are either initially imperfect or 
have become out-of-date, and an adequate subsequent rule-making amending the 
constituent instrum ents, for some reason, appears to be impossible. The practice of 
IEOs has seen many examples of such implication in relation to the treaty-making, 
interpretative and sanctional competence (the latter with regard to the non­
members).
It might be also suggested tha t if any decision is taken by virtue of implied 
powers, no disagreeing Member State should be forced to follow it. Such approach 
seems to be logical in view of the ultimately consensual nature of any international 
legal rule, especially, if the rule lays down the additional obligations on the 
Member State in relation to which it did not have any opportunity to express its 
attitude before. This is also an argument to explain why implied powers can be
(Footnote continued from previous page)
functions, or for the exercise of the powers explicitly granted" (Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Implied 
Powers of International Organizations. - In: International Law at a Time of Perplexity. Essays in 
Honour of Shabtai Rosenne. Ed. Yoram Dinstein. Dordrecht, 1989, p. 856).
Schwarzeneberger suggested "the presumption in favour of granting to international institutions 
such implied powers as are indispensable to the fulfillment of their functions" (Georg 
Schwarzenberger. A Manual of International Law. Sixth edition, p. 194).
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hardly applicable to the sanctional competence of an IEO in relation to its members: 
the rights of a Member State may be curtailed only in the manner expressly laid down 
in the constituent documents. This is an important consideration of a potential 
member when it takes a decision on the adherence to the organization.
However, as many other issues of the IEOs’ activities, the problem of implied 
powers remains, first, an individual m atter oriented to the arising needs of a 
particular IEO, and only then, a general problem relating to all organizations. 
Hence, it is difficult to give any general recommendations on: (1) which organ may 
take a decision on implied powers; (2) what are the legal consequences of a protest 
made by a limited number of Member States with regard to the alleged abuse of right 
in the application of the "implied powers" concept. These questions can be answered 
only within the context of the purposes, functions and expressed powers of a 
particular IEO.
3.4. The Shift from Bilateralism to Multilateralism in IEL
Perhaps, the most easily visible contribution of IEOs to the present-day 
international law-making and law-implementation has been the shift from bilateralism 
to multilateralism in IEL. For centuries IEL has been evolving as a body of 
predominantly bilateral rules. The first fragmentary attempts of m ultilateral 
regulation in the economic field made in the 19th century and the first decades of 
the 20th century (e.g. the first international commodity agreements) did not 
basically change the character of IEL of that time, which remained prevailingly a 
set of numerous bilateral inter-State trade agreements. Only in the second half of 
the 20th century did IEL see a decisive shift from bilateralism to multilateralism, 
primarily connected with the intensive rise of IEOs. It should be borne in mind that 
in other branches of international law (e.g. the law of treaties, diplomatic law, 
hum anitarian law, ecological law) the trend towards multilateralism, also apparent
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during last decades, was not necessarily so tightly linked with international 
organizations as in IEL .
M ultilateral legal rules and IEOs may interrelate in many ways:
(1) normally, a constituent act of an IEO is a m ultilateral treaty;
(2) in the case of GATT, a m ultilateral economic agreement initially not intended to 
set up an IEO, in fact, gave an impetus to a new international institution;
(3) IEOs themselves participate in m ultilateral rule-making in the treaty, decision, 
and customary forms.
(4) IEOs supplement individual law-executing efforts of the Member States with 
collective m ultilateral measures.
In sum, multilateralism  reasonably combined with bilateralism brings such
obvious advantages as: (a) concentration of the Member States efforts, and (b)
avoidance of the unnecessary duplication in both law-making and law-implementation.
To quote Meinhard Hilf, "the evolutionary trend towards more effective international
institutions is irreversible. Bilateralism can be no substitute for effective
196m ultilateral rules and institutions"
4. Coordination of the Decentralized International Legal Process
The above analysis would be incomplete without answering a general question: 
does the shift from bilateralism to multilateralism, and increasing*
institutionalization of international economic life mean tha t international legal 
regulation is getting more centralized in this field? Two different approaches were 
taken in writings on international economic order:(l) the proposal of reshaping the 
existing economic order for a more centralized one by virtue of new worldwide
196. Meinhard Hilf. Op. cit., p. 321.
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IEOs ; (2) the search for alternative decentralized coordination and steering of
international economic activities through market competition and through private and
public national laws, that "are likely to remain of far greater importance than
public international economic law which, due to the necessary respect for national
economic sovereignty, will have to confine itself in many areas to general framework
198rules, procedures and institutions with decentralized decision-making"
Actually, international economic activities within the market economy conditions 
are likely to remain more decentralized than not, both (1) on the level of 
enterprises and individuals moved by their economic self-interests; and (2) on the 
level of more than 180 sovereign States with their individual economic demands. 
Moreover, the existing system of IEOs itself is neither centralized nor strongly 
cohesive. This cannot deny, of course, the fact that the process of intensifying 
institutionalization giving birth to dozens of IEOs makes international legal 
regulation in the economic area more coordinated in general, and even regionally 
more centralized in particular cases (e.g. the EEC).
It means that, as a general rule, the nature of international decision-making 
based on the consent of the parties has not been basically changed within IEOs. It 
remains decentralized, and any global international center taking legal decisions on 
economic issues in a legislative manner is unlikely to appear in a visible future. 
This does not challenge the fact that the decision-making within IEOs, compared to 
the decision-making among non-members, is more systematic, regulated and 
predictable.
The process of international law-implementation within IEOs also remains 
decentralized. The major burden of law-execution is carried by individual Member 
States which are obliged to fulfill their international obligations arising from the
197. See: J.Tinbergen. Reshaping International Order, Moscow, 1980.
198. E.U.Petersmann. Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic 
Law, p. 20-21.
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membership of IEOs in a proper and timely manner. In addition to this, IEOs co­
ordinate and facilitate the law-implementing efforts of the Member States by virtue 
of the wide spectrum of sophisticated implementing techniques.
In a properly organized world economic order the coordination of the intra-IEOs 
law-making and law-implementing efforts should be supplemented by appropriate inter- 
IEOs coordination (the exchange of information, examination of experience, 
combination of various legal techniques aprobated by the "family" organizations, 
establishment of the purpose-oriented joint institutional structures, coordination 
of m ultilateral convention-making programmes, coordination of the use of sanctions, 
etc.). So far, only the first steps have been made in this direction, which could be 
expected to give a new impetus to the process of institutionalization in the 
international economic field.
* * *
In short, the main trends induced by IEOs into international legal process in 
the economic area may be summarized as follows:
(1) a gradual shift from previously prevailing bilateralism to its combination 
with m ultilateralism  in IEL;
(2) an increasing co-ordination of predominantly decentralized rule-making and 
rule-implementation by virtue of institutional means;
(3) an interpolation of new forms, techniques, procedures and methods in law­
making and law-executing in IEL.
Obviously, there is a striking difference from one IEO to another as regards 
their impact on the economic environment and international legal practice. But on 
the whole, the existing IEOs, not being ideal institutional models, possess a 
sufficient arsenal of law-making and law-implementing instrum ents to make a 
considerable impact on the international legal regulation in the economic field. How
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this potential is realized depends on the economic and political climate in the 
world, on the wills and intentions of their Member States. Nowadays, at the time of 
decisive positive changes in international life, one feels more optimistic about the 
IEOs’ creative impact on the legal order in international economic relations.
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